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Abstract 
The study presented in this thesis investigates the causal relationship between Internet 
governance and economic output in Lebanon. It addresses the controversy surrounding 
concepts of multistakeholder Internet governance and the Lebanese government’s 
monopoly regime. It seeks to investigate and engage with issues that are of rising 
importance to the vitality of the Internet, which is becoming more central to economic 
and social development around the world. Specifically, it highlights the importance of 
multistakeholder participation in Internet governance and examines the implementation 
of such an approach in practice.  
The purpose of this study is twofold. On one hand, it attempts to answer a relatively 
straightforward question: does Internet governance spur Internet development and 
economic advancement? Intuitively, it seems clear that broadband Internet with good 
governance engenders economic growth. Here, the researcher presents the evidence 
generated by the literature regarding the debate over Internet governance and the impact 
of the Internet on the economy, examining some empirical studies and investigating case 
studies that illustrate how multistakeholderism is applied in practice at a national level.  
On the other hand, this study examines empirical evidence the researcher has gathered 
in Lebanon; this evidence addresses current Internet infrastructure and Lebanese 
stakeholders’ views on the process of multistakeholder Internet governance. Some 
researchers in this area have focused on a direct relationship between broad Internet and 
economic growth, however, no study has investigated the effect of Internet governance 
on economic performance. This study attempts to develop a model of multistakeholder 
Internet governance, (MIG-L), that helps explain the origin of Internet governance and 
points toward theories linking the structure of the proposed model to the performance 
of the Internet and the economy.  
The literature on governing the Internet suffers from insufficient attention to the 
governance dynamics and influences within countries and limited appreciation for the 
micro-level political and social roots of governance. By raising some yet unexplored 
issues in the debate, this thesis aims to contribute to efforts to better understand the 
dynamics of multistakeholderism at a national level and to leverage a more pragmatic 
	 iv	
model of multistakeholder Internet governance. The pragmatic epistemological 
approach offered in this mixed-methods research is consistent with interpretations of 
contemporary institutional scholars like Coase as well as those of liberal economists like 
Stigler, Posner and Peltzman.   
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Chapter One: Introduction 
The United Nations once dealt only with governments. By 
now we know that peace and prosperity cannot be 
achieved without partners involving governments, 
international organizations, the business community and 
civil society. In today’s world, we depend on each other. 
(Kofi Annan, 1999) 
 
 
1.1 Setting the Scene 
 The Internet is well integrated in everyday working, personal and family lives. The need 
for proper, well-formulated and widely acceptable governance is required (Pimenidis, 
2009). As of June 2018, more than half of the world’s population (4.2 billion) has gained 
access to the Internet (Internet Worlds Stat, 2018). The Internet’s potential for 
supporting social and economic development has been recognised, as has its potential 
for enhancing the free flow of information and ideas around the world. However, the 
Internet’s growing pervasiveness has also placed increasing strain on its governance 
systems (Spuy, 2017). 
In light of this growing importance of information communication technology and the 
Internet revolution, the International Telecommunications Union proposed the idea 
organising a World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) under the auspices of 
the United Nations. The World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), which was 
held in Geneva in 2003 and in Tunisia in 2005, has recognized information and 
communication Technology (ICT), with Internet as the main pillar, as transformational 
technologies and as important enablers for social and economic development (WSIS, 
2015a). The WSIS declared its challenge to harness the potential of information 
communication technology (ICT) to promote sustainable development, especially the 
United Nation Sustainable Development Goals (WSIS, 2015b). 
No doubt, Internet governance is one of the most pressing public policy issues of our 
time. Some estimates put the economic contribution of the Internet as high as 4.2 trillion 
US dollars (Dean et al., 2012), and the Internet of Things (IoT) could result in upwards 
of 11.1 trillion US dollars in economic growth and efficiency gains by 2025 (James et 
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al., 2015). The Internet is more than a platform for innovation and access to information; 
it acts also as a system of national wealth-generation. Yet across multiple levels, the 
Internet’s basic functionality is under strain. Pimenidis (2009) explains that 
governments, businesses and citizen groups have to stay vigilant in protecting 
themselves and the network to ensure that they continue enjoying the benefits of using 
the Internet for a long time to come. 
Recent development literature perceives the Internet as having a vast potential for 
inclusive growth and socio-economic development (Dalberg, 2013). As the “knowledge 
economy” continues to transform our society, broadband Internet access is an essential 
component of infrastructure for economic development (Shidler et al., 2007). According 
to Katz (2012), broadband Internet is a contributor to economic growth on several levels, 
and no one doubts today that computing in particular and ICT in general have 
significantly contributed to economic growth in the industrialized world.  
Unarguably, the literature agrees that Internet spurs countries’ economic development. 
However, good governance is also indispensable for such development. In this context, 
many scholars and researchers have confirmed the positive link of improved quality of 
governance and economic growth (Keefer, 1997; Campos and Nugent, 1999; Kaufmann 
et al. 1999a and 1999b; Mehanna et al., 2010; Han et al., 2014).  
Governments and businesses recognise and embrace the enormous opportunities the 
Internet can create in nurturing the development of a healthy Internet ecosystem, one 
that boosts infrastructure and access, builds a competitive environment that benefits the 
country’s economy. The economic rationale is clear: field studies have estimated that 
developing countries could benefit from Internet technologies to increase their GDP by 
1.5 to 3 percent by removing the barriers holding back Internet development (World 
Bank, 2009; McKinsey Global Institute, 2011a; Boston Consulting Group , 2014). 
According to a McKinsey Global Institute report published in 2011, the Internet 
accounted on average for 3.4 percent of GDP across the large economies that make up 
70 percent of global GDP, where the Internet’s total contribution to global GDP is bigger 
than the GDP of Spain or Canada. 
As the Internet economy has matured, developing countries, including Lebanon, started 
to face particular challenges hindering its development. While the countries of the 
digital frontier, Western Europe and the United States, demonstrate consistent Internet 
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development and digitisation, some Middle Eastern countries such as the United Arab 
Emirates, Qatar, and Bahrain have made great progress, while others such as Kuwait, 
Egypt, and Lebanon are lagging behind (Mckinsey Digital, 2016). 
 In essence, each country needs to identify which challenges affect its digital economy, 
and thereby develop relevant solutions. In Lebanon, ICT is still lagging behind due to 
several inefficiencies, including government monopoly, political motivation, hindered 
privatization, and inadequate competition. Additionally, the sector faces other 
challenges like a deficient regulatory framework, and it is exposed to substantial 
uncertainty due to destabilizing security issues (BankMed, 2014). Another major issue 
faced by the ICT sector in Lebanon is the lack of competitiveness due to the 
government’s tight control over the sector (BLOMINVEST, 2016).   
In this context, Dean (2016) explains that successful countries have taken a 
comprehensive multistakeholder approach to addressing the challenges that hinder their 
Internet development. Similarly, DeNardis and Raymond (2013) elucidate that efforts 
to study and practice Internet governance start from the premise that the Internet is 
governed by an innovative, unusual (perhaps unique) ‘multistakeholder’ model. 
Therefore, this thesis is an exercise in re-conceptualizing and re-framing the traditional 
multistakeholder Internet governance model to make it more explicit and applicable in 
Lebanon, linking it to the country’s Internet development and economic growth. 
This thesis questions the governance of the Internet. Without prior agreement on Internet 
governance upstream, there can be little agreement on Internet- and economic growth 
downstream. To make this argument, this research concentrates on definitional and 
conceptual issues and then presents empirical materials and case studies that are 
illustrative and exemplary. 
This research questions and challenges the current monopoly governance of the Internet 
in Lebanon and argues that a multistakeholder Internet governance can drive Internet 
development and the country’s economic growth. While Lebanon discusses Internet- 
and telecommunications goals for 2020 that should have been achieved in 2013, the loss 
estimated is between 5 and 7 billion USD of economic growth by 2020 (Maharat, 2016). 
It is important to note that this study uses the terms “Information Communication 
Technology” (ICT) and “Telecommunications” interchangeably as they 
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core of the Internet. However, the Internet comprises the central focus of this research 
due to its importance in connection to all types of technologies. The Internet in its broad 
meaning has had such a massive impact on almost all aspects of life as it connects 
humans and machines so that information can be distributed, shared and accessed 
effortlessly from anywhere. 
1.2 Background of the Study 
The literature on Internet governance exists due to the significance and importance of 
the technology, as well as its effect on all aspects of life. The reliance of individuals and 
governments on the Internet increases. Whilst many national economies in developed 
countries have been the greatest beneficiaries of this technological revolution, 
developing countries are still lagging behind. 
Until recently, Internet governance has generally been considered to be a prerogative of 
developed economies such as the United States and the European Union. However, the 
World Summit on Information Society (WSIS) meetings convened in Geneva in 
December 2003 and in Tunis in November 2005 were a turning point. Moreover, what 
makes this topic so engaging and controversial is that some countries are pushing to 
expand the influence of national governments while others are calling for a 
multistakeholder model of Internet governance. At the global stage, Russia, China, India 
and some of the Arab countries call for member states to take over Critical Internet 
Resources (CIRs). The United States of America and the European Union oppose this 
proposal, stressing that they believe that Internet governance must be multistakeholder-
driven and hence Internet policy should not be determined by member states but by 
citizens, communities, and broader society (DeNardis & Raymond, 2013). Yet, the issue 
of multistakeholder Internet governance is globally and nationally not settled and still a 
subject of active negotiation among the different stakeholders. 
From a micro-level perspective, the need to investigate the concept of multistakeholder 
Internet governance on a national level is more than an academic problem. Internet 
governance varies from one country to another, notably with respect to the roles of 
governmental and non-governmental stakeholders. In opposition to other stakeholders 
calling for a bottom-up, open and inclusive governance model, some governments are 
requesting and pushing for more state-controlled Internet governance. In some 
countries, management of the Internet is in the hands of governments and regulators, 
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whilst other countries allow for private and non-profit sector involvement. In Lebanon, 
as in many other developing countries, Internet infrastructure, policy and regulations are 
solely under government jurisdiction.  
Academically, the controversy surrounding Internet governance starts with the 
definition of “the Internet.” The way the Internet is defined reflects different 
perspectives, approaches, and policy interests (Kurbalija, 2014). To Hofmann et al. 
(2017),  the general concept of governance in Internet governance is still disputed, and 
the shortcomings of the founding days of Internet governance research are still 
noticeable today, as Van Eeten and Mueller’s (2013) recent criticisms attest. 
Newly-emerging and under-developed economies have started seeing the potential of 
the Internet from the perspective of economic development, and they have wanted to 
catch up to the developed countries by endorsing the advantages of multistakeholderism. 
An examination of cases of multistakeholder governance reasonably begins with 
governance of the Internet because of the rising importance of Internet coordination and 
oversight to economic, political and social life (Raymond & DeNardis, 2015).  
 
1.3 Research Problem 
As the Internet has become increasingly central to societies and economies, 
governments and other stakeholders have started jostling for greater involvement in the 
challenges of Internet governance. 
The notion of multistakeholder participation in Internet governance is therefore not only 
in need of a realistic assessment, but it must also adapt to meet new challenges as the 
Internet becomes more central to knowledge societies. Failure to address some of these 
challenges could have negative consequences for the future of the Internet and its ability 
to support sustainable development (Spuy, 2017). 
To better understand Internet governance, more or less interdependent processes and 
practices need to be resolved. The question is how governance should be defined under 
the conditions of distributed collective action, overlapping authorities, and competing 
rationalities and goals (Hofmann et al., 2017). 
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Some hints towards an answer can be found in Brousseau et al.’s (2012) notion of 
‘heterarchical governance’ or a ‘networked heterarchy’ (p. 16), which is characterized 
by the absence of a hierarchy and a unified legitimate order. Starting from the 
observation that fragmentation and a lack of central control do not imply anarchy or the 
absence of rules, Brousseau et al. (2012) suggest looking at Internet governance as 
multiple orders, which create a need for internal coordination. The networked heterarchy 
consists of public and private organisations, which interconnect through various forms 
of mutual recognition and mutual legitimation.  
In the contemporary world, we have to accept that there is a shift in the social and 
economic dynamics of governments. However, there are many flaws in this pluralist and 
liberalist approach. Some governments, for instance, increasingly insist on “cyber 
sovereignty” over other stakeholder groups whilst ostensibly supporting 
multistakeholder approaches (Limbago, 2017). This thesis recognises the principle of 
national sovereignty, yet the challenge of defining the limits thereof adds further 
complexity to the issue of Internet governance. Internet governance is in this tangled 
terrain. 
 
1.4 Research Aim and objectives 
Given the context of the study and the overview of the research problem, there seems to 
be an imminent need and opportunity to better understand multistakeholder Internet 
governance at national level. This will help the government and policy-makers in 
Lebanon understand how to shape their policies and governance institutions to ensure 
the most appropriate and efficient use of Internet resources. This would also enable other 
stakeholders to understand how the Internet is actually governed and encourage them to 
collaborate with government.  
By raising some yet unexplored issues in the debate, this thesis aims to contribute to 
efforts to better understand the dynamics of multistakeholderism at national level and to 
leverage more inclusive and transparent models of Internet governance. Specifically, 
this study seeks to develop a conceptual model for comprehensive multistakeholder 
Internet governance in Lebanon and to link it to Internet development and the country’s 
economic growth based on relevant theories and literature. 
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To this extent, the study investigates the current governance structure of the Internet in 
Lebanon and argues that, whilst a more suitable governance model is set to drive the 
development of the Internet, the reality of the actual monopoly regime is hindering 
Internet development and the country’s economic growth. Accordingly, the objectives 
of this study are as follows: 
•  To explore the history of the debate over multistakeholderism and 
Internet governance and the impact of the Internet and its governance on 
economic growth, thus contributing to the actual literature; 
• To carry out an empirical investigation on the current Internet 
governance model in Lebanon, explore its impact on Internet 
infrastructure and services, and survey the Lebanese Internet 
stakeholders' perceptions and thoughts on multistakeholderism and 
Internet governance; 
• To develop a conceptual multistakeholder Internet governance model 
for Lebanon and empirically associate its structure to Internet 
development and economic growth. 
 
1.5 Theoretical Background 
The theoretical backdrop of this research is eclectic in nature as Internet governance is 
a complex topic underpinning multiple disciplines. In order to better understand the 
complexity of the issue, this section intends to convey a broader understanding of 
different theories that are relevant to this contemporary debate. It uses a pragmatic 
approach in examining and analysing the empirics to explain multistakeholderism and 
Internet governance. 
The research posits that the role of actors is not well known and cannot be easily defined. 
Wilson (2005) argues that the micro-level motives, social origins, choices and 
behaviours of those who design Internet governance are too often left implicit and 
under-theorized. Thus, this research seeks to compliment Wilson’s argument by 
investigating and examining the actual governance regime and propose a new 
multistakeholder structure for Internet governance. This structure will help develop a 
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multistakeholder conceptual framework, trace the social origins of governance, and 
point toward theories linking the structure to a new regime of Internet governance.  
Although regime theory is usually considered a part of political science and international 
relations theory, it has strong roots in institutional theory. As defined by regime theory, 
which falls within the neo-liberal institutionalist camp, regimes are sets of implicit or 
explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations (Krasner, 1983). From 
this perspective, the institutional theory focuses more on informal norms and values 
within agencies and political-administrative systems (Selznick, 1957), which guide and 
restrain the collective activities of a group (Keohane & Nye, 2000).  
It is agreed that multistakeholder models continue to contrast sharply with the model of 
governmental organisations, which reserve decision-making power exclusively to states 
(Cammaerts & Padovani, 2006; Hintz, 2007; de La Chapelle, 2008). Supporters of 
multistakeholderism argue that it offers a framework for re-conceptualising the 
relationship between different actors. However, multistakeholderism raises serious 
issues of legitimacy, representativeness and accountability (Bendiek & Wagner, 2012). 
Within the wider context, the research aims to question and challenge the current 
governance structure and argues that, while Internet governance through 
multistakeholderism could sustain a stable Internet for economic development, the 
reality is that regressive state regimes regulating and governing the Internet have 
obstructive effects on the Internet economy. The effort of the research to demonstrate 
that Internet governance provides a significant challenge for state-centric theories of 
governance and an opportunity for a multistakeholder regime will lead to an 
examination of the stakeholder theory (Freeman R. , 2010). 
1.6 Proposed Conceptual Model 
Building upon the reviewed literature and the theoretical backdrop of this study, this 
thesis suggests reframing the model of multistakeholder Internet governance in 
countries where government opposition to this model makes the implementation of 
multistakeholder participation difficult and even impossible. Accordingly, this research 
proposes a new conceptual model, Multistakeholder Internet Governance Lebanon 
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“MIG-L”, taking into consideration the government’s reservations and stakeholders’ 
expectations. 
 
Figure 3.1: MIG-L conceptual Model 
The proposed model “MIG-L” is a useful heuristic that directs scholarly attention to the 
social interactions between stakeholders that negotiate governance outcomes. 
Conceptually, “MIG-L”’ refers to persistent networked interactions of individuals 
across five defined stakeholder groups - government, the private sector, academia, civil 
society and the technical community - linking its structure to Internet development and 
economic growth. “MIG-L” will be presented and discussed in chapter 3. 
1.7 Research Methods and Analyses 
A pragmatic epistemological approach is used for this mixed-methods research 
(qualitative and quantitative), the methodological lens of which employs a concurrent 
data collection. The quantitative data will be collected using an online survey, while the 
qualitative data will be gathered using semi-structured interviews. Hence, being 
pragmatic, the researcher has the flexibility to choose the approach and research design 
that best meet the research aim and objectives. Tashakkori and Teddlie (2010), Morgan 
(2007) and Patton (1990) convey the pragmatic importance of focusing attention on the 
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research problem in social science research and then using pluralistic approaches to 
derive knowledge about the problem. 
Although many designs exist in the mixed-methods field, a convergent parallel-mixed 
method will be used in this research insofar as it collects diverse types of data to provide 
a more complete understanding of multistakeholder Internet governance and its impact 
on a country’s economic growth. This is a form of mixed-method design in which the 
researcher converges and/or merges quantitative and qualitative data to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of the research problem (Creswell, 2013). To back up the initial 
quantitative survey, the study includes a survey in order to reach a large population and 
to follow up with purposeful interviews with decision makers to obtain their specific 
views about Internet governance.  
To strengthen the study’s findings, qualitative-method research with a purposive 
sampling technique will be used on the assumption that doing interviews provides a 
more complete understanding of the topic of contested Internet governance than 
collection of quantitative data alone. Purposive sampling leads to greater depth of 
information from a smaller number of carefully-selected cases, whereas probability 
sampling leads to greater breadth of information from a larger number of units selected 
to be representative of the population (Patton, 2002). 
Using a questionnaire in the survey is appropriate, since we are aiming to reach a large, 
dispersed Internet community and gather data from a larger sample. The broad 
participation categories in the study's online survey are those defined by the Working 
Group on Internet Governance (WGIG), including government, the private sector, 
academia, civil society, the technical community and international organisations 
(WGIG, 2005). On the other hand, interviews targeted decision-makers from the above-
identified stakeholders’ groups to get in-depth information and verify the statistical 
results. 
In this design, both forms of data were collected at the same time, although the 
quantitative and qualitative data collection are presented separately in chapters 6 and 7, 
respectively. The analysis and interpretation combine the two forms of data to seek 
convergence or similarities among the results. Maxwell (1997) defined purposive 
sampling as a type of sampling in which ‘‘particular settings, persons, or events are 
deliberately selected for the important information they can provide that cannot be 
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gotten as well from other choices’’ (p. 87). Here, the researcher uses a side-by-side 
comparison approach. This comparison will be seen in the discussion presented in 
chapter 7, where the researcher will report the quantitative statistical results and 
qualitative findings that either confirm or disconfirm the statistical results. 
Finally, this research will also draw on and bring together information from a range of 
sources, principally from statistics, documents and reports published by reputed 
governmental, national and international organisations. Sometimes, the researcher 
intentionally uses some other form of data in a supportive role (Rogers, et al., 2003) 
1.8 Expected Contributions 
As the Internet grows exponentially, so do the complexities of Internet governance and 
its architecture. Internet governance has not been a static process, and the opportunities 
and challenges it creates demand the attention of interdisciplinary research and 
collaboration. Moreover, the present research serves as an investigation of the impact of 
Internet governance on Internet development and economic growth from the perspective 
of national development.  
The research expects to contribute in a number of ways to the body of knowledge of the 
field. It contributes to the knowledge base of national Internet governance, particularly 
with regards to the social origin and interaction of different stakeholders. Also, this 
research contributes to the literature on Internet governance and multistakeholderism by 
integrating data from a developing country into empirical generalisations of the findings 
where economic implication is also significant contributions in such a context. 
Therefore, this research aims at making a secondary contribution to this growing 
literature by investigating the lacunae of research on national Internet governance, 
studying its implication on Internet development and national economic growth and 
identifying areas for further research. 
From a theoretical perspective, this research uses a comprehensive approach to gain a 
better understanding of multistakeholder Internet governance, and the conceptual model 
is validated by the qualitative and quantitative findings. Therefore, the research 
contributes to an understanding of the nature of generalisability of the theories by 
extending their tenets into the Internet governance at a national level. 
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1.9 Thesis Outline 
This thesis adopted the doctoral thesis structure suggested by (Perry, 1998). The thesis 
proceeds by exploring the international views and debate on Internet governance that 
pave the way to the national level, which is the focus of this research. After identification 
of the problem, the research proposes a conceptual model supported by the literature 
and a theoretical framework to be validated empirically. The outline and the 
organisational patterns of the 8 chapters are as follows:  
Chapter 1 – Introduction: This chapter sets the scene, offering an introduction to the 
issue of Internet governance and Internet’s impact on the economy. It also specifies the 
objectives, context, theoretical backdrop, conceptual framework, methodology and 
contributions of the research as well as an outline of the thesis. 
Chapter 2 – Literature Review: This literature review examines the theoretical 
approaches and empirical research that have sought to explain drivers and barriers for 
Internet governance and its impact on economic growth. This chapter includes a 
consideration of the literature on the contemporary topic of Internet governance and 
multistakeholderism; it provides an overview of the topic and of its current 
understanding by the different stakeholders and two case studies from Kenya and Brazil. 
It also conveys an understanding of different theories that are relevant to the 
contemporary debate over Internet governance. Additionally, this chapter gives an 
overview of the political and economic environment of Lebanon and provides a brief 
overview of current Internet infrastructure and governance. It also examines the impact 
of the Internet on the economy by reviewing different studies on the topic, linking 
empirically the development and the good governance of the Internet to the country’s 
GDP. 
Chapter 3 - Conceptual Framework: This chapter reframes the traditional model of 
multistakeholder Internet governance by proposing a new conceptual model mapping 
the social interactions among stakeholders and linking it to the Internet and economic 
performance.  
Chapter 4 – Methodology and Research Design: This chapter describes the methodology 
and framework used for this mixed-methods research (qualitative and quantitative 
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approaches). It explains the methods of investigation and the target population, and it 
justifies the mixed-methods approach for this research.  
Chapter 5 - Quantitative Data Analysis: This chapter presents the data analysis of the 
quantitative strand to answer the research questions. This chapter covers the data 
collection, data analysis procedures and the descriptive statistics. 
Chapter 6 - Qualitative Data Analysis:	This chapter explores the qualitative findings 
through thematic analysis focusing on common evidence from the in-depth interviews 
in context, supported by informants’ quotes.  
Chapter 7 – Findings, Discussion and Conclusions: This chapter synthesises the overall 
findings, bringing the findings of chapters 5 and 6 together into a coherent discussion 
and conclusion This chapter discusses the in-depth findings reinforced by key 
informants’ quotations on the topic in question, validating the proposed conceptual 
model and some theoretical arguments while contradicting others. This Chapter also 
presents a summary and conclusion of the study as well its outcomes. It concludes with 
research impacts, strengths and limitations of the study and suggestions for future 
research.   
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Chapter 2: Literature Review  
2.1 Introduction 
This literature review examines the theoretical approaches and empirical research that 
seek to explain drivers and barriers for Internet governance and its impact on economic 
growth. 
The review will first examine the political and economic environment of Lebanon that 
directly affects Internet governance. It provides a brief overview of the current 
monopoly governance, regulatory frame and status of infrastructure. It also examines 
some ICT indicators to understand the obstacles hindering Internet development; it is 
not about indices and rankings; it is rather about the assessment of the situation. 
Second, the chapter will review literature on the contemporary topic of Internet 
governance and multistakeholderism, providing an overview of the topic and its current 
understanding. Specifically, this chapter explores the controversial concepts 
‘multistakeholder’ and ‘governance’, which have been developed in the World Summit 
on the Information Society (WSIS) held in 2003 and 2005. These concepts continue to 
make the debate engaging and controversial, politically and academically, on a national 
and global level. According to Kurbalija (2014), the controversy surrounding Internet 
governance starts with its definition: the way the Internet is defined reflects different 
perspectives, approaches, and policy interests.  
Third, in order to analyse the impact of Internet governance on the economy, this chapter 
will look at different empirical studies on the economic impact of Internet governance 
and examine empirical research and studies linking the development of Internet and 
good governance to economic growth. It will also examine two case studies from Brazil 
and Kenya as examples of multistakeholder participation in Internet governance at a 
national level. 
The final section of the literature review aims at conveying an understanding of different 
theories that are relevant to the contemporary debate over Internet governance. The 
extant literature is designed to explore the theoretical foundation that underpins Internet-
governance studies and that is used in this study. The effort of the research to 
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demonstrate that Internet governance provides a significant challenge for state-centric 
theories of governance and an opportunity for a multistakeholder regime will lead to a 
study of the stakeholder theory (Freeman R. , 2010). 
 
2.2 Understanding the Lebanese Telecommunication and Internet Market 
The ministry of telecommunications (MoT) has a monopoly over fixed and mobile 
networks, in addition to voice and Internet international gateways. The current law that 
governs the Internet is the old telecom law issued in 1959. Several political, regulatory, 
technical and administrative problems are hindering the development of the Internet in 
Lebanon, mainly the non-implementation of the new telecom law 431, ratified in 2002, 
and the takeover of responsibility for the Telecommunication Regulatory Authority 
(TRA) by the ministry of telecommunication. 
Despite the progress made in the last two years in increasing international bandwidth 
and initiating the deployment of Fibre optic networks to provide fast and reliable 
Internet, the Internet speed is still far to congregate the global average. Additionally, 
illegal Internet services have resulted in the disruption of legal ones and deprived the 
economy of an essential financial resource.  
2.2.1 Political Overview 
The Lebanese Republic (Lebanon) is situated between (Palestine and Israel) in the south, 
Syria in the northeast and the Mediterranean Sea in the west. The country gained its 
independence in 1943 after 23 years of French mandate (since 1920) beginning after 
World War I. In 2016 it reached a population of 6 million, spread over a relatively small 
area of 10,452 square kilometres (4,036 miles) (World Bank, 2009) (World Bank, 2017). 
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Figure 2.0: Lebanon map and national flag 
The country suffered a civil war between 1975 and 1991; the political and ethnic 
antagonists signed a national reconciliation agreement in 1989. Since then, the 128 
Lebanese representatives (deputies) in parliament have been selected in a flawed 
democratic process privileging political and religious considerations in elections. 
Similarly, the cabinet of ministers is formed on religious, political and ideological 
considerations. Lebanon is the only country in the Middle East with a population 
consisting of Christians and Muslims, distributed evenly, comprising 18 
ethnicities/sects. Thus, the framework of Lebanese society is one of the most 
complicated and divided in the world. Since the civil war, Lebanon has been and is still 
entrapped in conflicts involving its country’s neighbours, Israel and Syria. The country 
has hosted around 600,000 Palestinian refugees in special camps around the country. To 
exacerbate and further complicate the situation, Lebanon has also seen several large 
influxes of Syrian refugees in recent years: The United Nations has confirmed that over 
1.5 million Syrians who escaped the civil war in Syria are sheltered in Lebanon. Deep 
division between political leaders has rendered the presidency vacant many times over 
the years. In October 2016, after a two-year vacancy in the office of the president, the 
political impasse ended with the election of President Michel Aoun and the formation 
of a government of national unity headed by Saad Hariri. 
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2.2.2 Economic Outlook 
Lebanon’s economy recovered from 16 years of destructive civil war that ended in 1991. 
Economic growth in the country remains subdued. Following a sharp drop in 2011, 
growth edged upward briefly to 2–3 percent but has now slowed once again. The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated that Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
increased by 1 percent in 2015, and it projected a similar growth rate in 2016 with a 
public debt-to-GDP ratio of 138 percent in 2015, which recorded a GDP of USD 50.9 
billion (IMF, 2017). 
The ICT sector is considered the fastest-growing sector of the economy and holds a lot 
of potential for development. It contributed USD1.3 billion in 2013 and is estimated to 
reach USD1.6 billion in 2016, hence contributing more than 3 percent of gross domestic 
product (GDP) (BLOMINVEST, 2016). The increasing demand for Internet access 
seems to be transforming the Internet market’s dynamics in Lebanon. According to the 
Ministry of Telecommunications (MoT), the number of broadband Internet subscribers 
doubled from 480,000 to 1.24 million between 2013 and 2015. Similarly, mobile 
Internet users hit 2.92 million in 2016 as compared to 2.02 million in 2015. 
The IMF team visited Lebanon in November 2016 and suggested in its 2017 report that 
Lebanese authorities need to promote sustainable growth by implementing new policies 
and regulations and addressing the economy’s most pressing bottlenecks, starting with 
electricity and Internet. According to the IMF report, for Lebanon to realise the full 
potential of its human capital, various stakeholders need to work together to create a 
conducive institutional and business climate, starting from strengthening infrastructure; 
frequent electricity outages and slow internet are a major hindrance for firms (IMF, 
2017). Similarly, the latest world bank update on the Lebanese economy indicated that 
the protracted Syrian crisis and the slow pace of structural reforms are critical 
impediments to achieving potential growth. Significant macro-financial risks remain 
(World Bank, 2017). 
2.2.3 Telecom Market Overview 
The telecommunication and Internet sectors have been subject to decay for many years, 
dragging Lebanon back from its leading position in the region to one of the least 
developed markets. There is no ICT ministry or any other institution in charge of the 
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Internet in Lebanon, while the telecommunications infrastructure constitutes the 
backbone of the Internet.  
The Ministry of Telecommunications (MoT) has a monopoly over fixed and mobile 
networks, in addition to voice and Internet international gateways. OGERO (Organisme 
de Gestion et d'Exploitation de Radio Orient), which was established in 1972 and is 
owned 100% by the government, is in charge of the operations and maintenance of the 
fixed telecom network in the country. As for the mobile market, the two state-owned 
mobile networks have been operated under management contracts since 2004. 
Accordingly, the current laws and regulations applied to the Internet and ICT sector are 
those correlated directly to both the old telecom law issued in 1959 and to the new 
partially implemented telecom law 431 ratified in 2002. 
In 2000, after the period of civil war and, later, reconstruction, Lebanon decided to 
liberalise its telecommunications market by privatising state-owned 
telecommunications entities and opening up the market to private sector investment and 
competition. Under this context, a new law was ratified in 2002, Telecom law 413, to 
address these ambitious goals. Internet reform was a major part of the overall reform 
agenda, a move which has been put on hold under successive governments due to 
political conflicts. For several years, even the telecom and Internet sector faced hardship 
due to the political rhetoric between some telecom ministers and OGERO management 
coming from two different political camps. The disputes reached a point where OGERO 
refused to comply to the ministers’ directives. 
In 2016, the increasing demand for Internet access and the negligence and carelessness 
of the public operator OGERO to respond these demands, opened the door for a grey 
market, where the authorities discovered four unlicensed Internet Service Providers 
(ISPs) supplying illegal Internet services from Cyprus and Israel at reduced prices. 
According to the Lebanese Minister of Finance, this caused a loss of USD200 million 
for the country’s treasury.  
2.2.4 Regulatory Framework 
As mentioned earlier, the current laws that govern the Internet and telecommunication 
sector are the old telecom law ratified in 1959 and the new partially implemented 
telecom law 431 ratified in 2002.  
	 19	
The Ministry of Telecommunications (MoT) still applies legislative decrees 126 and 
127 issued on 12 June 1959 to manage and administer the telecom and Internet sector 
in Lebanon. The two decrees state that the Lebanese government, represented by the 
ministry of telecom, holds the exclusive right to offer both telecom services, including 
internet. The decrees also define licensing to use local and international telecom and 
Internet services, as well as the prices of these services. These were amended as needed 
to ensure business continuity. 
As for the new telecom law 431, its main objective was to reform the sector by creating 
separate entities for regulation and operation, respectively. The new law was to establish 
the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA) as an independent regulatory 
agency; however, appointments to its board were to be approved by the government. 
The TRA’s defined role is to a liberalise, privatise, regulate and develop the sector by 
promoting competition and protecting the rights of users. After five years, the board was 
inaugurated by government decree on 21 February 2007. In June 2011, the ministry of 
telecommunications confiscated the powers of the TRA, making itself the sole body 
authorised to set new rules and guidelines for the sector. The TRA became void and the 
government did not appoint any new board members. From the operation side, law 431 
was to create a joint public-private operator, LIBAN TELECOM, to operate, maintain 
and develop the networks. Unsurprisingly, due to political and religious conflicts, the 
board of “Liban Telecom” was never appointed.  
Licensed Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and Data Service Providers (DSPs) offer 
internet access and are also allowed to operate certain wireless access infrastructure. 
The public operator OGERO is licensed as both a DSP and an ISP, and currently holds 
the biggest market share and a monopoly on the Internet International gateways. 
Remarkably, the country has more ISPs than it needs: 43 licenced ISPs and 10 DSPs 
operate under interim licenses, renewable on an annual basis. However, not all licensed 
ISPs and DSPs are operational; the concerned players have claimed that OGERO didn’t 
provide them with the needed connectivity to its network. 
It is worth noting that to this day, there are no laws or legislation protecting consumers; 
there are only some exceptional, government-issued directives related to the quality of 
the service and pricing. 
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2.2.5 Infrastructure 
The current infrastructure still relies on old copper cable, and the Internet provided today 
is the best possible given the current infrastructure. Today there is a plan to install Fiber 
optic technology in homes across the country. This plan was announced by the telecom 
minister in July of 2015 as part of the ‘telecom 2020 vision’. At the time of writing, the 
debate, involving all parties, on how to use the USD 100 million budget approved by 
the council of ministers to deploy the Fiber network is at a standstill. 
Nevertheless, in an effort to involve the private sector, the ministry of 
telecommunication, OGERO, ISPs and DSPs signed a memorandum of understanding 
(MoU) in January 2006, to deploy Internet broadband technology to bring DSL 
technology to Lebanon, with a gentlemen’s agreement that OGERO would not abuse a 
dominant market position. OGERO commercially launched the DSL services in May 
2007 and started providing broadband Internet services. However, the high Internet 
speed did not reach many distant areas due to the limitation of the existing network and 
failure to upgrade and install new equipment. Furthermore, OGERO has exclusivity in 
the provisioning of international Internet bandwidth to Lebanon, where it holds a market 
share of 65% as Internet service provider (ISP). 
Despite the progress made in the last two years in increasing international bandwidth 
and initiating the deployment of Fibre optic network to provide fast and reliable Internet, 
Internet speed is still far to congregate the global average. According to Ookla index 
2017, Lebanon ranked 126th out of 200 countries in terms of Internet download speed,  
with an average speed of 4.94 Mbps (Megabits per second) compared to the global 
average of 40.71 Mbps (Ookla, 2017).  
2.2.6 Benchmarking 
Several international organisations have published reports and studies deploying 
different methodologies to measure and compare ICT/Internet development and its 
impact on national economies. In order to shed more light on the current infrastructure 
status in Lebanon, this thesis reviews two recent studies published by the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the World Bank:  
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1. The ICT Development Index (IDI): prepared by the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU), the technology arm of United Nations (UN), 
measuring ICT infrastructure and use. 
2. The Network Readiness Index (NRI): prepared by the World Bank, measuring 
the impact of ICT development economically and socially. 
ICT Development Index 
The ICT Development Index (IDI), which was published by the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) in 2016, is a composite index that combines 11 
indicators into one benchmark measure comparing developments in ICT between 
countries and over time. The IDI aggregates quantitative indicators for Access, Use and 
Skills in the large majority of world economies, including Lebanon. According to the 
report, the ICT development process, and a country’s transformation into an information 
society, can be conceived as following three stages as illustrated in Figure 2.1: 
 
Figure 2.1: The 3 stages in the evolution towards an information Society 
§ Network infrastructure and Access (ICT readiness): This sub-index captures 
ICT readiness and includes five infrastructure and access indicators: fixed-
telephone subscriptions, mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions, international 
Internet bandwidth per Internet user, households with a computer, and 
households with Internet access. 
 
§ Use (ICT intensity): This sub-index captures ICT intensity and includes three 
intensity and usage indicators: individuals using the Internet, fixed-broadband 
subscriptions, and mobile-broadband subscriptions. 
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§ Skills (ICT Skills): This sub-index seeks to capture capabilities or skills which 
are important for ICTs. It includes three proxy indicators: mean years of 
schooling, gross secondary enrolment, and gross tertiary enrolment. As these 
are proxy indicators, rather than direct measures of ICT-related skills, the skills 
sub-index is given less weight in the computation of the IDI than the other two 
sub-indices. 
 
The IDI results ranked Lebanon 7th in the region and 66th globally (See Table 2.1). 
 
Table 2.1: Lebanon scored 66th in the ICT Development Index (IDI) 
Exploring and analysing the IDI report, the result of the assessment for Lebanon can be 
summarised as follows:   
The IDI report indicated that Lebanon was among the dynamic economies worldwide 
in terms of IDI values and rankings in the period between 2010 and 2015. Between 2015 
and 2016, however, while all countries in the region saw some improvement, Lebanon, 
with 5.93 points (within a possible range from 0 to 10), dropped five places to 7th among 
the Arab countries and to 66th globally. 
More precisely, the report showed that Lebanon ranked 66th with 6.57 points according 
to the IDI access sub-index and 53rd with 5.51 points according to the IDI use sub-
index. In the IDI skills sub-index, Lebanon ranked 110th with 5.46 points (IDI, 2016). 
These figures showed that Lebanon performs less well in the use sub-index than in the 
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access sub-index. The imbalance suggests that strong demand for services is not 
currently matched by adequate high-quality infrastructure and that policy intervention 
to stimulate the supply side of the market may be required. 
Another key finding of the IDI report is that the high cost of ICT services remains one 
of the main barriers to ICT uptake in Lebanon. Thus, monitoring prices is critical for 
developing policies that aim to make ICT services affordable for all citizens. According 
to the IDI report, a number of developing countries offer low prices (less than USD 10 
per month) for monthly subscription, entry-level fixed broadband Internet. The IDI 
figures, however, showed that Lebanon ranked 73rd globally, with an average monthly 
cost of USD 17.51. As for the mobile broadband services, Lebanon ranked 83rd, with 
monthly fees of USD 11 as compared to USD 5 in other Arab countries (ITU, 2016). 
Network Readiness Index 
 
The second study to be examined is the Network Readiness Index 2016 (NRI-2016), 
initiated by the World Economic Forum (WEF) in 2001 to assess countries’ ability to 
capitalise on the digital revolution and their preparedness. The study invites 
policymakers, business leaders, civil society leaders, academics, and the public at large 
to consult the performance of their countries in the Global Competitiveness Index and, 
together, identify the main challenges and barriers to growth facing their economies. 
Covering 139 economies, the Global Competitiveness Index (NRI-2016) measures 
national competitiveness, which is determined through examination of the set of 
institutions, policies and factors that determine the level of productivity. Examining the 
NRI-2016 study, it rests on whether a country possesses drivers that are necessary for 
digital technologies to unleash their potential, and on whether these technologies are 
actually impacting the economy and society (WEF, 2017). The drivers are grouped 
within four sub-indices as shown in Figure 2.2:  
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Figure 2.2: The 3 stages in the evolution towards an information Society 
§ Environment: Political and regulatory environment (9 indicators) and the 
environment of business and innovation (9 indicators) 
§ Readiness: Infrastructure (4 indicators), Affordability (3 indicators) and Skills 
(4 indicators) 
§ Usage: Individual usage (7 indicators), Business usage (6 indicators) and 
Government usage (3 indicators) 
§ Impact: Economic impacts (4 indicators) and Social impacts (4 indicators) 
(WEF, 2016). 
The study reported that Lebanon still ranks 88th globally. Table 2.2 shows Lebanon’s 
rank in the Networked Readiness Index. 
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Table 2.2: Networked Readiness Index for 2016 
 
Under the “usage” sub-index, the study shows that Lebanon is doing best in individual 
usage (46th place), scoring 5 points (out of 7); followed by business usage (97th place), 
scoring 4 points; and finally government usage (124th place) with 3 points. (WEF, 2016). 
Additionally, the impact sub-index shows that the Economic and Social impact of ICT 
has been slight in Lebanon, which ranked 83rd and 114th, with 3.1 and 3.3 (out of 7) 
points in these measures, respectively. This suggests that there is work to be done on 
infrastructure and the network in order to improve access for Lebanese citizens. In the 
criteria of “regulatory environment,” which falls under the “environment” sub-index, 
Lebanon ranked in the bottom half of the list, holding 126th place with a score of  3 
points (out of 7). Here, rational reforms are needed to improve the regulatory 
environment. In the radar chart 2.1 (Figure 2.3), the blue line shows Lebanon’s 
econoomic score in the 10 pillars that make up the 4 sub-indices. 
 
 
 
 
	 26	
 
 
Figure 2.3: Radar chart of Lebanon’s economic performance 
One of the key findings of the NDI-2016 is that digital technologies are unleashing new 
economic and social dynamics that will need to be managed differently to deliver long-
term and broad-based gains. The finding stressed that a resilient digital economy calls 
for new types of leadership, governance, and behaviours. A critical ingredient for the 
success and sustainability of the emerging system will be agile governance frameworks 
that allow societies to anticipate and shape the impact of emerging technologies and 
react quickly to changing circumstances (WEF, 2016). 
2.2.7 Missed Opportunities 
As the debate continues on the illegal Internet services and the misappropriation of 
public funds to deploy the national Fibre optic network, Lebanon continues to miss 
opportunities to develop its Internet infrastructure. According to BLOM Investment 
Bank (2016), the ICT contributed USD 1.3 billion in 2013 and USD1.6 billion to the 
country’s GDP in 2016, hence accounting for more than 3 percent of Lebanon’s GDP. 
 In 2009, at the request of the Lebanese Finance Ministry, the World bank published a 
study investigating the impact of Internet broadband on the country’s economy. In this 
study, the World Bank used an econometric model projecting that there is a direct 
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correlation between Internet broadband and GDP. The study indicated that, in 2008, a 
10 percent increase in Internet broadband penetration would result in a 1.2 to 1.5 percent 
increase in GDP in Lebanon, equivalent to USD 348 to USD 435 million per year, in 
addition to an annual fiscal contribution of USD 78 to USD 98 million per year resulting 
from additional growth on a recurring basis. This indicated that the Lebanese treasury 
could receive, on average, an extra USD 500 million per year if the government 
considered the World Bank study (Table 2.3). 
 1.2 % increase in GDP 1.5% increase in GDP 
Contribution to GDP USD 348 m USD 435 m 
Fiscal contribution USD 78 m USD 98 m 
Total Contribution USD 426 m USD 533 m 
 
Table 2.3: Impact on Lebanon’s GDP for each additional 10% increase in Internet 
 
The economists who developed the model implicitly provide some notion of the costs 
of not investing in Internet broadband. The benchmarking and best practice examined 
by this study showed that Lebanon is lagging behind its neighbours in delivery of 
broadband Internet networks and services, and that, as a result, Lebanon’s local 
telecommunications market is not growing as fast as others. Moreover, the study showed 
that Lebanon is paying certain opportunity costs for not providing higher capacity and 
more competitively priced broadband Internet services (World Bank, 2009). 
Remarkably, the study predicted the current gloomy situation of the Internet, stating 
that, “if regional competitors do invest in broadband while Lebanon does not, then 
Lebanon will miss out on the associated accelerated growth rates. As the benefits of the 
general-purpose technology unfold in regional competitors it is conceivable that the 
existing long-term growth rate of Lebanon may be threatened, heralding the possibility 
of economic stagnation or even decline” (p. 42). 
2.3 Multistakeholder Internet Governance 
The setting offered here is to trace comprehensively the history of the World Summit 
on Information society (WSIS) and the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) as the 
multistakeholder venues for the origin of and the debate over Internet governance. With 
the advent of the World Summit on Information Society (WSIS) and the creation of the 
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Internet Governance Forum (IGF), the field has become much more diverse (Hofmann 
et al., 2017).  
 The potential of the Information Communications Technologies (ICTs) to eradicate 
poverty and improve the life of citizens in developing countries has made it a top priority 
in the agendas of different decision-making bodies at national and international levels. 
The concern was that the poor are excluded from much of the world’s information and 
that no one has even begun to outline a solution to the problem. Kofi Annan, an ex UN 
secretary general, asserted that ICT offers an unprecedented opportunity for less 
developed countries to ‘leapfrog earlier stages of development’ (Annan, 2000). This 
perspective is in line with Wresch (1996), who claim that ICTs can be mechanisms that 
enable developing countries to ‘leapfrog’ stages of development. This is the process of 
expanding human capabilities and access to opportunities in social, economic and 
political arenas, therefore improving the overall quality of life. In response to this 
concern, United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution number 56/183 in 
January 2002, as a possible framework to organise the ‘World Summit on the 
Information Society’ (WSIS) to bridge the ‘Digital Divide’ between the developed and 
developing countries (ITU, 2006).  
Despite the fact that the first phase of the World Summit on the Information Society 
(WSIS), held in Geneva in 2003, ended with an agreement on the declaration of 
principles and a plan of action, it left unsolved more controversial issues, including 
questions on Internet governance and related issues. Therefore, and in order to resolve 
this issue, the United Nations decided to establish the ‘Working Group on Internet 
Governance’ (WGIG) in 2004. The WGIG report published in 2005 indicated 
significant progress in the main issues relating to the structure of Internet governance 
and the role of the stakeholders. It also identified a vacuum within the context of existing 
Internet governance structures, since there is no global multistakeholder forum to 
address Internet-related public policy issues.  Therefore, it concluded that there would 
be merit in creating such a space for dialogue among all stakeholders (WGIG, 2005) 
(Appendix D).  
Responding to the WGIG recommendation, the UN general secretary Kofi Annan 
announced the creation of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) at the second phase of 
the World Summit on the Information Technology (WSIS) held in Tunis in 2005. The 
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IGF’s mandate was fixed to a five-year process, aiming at facilitating and allowing for 
a wider global dialogue on Internet policy principles in an open multilateral, 
multistakeholder, democratic and transparent process – Paragraph 73 of the Tunis 
Agenda - (WSIS, 2005b) (Appendix C). The mandate was renewed for another five 
years until the end of 2015 and was extended for additional 5 more years until 2020. 
This is the venue where international agencies, governments, Internet professionals, 
business and civil society organizations explore, on equal footing, the development of 
the Internet and its interaction with other areas of public policy. The IGF constitutes a 
challenge and an opportunity for stakeholders with diverse views to enhance 
cooperation among all involved parties under the main objective, which is the 
constructive evolution of the Internet and its use. It is an opportunity to share ideas, 
views and practical experiences (IGF, 2017). 
However, moving forward, different participants have had divergent visions and hidden 
agendas. These hidden agendas are increasingly driven by a coalition of states with 
common interests. From one side, the countries known as ‘non-democratic states’ such 
as Russia, China and the Arab states requested and pushed for more state-control while 
the advanced industrial countries and other democratic states had different views and 
pushed for a bottom-up, open, inclusive multistakeholder governance model. During the 
World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in 2003 and 2005, a coalition of 
states including Russia, China and the Arab states had driven the explicit rule-making 
agenda at the international level (Clement, 2013). 
This debate was demonstrated at the International Telecommunication Union 
Plenipotentiary Conference (ITU PP-14) held in Busan in November 2014 –the present 
researcher attended as a member in the Lebanese delegation. Russia and India, supported 
by China and several emerging countries, endorsed a proposal calling for ITU, the 
agency that is the technical arm of UN, to take over Internet resources (numbering, 
naming, and addressing). The United States of America and European delegations 
firmly rejected the proposal. Overall, ITU PP-14 resulted in no major changes for the 
ITU’s role in cyber security – controversial, expansionary proposals were either stopped 
or watered down during the conference (Shackelford et al., 2015). A precedent to this 
heavily political debate had taken place at the World Conference on International 
Telecommunications (WCIT) held in December 2012 in Dubai, where disputes hinged 
on whether the principles, norms and regulations of Internet governance should be 
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handled by ITU. The United States and European countries couldn’t agree, stressing that 
Internet policy must be multistakeholder-driven and hence that Internet policy should 
not be determined exclusively by member states but by citizens, communities, and 
broader society (Kramer, 2012). Those opposed to this position aimed to preserve the 
status of the ‘Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers’ (ICANN), which 
is in charge of Internet resources, and questioned whether the ITU should be involved 
in the business of Internet governance at all. The question of the proper role of the state 
in Internet governance was left unresolved, and the end of the conference brought no 
solutions to this intractable problem (Marchant & Robertson, 2015). 
 The Internet’s constant evolution and its economic, political and social importance 
raised the stakes of the discussion on the future of the Internet and made any discussion 
clearly unsustainable. In 2013, the leading Internet organisations met in Montevideo to 
warn against the undermining of the trust and confidence of Internet users globally due 
to the ‘Snowden’ revelations of pervasive monitoring and surveillance (ICANN, 2013). 
One result of the Montevideo meeting was the organization of the NETmundial 
conference, which was held in Brazil in April 2014. It was defined as the ‘Global 
Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance’ (ICANNwiki, 2014). 
The Netmundial meeting produced a set of principles and a roadmap for the evolution 
of the Internet that were endorsed by most participants but were once again rejected by 
countries on the other extreme of the continuum: China, India, or Russia. These 
countries preferred a UN-led government-centric approach to Internet governance 
(Corwin, 2014). One of the NETmundial Internet governance principle states: “Internet 
governance should be built on democratic multistakeholder processes, ensuring the 
meaningful and accountable participation of all stakeholders, including governments, 
the private sector, civil society, the technical community, the academic community and 
users. The respective roles and responsibilities of stakeholders should be interpreted in 
a flexible manner with reference to the issue under discussion” (NETmundial, 2014). 
Even though Internet governance has been a debate for more than thirteen years, it is 
still a contested topic among governments globally, and among stakeholders nationally.  
To understand the term ‘multistakeholder Internet governance’, it is important to know 
what the terms ‘Internet’, ‘governance’ and ‘multistakeholder’ mean. 
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2.3.1 The Internet 
The Internet is a network of networks (Mathiason, 2009) that enables communication 
between networks on a global (Muller et al., 2007) and mostly public (MacLean, 2004) 
scale.  
The argument for the use of the term “Internet” is enhanced by the rapid transition of 
global communication towards the use of the “Internet protocol” (IP) as the main 
communication technical standard for information where it can be captured, processed, 
shared, displayed and stored. This is in line with the definition of Duncombe & Heeks 
(1999) who described ICTs as electronic means of capturing, processing, storing and 
disseminating information. Similarly, Chowdhury, 2000 explains that ICT encompass 
technologies that can process different kinds of information (voice, video, audio, text 
and data) and facilitate different forms of communications among human agents, among 
humans and information systems, and among information systems. The already 
ubiquitous Internet continues to expand at a rapid rate, not only in terms of the number 
of users but also in terms of the technology and services that it offers, notably, social 
media, voice over Internet protocol (VoIP), the Internet of Things (IoT) and cloud 
storage. These technologies and services form the ICTs. 
2.3.2 Governance 
The concept of governance reflects a broad understanding of ordering processes 
transcending the actions of governments (Rosenau & Czempiel, 1992). State-centric 
models of command-and-control have been deemed outdated and incapable of 
accounting for the complex interactions between the state and society (Jessop, 2003; 
Mayntz, 2003). The governance perspective has highlighted pluricentric regimes and 
rationalities, cooperation and competition, new sites and tools of ordering. The state is 
no longer understood as the ‘control centre of society’ (Mayntz, 2003, p. 29), but as one 
actor among others. As a result, the boundaries between rule-makers and rule-takers are 
blurring. Not only soft laws, such as informal agreements, memorandum of 
understandings, and codes of conduct, but also technical standards and other forms of 
expertise have become prominent in the literature on governance (Feick and Werle, 
2010, p. 525).  
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The concept of governance is analytically valuable, because it comprehends ordering 
processes and de-essentialises the role of public authority. It represents a significant 
shift in the analysis of rule-making with a focus on ‘structured interaction’ (Colebatch, 
2006), interaction of various regulatory structures (Bora and Münte, 2012), cooperation 
and negotiation (Levi-Faur, 2013), coordination (Schuppert, 2008), conversation and 
discursive manifestation (Flyverbom and Bislev, 2008). 
In the debate over Internet governance, controversy has arisen over the term 
‘governance’ and its various interpretations. The United Nations Working Group on 
Internet Governance (WGIG), mentioned earlier, formulated the following working 
definition of Internet governance: “Internet governance is the development and 
application by governments, the private sector, and civil society, in their respective 
roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes 
that shape the evolution and use of the Internet” (WGIG, 2005). A careful examination 
of the definition reveals that it clearly underpins regime theory. The founder of regime 
theory, Stephen Krasner, notes that “regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit 
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of 
fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of 
rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. 
Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing 
collective choice” (Krasner, 1983, p. 2). Still, this broad definition does not resolve the 
question of different interpretations of the term “governance”. 
Furthermore, this confusion was highlighted by the way the term ‘governance’ was used 
by some international organisations. For example, the term ‘good governance’ has been 
used by the World Bank to promote the reform of states by introducing more 
transparency, reducing corruption, and increasing the efficiency of administration. The 
World Bank defined governance as “a concept of governance [that] captures the manner 
in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social 
resources for development” (World bank, 1992). In this context, the term “governance” 
is directly related to core government functions.  
Another terminological confusion was exacerbated by the translation of the term 
‘governance’ into other languages. In Spanish, the term refers primarily to public 
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activities or government (gestión pública, gestión del sector público, and función de 
gobierno). The reference to public activities or government also appears in French 
(gestion des affaires publiques, efficacité de l’administration, qualité de 
l’administration, and mode de gouvernement). Portuguese follows a similar pattern 
when referring to the public sector and government (gestão pública and administração 
pública) (Kurbalija, 2014) 
2.3.3 Internet Governance 
The field of ‘Internet governance’ has formed its topics and boundaries through a path-
dependent process (Van Eeten & Mueller, 2013). The term was originally used to denote 
the institutional and policy problems related to the global coordination of the Critical 
Internet Resources (CIRs): Internet Protocol addresses (IPs) and Domain Name System 
(DNS). Critical Internet Resources (CIRs) was defined by Weber (2010) as a central 
theme in Internet governance research and in global debates over control of the Internet. 
Internet protocols (IPs) are the fundamental resource required for the exchange of 
information over the Internet while Domain Name System (DNS) establishes the 
domain name space in the same way that the Internet Protocol establishes the Internet 
address space. The encounter with those problems culminated in the creation of the 
Internet Cooperation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) in 1998 to manage 
the Critical Internet Resources (CIRs). This innovation prompted the development of a 
research literature that critically assessed the ICANN as a multistakeholder institution 
(Mueller, 2009; Hofman, 2016). 
The next step in the evolution of the field was prompted by the World Summit on 
Information Society (WSIS). The Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) was 
charged to develop a definition of Internet governance. The definition moved beyond 
ICANN and included a much wider range of policy issues and players, applying the term 
to any and all shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and 
programs that shape the evolution and use of the Internet (Drake, 2005). The WSIS 
definition points out that Internet governance involves many actors: “Internet 
governance is the development and application by all stakeholders in their respective 
roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programs that 
shape the evolution and use of the Internet” (WGIG, 2005) .  Likewise, Bygrave (2009) 
notes that governance ‘embraces more than government’ (p. 2) and links the variety of 
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actors to plural modes of governance. While Bygrave (2009) understands governance 
as ‘government plus’, Mueller (2010) portrays it as something ‘weaker than 
government’ (p. 8) that ‘denotes the coordination and regulation of interdependent 
actors in the absence of an overarching political authority’.  
Few of the international political conflicts that took place in the WSIS were resolved. 
This failure led the United Nations and world’s governments to be involved in the 
Internet Governance Forum (IGF), which was designed to provide a non-threatening, 
non-binding venue for multistakeholder dialogue. According to paragraph 61 of the 
Tunis agenda for WSIS, the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) is a forum formed under 
the auspices of the United Nations to provide a transparent, democratic, and multilateral 
process of dialogue on Internet governance policy, with the participation of 
governments, the private sector, civil society and international organisations, in their 
respective roles (WSIS, 2005b). The field of Internet governance studies has been 
profoundly shaped, if not defined, by this path. 
Even though the IGF in particular is an effective middle-ground facilitating the 
discussion between different stakeholders, its commitment to multistakeholderism is 
questionable (Drake, 2011). The role of the IGF is to cultivate multistakeholderism by 
building bridges of trust and confidence and practical partnerships between the 
stakeholders. However, the IGF poses a great challenge, because a variety of cultures 
have to interact constructively. It is a forum which brings together governments (who 
are accustomed to the courteous protocols of inter-governmental discussions); 
businesses (which look for practical results from such meetings); NGOs, consumer 
rights groups and human rights activists (who want to give voice to their concerns loudly 
and clearly); internet specialists (who are familiar with structured approaches to 
consensus building in their technical processes); and the media (which is there to cover 
the proceedings and to participate as a stakeholder). Furthermore, for the dialogue to 
work, participants need to adjust their expectations to consider this diversity of cultures 
present in the forum. Thus, if Internet governance is to be justifiably and legitimately 
manageable, there must be as much listening as talking in a multistakeholderism 
ecosystem. 
Academically, the field of Internet governance is highly interdisciplinary: it includes 
work from the perspective of institutional economics, political science and international 
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relations, communication and information studies, sociology and law. However, most 
of the work in this field falls into three categories: policy and institutional analysis of 
the ICANN and the Regional Internet Address Registries; exploration of various aspects 
of the WSIS and the IGF; and multistakeholderism and the relationship between private 
sector self-governance and intergovernmental organisations (Van Eeten & Mueller, 
2013). 
The controversy surrounding Internet governance starts with its definition. This 
controversy is not merely linguistic pedantry -the way internet governance is defined 
reflects different perspectives, approaches, and policy interests (Kurbalija, 2014). In the 
last few years, Internet governance has attracted growing attention from 
interdisciplinary scholarship. It has been described as an emerging academic field. Yet, 
what is Internet Governance?  
2.3.4 The Internet and the Dilemma of its Governance 
As the influence of the Internet continues to expand, debates about Internet governance 
have become ever more contentious, and the stakes are high (Bradshaw et al., 2015). 
The debate about the most appropriate approach to Internet governance continues to 
evolve. Until recently, the debate has seen a rough division into three camps: those 
favouring the continuation of a multistakeholder approach that originated organically 
from entities forming the technical community, as the Internet was created and further 
developed following commercialization; those favouring a migration to international 
institutions based, for example, in the United Nations; and a third camp comprising 
countries favouring a strong governmental model with states exercising sovereign 
control over their countries’ portion of the Internet, accompanied where necessary by 
international treaties (GCIC, 2016) . 
The WGIG definition compromised specific issues, ranging from infrastructural issues 
and management of critical Internet resources, to regulatory frameworks and 
developmental aspects (WGIG, 2005). This has been illustrated in all IGF agendas from 
the one held in 2006 in Greece to the latest one held in Geneva last year. Discussions 
have been held under different themes connected to the Internet, such as infrastructure 
and access, critical resources, public policy and regulations, Cybersecurity, freedoms 
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and innovations and enhanced multistakeholder Internet governance for economic 
growth and development (IGF, 2017). 
From this perspective, and among other existing literatures and texts, these issues among 
others are used to classify arguments on Internet governance, but most of them have 
limitations (Nye, 2014; Castro & Atkinson, 2014; DeNardis & Raymond, 2013; 
Maclean, 2004). Nye (2014) observes that a large cyber regime complex exists to 
address many issues that constitute Internet governance, and he lists seven related 
issues, namely, standards, crime, war/sabotage, espionage, privacy, content control and 
human rights. Likewise, Castro & Atkinson (2014) identify eight issues, namely, content 
regulation, intellectual property, data, commerce, cybercrime, network operations, 
network performance, and equity and access. Similarly, DeNardis (2014) lists six issues, 
namely, control of critical resources, setting Internet standards, access, and architecture-
based IP rights enforcement. Also, MacLean (2004) uses a “governance matrix” to 
attempt to map some of the issues that arise on this broad view of the Internet 
governance universe. This matrix arrays governance tools, ranging from “hard” to 
“soft”, the main categories of which have historically attracted international governance 
on the other such as: exchange of information and communications, usage of common 
resources, development of networks, and applications of technology for economic, 
social, cultural and political purposes. Murray (2006), however, offers an examination 
of “cyberspace public policy”, which is supported by his analysis based on different 
models. Consequently, if Internet governance is to be manageable, must the problem be 
simplified? On this respect, calls have been made to simplify Internet governance 
through greater cooperation and coordination and by allocating responsibility to relevant 
organisations (Kapur, 2005; Castro & Atkinson, 2014). Thus, the question to be asked 
is: What Internet issues need to be governed, and by whom? “A question such as who 
should control the Internet, the United Nations or some other organisations, makes no 
sense whatsoever. The appropriate question involves determining what is the most 
effective form of governance in each specific context” (DeNardis, 2014). We can argue 
that the example of the United Nations is not a very encouraging one, as there have been 
many cases in which the organisation has been dominated or even controlled by one of 
the leading nations. Furthermore, could we eventually trust a non-government 
organisation to control the Internet; and if so, how independent can that be? 
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As the Internet spread rapidly, some world governments questioned whether the bottom-
up form of governance is adequate to deal with the increasingly complex issues that 
needed attention. At a very basic level, these are questions of legitimacy, in the sense of 
requiring the consent of the governed. But there were also questions about whether the 
governance model truly considered the necessarily broad range of inputs, and whether 
the outputs were effective in achieving the goals that [the governed] care about (Scharpf, 
2004). 
In 2010, the BBC World Service conducted a global poll, which found that 53% of 
respondents agreed that the Internet should be free from any government regulation 
(BBC, 2010). To highlight the difficulties in establishing a unified approach to 
governing the Internet, the poll for example indicated that 72% of Mexicans respondents 
feel that governments should not regulate the Internet at all, while Australians’ and 
Canadians’ primary policy concern with regards to the Internet was fraud and privacy. 
This shows that the term Internet governance has not been interpreted in a coherent 
manner and that, conversely, it has been employed with different meanings resulting in 
different implications, not only for the process of governing itself but also for the role 
government plays in governance.  
Authors take different positions on governments’ role when examining the structure of 
Internet governance. In the famous Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, 
Barlow (1996) criticises governments’ attempts to govern the Internet through legal 
processes and declares that cyberspace is naturally independent of tyrannies, with no 
elected government or legal order from the real world. Other authors with similar 
opinions also concede that the Internet is decentralised and can be governed by the 
private sector, and they suggest a bottom-up structure with government interventions 
(Mclaughlin & Pickard, 2005; Kleinwächter, 2006). Negroponte (2004) provides a 
similar but more idealistic suggestion, claiming that the present structure of Internet 
governance is not healthy, and that the solution is to treat the Internet as an independent 
nation that belongs to everyone, even to make it a member of the United Nations.  
Conversely, Sunstein (2001) emphasises the importance of governments to Internet 
users and corporations, arguing that it is governments that create and maintain the 
relatively free environment for the Internet. Moreover, Drezner (2004) disputes the 
globalization literature that advocates a self-governing Internet dominated by private 
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actors, claiming that states are still the primary actors for Internet governance in the 
global context. In the same line, Netanel (2000) believes that unlimited cyberspace will 
free majorities to trample upon minorities and harm civil society in several ways.  
Accordingly, we can argue that each of the two opposing schools mentioned above is 
biased and unconvincing. While governments’ involvement in Internet governance has 
been controversial, privatised governance creates a different set of concerns.  So, which 
is the best model of Internet governance? The argument here has been that no single 
model provides the solution. Internet governance is a complex task requiring a complex 
set of regulatory mechanisms. As a result, this thesis argues that an optimal system of 
governance would be a combination of regulation by the national government and 
rational reforms involving the private sector and technical and academic communities, 
in addition to civil society, to secure a sustainable and cutting-edge Internet of the third 
millennium. This new framework can be seen as a way to in the location of authority 
(Rosenau, 2007). 
2.3.5 Where is Multistakeholderism in Internet Governance? 
There are very significant efforts underway that constitute a new phase in the ongoing 
development of multistakeholder Internet governance. The most notable of these was 
set in motion in 2014, when the US government announced its intention to transition its 
stewardship of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions to the 
multistakeholder community (GCIC, 2016). The global coordination of the Domain 
Names, Internet Protocols and other Internet protocol resources is performed as the 
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions. 
The IANA is a key element in how the Internet operates and, since the WSIS, it has been 
a focus of those who objected to the original governance mechanisms of the Internet. 
The IANA stewardship transition, completed on 30 September 2016, fulfilled a vision 
of multistakeholder governance. It is a powerful illustration of the multistakeholder 
model and an affirmation of the principle that the best approach to address challenges is 
through bottom-up, transparent, and consensus-driven processes (ISOC, 2016). 
The main source on the emergence of multistakeholder Internet governance could be 
assigned to Milton Mueller's “Ruling the Root” (Mueller, 2002). Mueller analyses the 
multistakeholder process as a competition between different interest groups, the various 
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stakeholders. According to Mueller, there were eleven stakeholders in Internet 
governance that participated in the debate of the 1990s (Mueller, 2002; table 8.1). All 
of them had clear and expressed interests. The debate between these stakeholders 
resulted in the creation of a new governance regime. While Mueller acknowledges the 
victory of a dominant coalition in the negotiations, the multistakeholder view 
emphasises the plurality of interests and the openness of the political arena. This view 
tends to present actors that have very different resources as being on an equal footing. 
This is in line with Barnes et al. (2003), Newman et al. (2004), Newman (2007) and 
Ballamingie (2009), who argue that the multistakeholder model is more than just a 
public consultation process of the sort routinely held by democratic states it claims, 
rather, to share decision-making power with non-state actors. Thus, the multistakeholder 
model continues to contrast sharply with the model of intergovernmental organisations, 
which represent only states and reserve decision-making power to states exclusively 
(Cammaerts & Padovani, 2006; Hintz, 2007; de La Chapelle, 2008; Padovani, 2005; 
Weber & Grosz, 2009). 
The multistakeholder approach remains the dominant view of Internet politics even if 
the categories differ from one author to another (Mathiason, 2009). As such, the 
multistakeholder model could credibly be considered an innovative governance concept, 
part of a wider global debate about rethinking governance in a globalised world. 
However, the multistakeholder concept has never been fully developed and is only 
beginning to be critically studied or evaluated (Raymond & DeNardis, 2005). 
Additionally, it raises serious issues of legitimacy, representativeness and accountability 
(Bendiek & Wagner, 2012). This can be seen in the Geneva Declaration at the first phase 
of WSIS (2003), in which governments traced their own role in the administration of 
Internet policy. They did not consult the other stakeholders when they made this 
decision and did not include the other stakeholders in the discussions when they 
developed this list of roles and responsibilities; rather, they unilaterally relegated all 
other stakeholders to subordinate roles. Thus, neither the private sector nor civil society 
has the appropriate procedures for selecting representatives in a way that will lend these 
representatives the legitimacy to participate. 
Internet governance was not the first field to explore multistakeholder models of 
governance. The earliest work on various models of participatory democracy that led 
the way for multistakeholderism can be found in the work of Elinor Ostrom (1991) on 
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models of economic governance, and some other relevant work has been done in the 
field of sustainable development (Wiener, 2000).  Hemmati (2002) explains that 
multistakeholder processes have been used for decades to address problems in a variety 
of areas including biotechnology, corporate conduct, energy, gender inequality, tourism, 
labour, mining, paper and sustainability. She notes that multistakeholder processes 
inform decision makers on issues, generate support for decisions, identify solutions to 
problems and encourage stakeholders to take ownership of issues. It has been effective 
in many social, political, economic and technical contexts, especially when the problems 
that have arisen are new, fast-changing and complex with important social and cultural 
dimensions.  
Multistakeholder participation and governance mechanisms may be a ‘rather recent 
invention’, but they have a longer tradition as an ‘organizing principle and political 
practice (Hofmann, 2016, p.29). Nonetheless, multistakeholderism in Internet 
governance refers most directly to Paragraph 34 of the Tunis Agenda in the second phase 
of WSIS: “A working definition of Internet governance is the development and 
application by governments, the private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, 
of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes that 
shape the evolution and use of the Internet” (WSIS, 2005b, p. 6). The wording “in their 
respective roles” was a perfect example of what diplomats usually describe as 
constructive ambiguity: agreements on terms that conceal a disagreement of substance 
(de La Chapelle B. , 2011). 
Some observers have expressed concerns about what they see as the primary or too 
‘prominent’ listing of ‘governments’ in the definition (DeNardis, 2014, p. 38). Others 
argue against the subsequent inclusion of technical and academic communities, saying 
that these should have been recognized as cross-cutting and not distinct stakeholder 
groups (Doria, 2014). Some have further pointed out that categorising stakeholders is 
not useful without scrutinising the diverse interests that diverse stakeholders have in the 
outcomes of multistakeholder processes (Belli, 2015) and that the classification is 
inadequate because it obscures diversity, perspectives, priorities, and conflict of 
interests within and amongst stakeholder groups (Souter, 2017). 
Accordingly, one could argue that this attempt to identify and define a new field of 
regulatory issues on global and national levels is more concerned with making 
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multistakeholderism attractive -due to its consensus-reaching process- than with 
mapping the emerging notion of Internet governance (Antonova, 2007). Indeed, at all 
IGFs, some participants still confided that the definition had not grasped the multitude 
of stakeholder expectations and that they feel uncomfortable with what governance 
means when applied to Internet. This constructive ambiguity has become one of the 
great impediments to the success of the multistakeholder model.  
Kummer (2013), who served as an executive coordinator for the IGF Secretariat, 
describes multistakeholder governance as a vehicle for policy dialogue where all 
stakeholders take part on an equal footing via a process that is open, inclusive and 
transparent. He added that, while multistakeholder participation in the WGIG and IGF 
meant and means that all stakeholders participate on an equal footing, it is also clear that 
in most organisations, whether intergovernmental or not, some structures are in place to 
facilitate decision-making processes. Here, another ambiguous contested term rose up: 
“on an equal footing”? Does this mean that all stakeholders have the same authority? 
Do they have equal access to decision-making processes and deliberations? This can be 
challenging given the inequality in the power experienced by the different stakeholders. 
Esterhuysen (2011) argues that the world, of which the Internet is a part, is not an equal 
place. There are vast differences in access to resources and power, between countries, 
and within countries. Governing bodies and processes need to recognise these 
differences and try to address them to achieve legitimacy over time. Liddicoat and Doria 
(2012) explain that while there is no single multistakeholder model, it is a form of 
participatory democracy that allows all of those who have a stake in a policy to take part 
in crafting that policy. While the composition of the stakeholder groups may vary, when 
used in reference to Internet governance, the stakeholders generally include 
governments acting in behalf of their citizens or of the global public good as they 
understand it, the private sector commercial organizations that reflect the businesses that 
affect and are affected by the Internet, the Internet technical community that is 
responsible for the development and maintenance of the network itself, and academics.  
Structurally, multistakeholder governance is produced by variation on at least two 
dimensions: the types of actors involved and the nature of authority relations between 
actors (Raymond & DeNardis, 2015). According to these dimensions, in order to qualify 
as multistakeholder governance, at least two classes of actors must be involved, even if 
not directly, in carrying out a coordinating function or in regulating or technologically 
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constraining such a function indirectly. This is similar to what Ruggie (1992) called the 
nominal or thin definition of multilateralism proposed by Keohane (1990).  Ruggie 
argues that multilateralism misses the qualitative dimension of the phenomenon that 
makes it distinct and that the issue is not the number of parties but rather the kind of 
relations that are instituted among them. While multilateralism admittedly combines a 
wide variety of actors, multistakeholderism differs in the authority relations between 
actors. The conclusion of this argument is that several scenarios of multistakeholderism 
exist depending on the relationship between the actors. Adopting this stance, further 
research is needed to maximise the applicability of these different multistakeholderism 
scenarios to empirical cases. 
While the benefits of multistakeholder governance have been identified, 
multistakeholderism should not be perceived as a sweeping solution to all governance 
issues, and its limits and risks should always be considered. Esterhuysen (2011) clearly 
stated that he doesn’t believe multistakeholder participation, as outlined in the WSIS 
principles, has reached that stage and that he doesn’t think we should strive for such a 
stage. Additionally, Zelenika & Pearce (2013) argue that Internet governance represents 
innovative forms of governance that are being put in place by multilateral groups. Given 
the fact that multilateralism has met with severe disapproval and faced many challenges, 
it is remarkable and important to weigh the potential for democratic governance that 
may be of great importance in future.  In the same line, Drake (2011) argues that the 
scope of stakeholder participation remains too narrow; while there has been much debate 
in recent years about the “democratic deficit” in multilateral institutions, 
multistakeholderism unquestionably faces its own challenges with respect to 
participation, authority and accountability.  
Governments are not equally supportive of the sort of multistakeholder participation that 
is common in Internet governance processes. While 171 governments participate in 
ICANN’s Governance Advisory Committee, some of these believe that the role of 
governments under ICANN’s bylaws is too limited and that governments should have 
the ultimate decision-making authority on key issues. There are concerns about the 
unequal representation in core Internet governance institutions, such as ICANN, ISOC 
and IETF (Hampson & Jardine, 2016).  
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Therefore, the concept of multistakeholder Internet governance is still very vague, and 
the roles and responsibilities of different actors are yet to be defined. One of the most 
problematic aspects of the multistakeholder approach is the very meaning of 
“participation” in political processes and the underlying vision of governance 
(Padovani, 2005). It is clear that power sharing and working relations between 
governments and non-governmental actors are changing. However, there are issues, 
especially with the degrees of representation. This thesis recognises that the actual 
literature on multistakeholderism raises definitional complications and that further 
research is needed to study the applicability of these different definitions to empirical 
cases. 
2.3.6 Governance Beyond Developing Governments  
In the large context, a considerable number of developing countries view the Internet as 
dominated by the wealthy developed countries. In their view, due to a lack of capital 
and expertise, they are excluded from any meaningful participation, and this situation is 
no longer acceptable especially when their national interests are on the stake (DOTF, 
2002). For the developing countries, a UN intergovernmental organisation such as the 
ITU would be an answer to their concern, not only to guarantee their sovereignty, but 
also to offer them relatively greater opportunities for participation. However, whether 
these developing countries are in a position to make use of these opportunities for 
participation is another matter entirely. Schmidt & Raymund (1998) explain that studies 
on ITU’s standardisation activities show that it is the developed industrial countries that 
normally set the tone. Moreover, ITU, which is handling the global coordinating 
responsibility of radio spectrum and geostationary satellite orbit allocation, traditional 
telephony standards and telecommunications development, has many shortcomings. Its 
meetings are generally closed, and its reports are generally sealed except to its sector 
members. Additionally, the ITU is a treaty organisation; if nations ratify treaties, they 
commit to implementing them. If the ITU were to control the Internet, it could decide 
that ratifying nations had to apply its standards while non-ratifying states applied other 
standards. Accordingly, ITU can’t be considered as a multistakeholder organisation, 
although this could change. 
For their part, developed countries have defended the existing governance arrangement. 
In response to demands for an intergovernmental solution, they have countered with the 
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“multistakeholder approach,” which was becoming increasingly popular in the course 
of preparations for WSIS. For them, this open participatory multistakeholder approach 
complements the Internet’s tradition and structure better than any other form of 
intergovernmental approach. Perhaps the most clear-cut example of multistakeholder 
governance involving multiple types of stakeholders is ICANN, which involves 
participants from corporations, governments and civil society. Thus, considerable 
Internet governance scholarship such as Mueller (2002) and Antonova (2008) focus on 
the governance functions over critical Internet resources enacted by ICANN and the 
form of multistakeholderism that has arisen in it. Even this relatively clear example of 
multistakeholder governance has been subject to criticisms ranging from claims of 
insufficient civil society participation, insufficient government authority, too much US 
government oversight; questions about legitimacy; and concerns about its contractual 
relationship with the United States government. However, since the U.S. government 
relinquished its oversight of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) to the 
global Internet community in 2016 (while keeping IANA under ICANN authority), 
some of these criticisms have disappeared.  
This discourse on multistakeholder Internet governance reflects longstanding 
international tensions about administrative control of the Internet, and these tensions 
have failed to define what is acceptable multistakeholder governance for any particular 
function. After several decades of experience with multistakeholder initiatives outside 
of the Internet, the political science community has begun to question whether self-
regulation is sufficient to ensure the proper management of vital resources and 
protection of workers or whether a direct role for governments is warranted (Locke, 
2013). The question remains whether the rise of multistakeholder Internet governance 
implies the dissolution of governments’ authority and the empowerment of other 
stakeholders. Even though multistakeholderism is subject to power struggles, these 
stakeholders are not equal, and the viability of multistakeholderism is not determined 
by its inclusiveness alone but arguably by the level of authority. This raises a further 
question as to whether multistakeholder governance will be well-suied for Internet 
governance. Mathiason (2008), Mueller (2010), Brousseau et al. (2012) and DeNardis 
(2014) explain the various tasks of Internet governance and associated taxonomies that 
lead to the conclusion that there is no unitary system that oversees and coordinates the 
Internet. Accordingly, some tasks are carried out by private industry, some tasks are 
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overseen by the ICANN and some administrative jurisdiction resides within sovereign 
states or multilateral governmental coordination. 
2.3.7 From Global to National Internet Governance  
Currently, many organisations are involved in coordinating Internet related issues 
globally. Some of these organisations are private and others are intergovernmental, and 
each has unique strengths and contributes in its own way to the success of the global 
Internet today.  
Gordenker & Weiss (1995) define international governance as efforts to bring more 
orderly and reliable responses to social and political issues that go beyond the capacities 
of states to address individually. Moreover, Hintz (2007) argues that while a crucial 
rationale for the concept is its ‘global’ approach, global governance does not just transfer 
policy-making from one level (nation-state) to the next (global) but rather involves 
qualitative changes. Therefore, to enable a robust global governance environment, it is 
critical that actors can cooperate by being able to speak a “common language.” In the 
technology context, this can mean a common set of standards. In the governance context, 
it means a mutually understood ontology of Internet-related issues and responses 
(Kurbalija, 2014b). Therefore, the global Internet governance ecosystem thus requires 
interoperability, that is, the ability for diverse social, political, organizational, legal and 
technical systems to meaningfully work together and collaborate around setting this 
common ontology. However, Raymond & Smith (2013) argue that the Internet has never 
been an ungoverned space; in fact, the internet would not and could not exist if it were.  
Just as basic functioning in the real world requires scarce natural resources, such as 
water and energy, the Internet’s basic functioning requires a set of critical virtual 
resources. Critical Internet Resources (CIRs) are a central theme in Internet governance 
research and in global debates over control of the Internet (Weber, 2010). The 
terminology of CIRs in the context of Internet governance usually refers to Internet‐
unique logical resources rather than to the physical, infrastructural components of the 
network. This theme of control over Internet resources is not unique to Internet 
governance. New technologies create new scarce resources. Battles over new scarce 
resources have historically been an issue of information and communication technology 
policy, whether electromagnetic spectrum allocation for broadcasting as mentioned by 
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Douglas (1987) or bandwidth allocation in net neutrality debates as stated by Wu & Yoo 
(2007).  
What may be unique about Internet resources, and in particular IP addresses, is that they 
are completely global rather than geographically bounded resources and require central 
coordination because of the technical criterion of each resource serving as a globally 
unique identifier. Thus, CIRs must meet a technical requirement of global uniqueness, 
requiring some central coordination, a condition at the heart of debates over who 
controls these resources and how they are distributed. In contrast, there are no 
coordination requirements for the physical infrastructure. DeNardis (2009) investigated 
the current debate that involves the question of what type of market intervention or 
government regulation might be necessary, if any at all. Unlike many other types of 
technological resources, CIRs have never been exchanged in free markets or directly 
regulated by sovereign governments.  
The WSIS was influential not only in creating the IGF, outlining a working definition 
for Internet governance, and recognising the importance of multistakeholder 
participation, among other things. It also stimulated multistakeholder approaches for 
Internet-policy formulation at national levels (Adam et al., 2007). As such, the 
multistakeholder governance at the national level could credibly be considered an 
innovative concept, part of a wider global debate about rethinking governance in a 
globalised world (Mueller & Wagner, 2014). 
At the national level, the principal challenge has been to develop a strategy to gather 
and effectively coordinate support from governments and non-governmental actors such 
as the private sector, academic and civil society that often have the necessary expertise 
to deal with Internet governance issues. According to Mueller and Wagner (2014), after 
WSIS many countries have managed to develop sufficient institutional capacity on the 
national level to follow global Internet governance negotiations. Some of these countries 
such as Brazil have developed an innovative national structure for following the Internet 
governance debate. While the Brazilian model is often taken as a successful example of 
a multistakeholder approach, the Lebanese efforts in this area have failed. But the 
multistakeholder concept has never been fully developed (Hintz 2007), and it raises 
serious issues of legitimacy, representativeness and accountability (Bendiek and 
Wagner 2012). 
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Nevertheless, Internet governance practices vary from one country to another, notably 
with respect to the roles of government. In some countries, the management of Internet 
is in the hands of governments and regulators while others allow private sector 
involvement. It is obvious that government involvement in Internet governance is both 
necessary and inevitable, but the level and nature of this involvement remain 
questionable. 
As the WSIS definition points out, Internet governance involves many stakeholders 
including governments.  Interestingly, the acknowledged plurality of stakeholders is 
used to support opposing conclusions on the means of governance. Bygrave (2009) 
focuses on binding laws enhanced by other means, whereas Mueller (2010) observes an 
overall loss of regulatory authority. Feick and Werle (2010) offer a plausible reading of 
these contradictory views, describing Internet governance as ‘patchworks of partly 
complementary, partly competing regulatory elements in the form of legal rules and 
ordinances, mandatory and voluntary technical standards and protocols, international 
and national contracts and agreements, and informal codes of conduct and “netiquette”’ 
(p. 525).  
Furthermore, it is important to mention that Internet governance has been seen as a new 
way to spread democracy and freedom of expression, since it offers more chances for 
people to put pressure on and watch their governments rather than just being watched. 
According to Shannon (2003), participation is the cornerstone of democracy. Yet, 
participation alone cannot be considered without understanding the type of participation 
process within governance. However, democracy is still the object of conflicts across 
the globe, and there are a number of governments that have been branded as enemies of 
the Internet since they tend to illegally monitor and filter the Internet to interdict freedom 
of expression.  According to Wu (2010), Egypt’s disconnecting of the Internet in 
January 2011 represents the most extreme form and has triggered wide debates about 
state-controlled “kill switches”.  
Much literature has focused on authoritarian states, documenting how countries such as 
China and Iran started to build national firewalls and sophisticated filtering systems 
(Deiber et al., 2008; Clayton et al., 2006). Autocratic regimes and some developing 
countries are arguing the case for more official control of the Internet to protect citizens 
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and control crime. Those that have been accused of illegally filtering the Internet argue 
that they are doing so to protect their citizens from the worst evils like child pornography 
or even the threat of terrorist acts. This last point has been quite frequently cited as a 
means of justifying almost any illegal attempt to control the Internet by governments, 
insofar as it blends the issue of sophisticated terrorism into the lives of citizens. Much 
attention has been paid to the filtering of Internet access by authoritarian regimes such 
as China or Iran (Boas, 2006; Deibert et al., 2008).  
Akdeniz (2010) argues that, although all democratic countries protect freedom of 
expression through a series of national and international legal instruments, each country 
holds a margin of appreciation to introduce speech-based restrictions to its laws. 
Moreover, Brown & Marsden (2013) claim that countries have differing human rights 
approaches. For example, in some countries such as those in Europe, freedom of 
expression has never been an inalienable right but is balanced against other rights, such 
as the respect of privacy or public order (Zeno-Zencovich, 2009). Internet traffic and 
online content are always subject to over-regulation in the Middle East, Russia, China, 
Iran and some other countries, which ignore any regard for freedom of speech and claim 
the need to protect and defend its internal stability, the safety of its citizens and 
sovereignty. Wagner (2012) claims that in authoritarian regimes, the government is 
generally directly involved in controlling Internet traffic. 
Taking into consideration the importance of the issues discussed at the national level, 
the question to be posed is: Why have Internet governance scholars and researchers 
failed to acknowledge the importance of governance and its related issues at the national 
level and have instead focused their research elsewhere, at a global level, adapting their 
approaches accordingly? The answer might be that it is much easier for them to define 
the Internet as a global phenomenon, since there are relatively few detailed studies of 
national Internet governance. Instead, global institutions like the ICANN and ITU 
occupy centre stage (Levinson, 2003). 
In addition, formalised institutions have explicit rules and procedures, which render the 
object of study readily available for empirical analysis while other areas of the Internet 
are often informal and thus more difficult to investigate. We can argue that the lack of 
a coherent conceptualisation of Internet governance at the national level has discouraged 
research on this issue.  For example, there are numerous studies on the participation of 
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civil society in the WSIS, on how state and non-state actors share power at IGF, and on 
the ICANN’s structure and processes (Froomkin, 2003; Klein, 2004; Kleinwächter, 
2004; Palfrey, 2004; Koppell, 2005). In other words, the field conceives Internet 
governance as taking place at these institutions rather than conceptualizing Internet 
governance and studying where and how it is actually taking place. The exclusive study 
of these formalised institutions that are officially designated as sites of ‘multistakeholder 
Internet governance’ presents us with a biased perspective. 
2.3.8 Code of Good Governance 
In this code of governance, the term “Internet governance” refers to ‘the development 
and application by governments, the private sector and civil society, in their respective 
roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes 
that shape the evolution and use of the Internet.’ It was defined in the Tunis Agenda on 
the Information Society and agreed on at the World Summit on the Information Society 
(WSIS) in Tunis in 2005 (WSIS, 2005b). 
While Bygrave (2009) understands governance as ‘government plus’, Mueller (2010) 
portrays it as something ‘weaker than government’ that denotes the coordination and 
regulation of interdependent actors in the absence of an overarching political authority. 
Although actors are diverse in role and character, their multistakeholder participation, 
open discussion and decision-making have emerged from the way in which the Internet 
has developed. This was mentioned in the “WSIS principles”, included in the Tunis 
Agenda outcome document of the World Summit on the Information Society, which 
declared that the management of the Internet should be multilateral, transparent and 
democratic, with the full involvement of governments, the private sector, civil society 
and international organizations” (WSIS, 2015a). 
In 2010, the Council of Europe and the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe published a code defining good governance practice as building upon the 
experience of the many entities concerned with Internet governance in order to reinforce 
transparency, information and participation. Improving governance and providing 
citizens across states and across the globe with improved services ensure less corruption, 
the safeguarding of democratic values and the promotion transparency and 
accountability in a government’s actions (Pimenidis, 2009). The code of good practice 
is built largely upon principles of transparency and information-sharing, of 
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multistakeholder participation and of open discussion and decision-making. It is 
intended as a framework of principles and guidelines which will help these entities to 
maintain and improve transparency, inclusiveness and accountability as the Internet 
continues to grow in range, diversity and importance. The ways in which these 
principles and guidelines are implemented will vary according to the roles and 
circumstances of the different entities concerned (CE & UNECE, 2010). It stipulates 
that:	
1. Internet governance decisions and decision-making processes concerned with 
Internet governance should be open, transparent and inclusive. 
2. Internet governance entities and processes should enable and encourage all those 
who wish to participate in processes and decisions concerning Internet 
governance to make contributions with the expectation that their views will be 
considered. 
3. Internet governance entities should actively foster participation in their work by 
all those who are or may be affected, or consider themselves affected, by the 
decisions that they make, including individuals and organisations from all 
stakeholder communities and world regions. 
4. Any individual or organisation should be able to initiate ideas for debates about 
Internet policy; standards development, coordination or administration; and the 
governance and structure of Internet governance entities. They should also be 
able to take part in such debates. 
5. Opportunities to participate in the work of entities concerned with Internet 
governance should be widely publicised, with the aim of ensuring that all those 
who wish to participate are aware of them. Internet governance entities should 
recognise that the quality of access may affect the ability of potential participants 
to engage with them and facilitate the participation of those adversely affected 
by poor connectivity. 
6. To facilitate inclusiveness and engagement, Internet governance entities should 
produce and disseminate clear information about modes of participation in their 
policy, standards, coordination and administration processes. They should 
recognise that lack of familiarity and expertise may prove barriers to 
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participation and should offer induction opportunities for new participants in 
both physical and online meetings.  
7. Internet governance entities should strive to make participation in decision-
making independent of physical location, ability to travel to physical meetings 
and financial resources. Efforts to achieve this should include offline and other 
mechanisms that meet the needs of particular communities, as well as remote 
online participation. 
8. Internet governance entities should seek to extend these principles into areas of 
dialogue and joint policy-making with other governance bodies, including those 
whose concerns lie primarily outside the Internet. 
This thesis endorses these principles and suggests that stakeholders concerned with 
Internet governance should regularly review their information, participation and 
governance arrangements, in the light of this code of governance. Methods of achieving 
this objective may include peer review and other assessment methods, where Internet 
governance entities make public the outcomes of such reviews.  
2.4 The Impact of the Internet on Economic Growth  
There is a growing body of literature suggesting a direct link between economic growth 
and the adoption of new technology (Heeks, 1999). This is reflected in the study by 
Roller & Waverman (2001), the results of which have shown a strong relation between 
investment in ICT infrastructure and productivity growth. According to Altig and 
Rupert (1999), Internet access is correlated with growth performance.  
Recent literature on international perceives the Internet as holding a vast potential for 
inclusive growth and socio-economic development (Dalberg, 2013). Not only could it 
increase productivity and contribute to the overall GDP of an economy, but it could also 
help connect remote populations to markets, promote citizens’ access to social services, 
expand educational opportunities, create platforms for innovation and increase people’s 
freedoms and access to government services (Madon, 2000). According to the World 
Bank (2014), cross-country data on Internet penetration and economic development 
suggests a strong positive correlation between percentage of Internet users and PPP 
GDP per capita. It should be noted that the economic impact of different Information 
and Communication Technologies (ICTs) has been studied for some time and that these 
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models have shaped the emerging framework for analysing the effect of broadband 
(Roller and Waverman 2001). 
In this context, the Communications Outlook report published in 2009 by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), noted: “New 
broadband Internet infrastructure investments are good targets for economic stimulus 
spending because many projects can be initiated relatively quickly, are labour-intensive, 
can minimise economic leakages, and may promise stronger marginal impacts on supply 
and productivity than investing in established networks such as electricity, gas, water 
and transportation”. Basically, developing countries have lower technological 
penetration than the developed countries, and hence, technological innovation will have 
more a significant impact on their economies (OECD, 2009). However, according to the 
“return to scale” theory, the impact of telecommunications infrastructure on the 
economic output is maximized once the infrastructure reaches a critical mass point, 
generally associated with developed countries’ levels of penetration. As a result, we 
initially observe increasing returns on growth (Roeller and Waverman, 2001; Shiu and 
Lam, 2008). While Roeller and Waverman (2001) associate “critical mass” with near 
universal voice telephony penetration, we are starting to identify this phenomenon for 
broadband as well.  
Nevertheless, many studies have sought to identify and understand the economic 
benefits of the Internet. A macro-level econometric analysis performed by the World 
Bank (2009) reports that a 10% increase in broadband and a 10% increase in wire line 
Internet penetration are associated with a 1.38% and a 1.12% increase in GDP growth, 
respectively.  
The next section will review some empirical studies attempting to quantify the 
contribution of Internet connectivity at all levels of economic development and to 
establish that the Internet is a dynamic tool for stimulating growth.  
2.4.1 Studies on the Economic Impact of Broadband Internet 
 
There has been a considerable amount of empirical work on the economic impact of 
broadband Internet on development and growth. The methodologies that have been used 
vary on issues like data availability and different econometric specifications. The broad 
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outcome of these studies concludes a positive and significant link between Internet and 
growth.  
An early study by the World Bank (Qiang et al. 2009) used a cross-sectional analysis to 
examine the impact of various ICTs, including fixed broadband, on GDP growth during 
the period 1980 until 2006 for 120 developing and developed countries. The framework 
is based on the endogenous growth model (Barro, Economic Growth in a Cross Section 
of Countries, 1991): 
GDP8006 = α0 + α1 × GDP80 + α2 × ( I/GDP)8006 + α3 × PRIM80 + α4 × BBPEN 
8006 + α5 × SSA + α6 × LAC + μ 
where GDP8006 is the average growth rate of real GDP per capita in US$ between 1980-
2006, GDP80 is per capita GDP in 1980, I/GDP8006 is the average ratio of investment 
to GDP between 1980 and 2006, PRIM80 is the primary school enrolment rate in 1980, 
BBPEN8006 is the average fixed broadband penetration and SSA and LAC are dummy 
variables for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean 
(LAC) respectively. 
The study concludes that a 10-percentage point increase in fixed broadband penetration 
would increase GDP growth by 1.21% in developed economies and 1.38% in 
developing ones.  
This model has been updated using recent data (Scott, 2012). The same model is used 
but with data for 86 countries for 1980–2011. The results were essentially the same as 
before, with a 10-percentage point increase in fixed broadband generating a 1.35% 
increase in per capita GDP for developing countries and a 1.19% increase for developed 
countries. The results suggest that that broadband Internet has the highest GDP growth 
increase (Figure 2.3). 
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Figure 2.3: GDP growth impact from 10-percent point increase. Source: Qiang et al. (2009) and 
Scott (2012) 
Similarly, Koutroumpis (2009) found that broadband penetration has a significant 
impact on GDP growth ranging from 0.26% to 0.85% for each 10-percentage point 
increase in penetration. The research covers 15 European Union countries based on data 
collected for the period 2003 to 2006 with 60 observations. Using a macroeconomic 
production function, variables are transformed to logs with the following equation: 
 
where t is time, GDP is Gross Domestic Product in millions of euros, K is stock of 
investment in millions of euros, LF is Population with full or part time work aged 
between 15 and 64 in millions, PEN is fixed broadband penetration and EDU is 
Population with tertiary education per 100 population aged between 25 and 64.  
In 2018, Koutroumpis  replicated the model he used in 2009 and updated its findings 
using an OECD panel of countries for the period 2002 to 2016. In this study, he presents 
the econometric framework that mimics the way broadband affects the national 
economy. Building on the work of the previous study, the dataset used in this study 
consists of annual observations from 35 countries for the fifteen-year period between 
2002 and 2016. The results confirm previous findings and reinforces our understanding 
of the impact of broadband on the economy (Koutroumpis, 2018). The result revealed 
that a 10-line increase from 10 to 20 lines per 100 people yields 1.40%. This estimate is 
in line with previous findings by Qiang (2009) and Scott (2012). 
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Another more optimistic study deploying a non-linear model found that a 10 percent 
increase in fixed broadband penetration triggered an average increase of 3.19 percent in 
per capita GDP. The study examined the broadband economic impact in Latin American 
and Caribbean (LAC) countries (Zaballos & Lopez-Rivas, 2012). The data covers 26 
LAC countries for the period between 2003 and 2009 with the economic impact 
calculated for three different periods: 2003–05, 2003–07 and 2003–09. The non-linear 
model was specified as: 
Y1 = Z - Z1 + Z2 - Z3 - Z4 + Y - Y2 
Where Y1 is GDP per capita, Z is the constant, Z1 is the interest rate spread, Z2 is the 
interest on new debt, Z3 is multilateral debt, Z4 is net official development aid and Y is 
fixed broadband penetration per 100 inhabitants.  
In conclusion, a variety of models has been designed to measure the impact of 
broadband Internet on the economy with different formulas and variables. In 
general, despite the methodology and whether it is cross-country or single country, each 
study examined found broadband Internet to have a positive economic impact (Table 
2.4) 
 
Study Increase in GDP 
 per 10 percentage point 
Number of Studied 
Countries 
Qiang et al. (2009) 1.21% - 1.38% 120 (Worldwide) 
Koutroumpis (2009) 0.26% - 0.85% 15 (EU) 
Scot (2012) 1.35% 86 (Worldwide) 
Zaballos and Lopez (2012) 3.19% 26 (Latin America and 
the Caribbean) 
Koutroumpis (2018) 1.40% 35 (Worldwide) 
Table 2.4: Summary of broadband Internet impact studies 
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However, the study of the economic effects of Internet broadband presents several 
methodological challenges. Katz (2012) has lightened these challenges along three 
avenues:  
- The macro-economic perspective founded on the Harvard economist Robert 
Barro's endogenous technical change model 13, which analyzes the aggregate 
impact of broadband on economic development. In this case the guiding question 
is: what is the contribution of broadband to GDP growth, productivity and 
employment?  
- The microeconomic perspective at the level of the firm, emphasising the 
contribution of broadband to business process efficiency and sales growth. The 
key issue here is to understand the return on broadband and IT investment at the 
firm and sector level.  
- The qualitative perspective, choosing the case study as its primary analytical 
tool. 
Nevertheless, the evidence accrued by these three bodies of research supports the 
hypothesis that Internet broadband has an important economic impact (Katz, 2012).  
2.5 The Impact of Governance on Internet and Economic Growth  
As presented above, the literature agrees that the Internet spurs countries’ economic 
development and growth. However, good governance is also indispensable for such 
development. Many scholars and researchers have confirmed the positive link of 
improved quality of governance on economic growth (Keefer, 1997; Campos and 
Nugent, 1999; Kaufmann et al. 1999a and 1999b; Mehanna et al., 2010; Han et al., 
2014).  
Much of the research of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nations, 
and the World Bank shows that good governance leads to economic growth. The World 
Bank’s World Governance Indicator project shows that the Middle East and the North 
Africa region always rank below the average. This World Bank project seeks to measure 
the quality of governance using six metrics: Voice and Accountability, Political 
Stability, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of 
Corruption. These metrics are measured both by a Governance Score that ranges from -
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2.5 to +2.5, and a Percentile Rank relative to nations worldwide. For instance, Kaufman 
and Kraay (2002) evaluate the World Governance Indicators over the period 1996 to 
2002 and find a positive relationship between per capita income and quality of 
governance.  
Furthermore, Han and el. (2014) analyse the governance gap and its effect on economic 
growth. Among many other results, the study shows that Middle Eastern and North 
African countries with a surplus in political stability, government effectiveness, and 
corruption control are observed to grow faster than those with a deficit in these 
indicators by as much as 2.5 percentage points annually. The study implies that 
governance matters to economic growth. 
Given the previous background, these findings point to the importance of good Internet 
governance for economic development. However, the relation between Internet and its 
governance is a complex process with diverse and multidisciplinary 
components. Consequently, the challenge is making these components interact and work 
in a combined and interplayed framework. Granovetter (2005) and UZZI (1996) argue 
that strong bonds form the basis for people’s identity, business interests and professional 
associations and that networks contribute to economic development. A low degree of 
embeddedness in local social structures of governance, on the other hand, may lead to 
isolation, lack of trust and knowledge-sharing and a pure profit-oriented approach. Thus, 
the weak governance framework in the developing countries is an obstacle for the rapid 
and successful exploitation of Internet, which in return significantly reduces the 
potential of an economic growth. This is in line with the work of Chauvet and Collier 
(2004) that find developing countries with poor quality of governance will lead to less 
economic growth. 
The design of such a governance model should rely on country-specific know-how and 
governance diagnostic tools to identify specific priorities. And understanding the 
political and economic forces shaping policymaking and law making (which vary from 
setting to setting) is key to identifying realistic and country-relevant strategic priorities 
(Kaufmann & Kraay, 2004). Although many of these strategic priorities may appear 
purely technical, they have important social, political and economic consequences. The 
Boston Consulting Group report (2014) specifies that the barriers that hold back Internet 
development are related to infrastructure, access, cost, and outdated regulations and 
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policies and that they are imposed by governments through restrictions of various forms 
(BCG, 2014). Appropriately, successful countries have taken a comprehensive 
multistakeholder approach to addressing the challenges that hinder their Internet 
development (Dean, 2016). Therefore, decisions made in the realm of multistakeholder 
Internet governance can play a significant role in economic growth.  
Similarly, the World Bank study (2009) emphasises that good governance through 
implementation of suitable laws, adoption of new regulations, and competition policies 
will enable participation by the private section and others to overcome lagging sector 
development. This approach is to be propelled by both structural and regulatory reform 
to unlock the potential benefits and services of Internet broadband, thus enabling the 
country’s economic growth.  
In this context, this thesis examines 2 successful case studies from Brazil and Kenya, in 
which multistakeholder participation has been interpreted and implemented in diverse 
instances of Internet governance.  
2.5.1 Brazilian Multistakeholder Internet Governance Model 
 
Brazil has developed a multistakeholder Internet governance model in a way that truly 
engages different sectors, including civil society, government, academia and business. 
Its model remains a concrete example for any country seeking to build an effective 
multistakeholder governance body (Almeida, 2017). 
The Brazilian story is about a powerful coalition of pro-monopolist statist interests 
opposed by a counter-coalition with diametrically opposed ideas about Internet 
governance. Specifically, the state enterprise leaders insisted that their monopoly should 
be legitimised and extended to the Internet market, and they wanted to restrict legitimate 
participation in policy making to the usual suspects – themselves and a few trusted 
ministry officials who also favoured state monopolies (Wilson, 2005). 
The central part of Brazil’s Internet governance ecosystem is the Brazilian Internet 
Steering Committee (CGI.br), which was created by Interministerial Ordinance 147 on 
31 May 1995 (NIC, 2018). The Brazilian government established the Brazilian Internet 
Steering Committee (CGI.br) as a multistakeholder governance body. The CGI.br board 
has 21 members: nine from government organizations, four from civil society, four from 
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the private sector and four from the academic and technical communities. Government 
members are appointed, and all other members are elected by their respective 
communities. No single sector, even government, has a majority of votes on the board 
(CGI.br, 2018). Two years later, Brazilian telecommunications legislation defined the 
internet as a “value-added service” different from the telecommunications 
infrastructure. This innovative approach allowed the internet to grow quickly in Brazil.  
The purpose of the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee (CGI.br) is to coordinate and 
integrate all of the country’s internet service initiatives, as well as to promote technical 
quality, innovation and dissemination of available services. The CGI.br constitutes an 
internet governance model for societies to effectively participate in decisions involving 
network implementation, management and use. Based on the principles of 
multilateralism, transparency and democracy, the CGI.br has been democratically 
electing representatives from civil society since July 2004 to participate in discussions 
and to debate priorities for the internet together with the government. 
The main responsibilities of the Brazilian Steering Committee are to:  
• Establish strategic guidelines related to the use and development of the internet 
in Brazil;  
• Recommend standards for technical and operational procedures for the internet 
in the country;  
• Establish guidelines to orient relations between the government and society in 
the execution of the Domain Name System registration activities, in the 
allocation of Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and in the administration of the 
country code top-level domain;  
• Propose research and development programmes related to the internet and 
economy;  
• Promote statistical studies and recommend procedures, norms, technical and 
operational standards for network and internet services security, as well as for 
its growing and adequate use by society; and  
• Participate in national and international technical fora for internet governance. 
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Conceptualized in 2007, the “Bill of Rights” for Brazilian internet users “Marco Civil” 
was drafted using an open multistakeholder process through which members of the 
public, government, global and local internet companies, civil society and others 
engaged in negotiations over the legislation’s text. The Marco Civil Law No 19.965 
published in 2014 is distinctive due to its substance and the way it was created to protect 
the internet’s key principles (CGI.br, 2018). 
2.5.2 The Kenyan Multistakeholder Model of Internet Governance 
 
The World Summit on Information Technology (WSIS) was influential not only in 
outlining a working definition of Internet governance and recognising the importance 
of multistakeholder participation. It also stimulated a multistakeholder approach for 
Internet policy formulation at a national level (Adam et al., 2007). This is found in 
Kenya’s delegation to WSIS that included non-governmental stakeholders who 
contributed prominently to the deliberations.  
Kenya is widely regarded as one of the most vibrant Internet governance communities 
in Africa. ICTs have contributed substantially to the growth of Kenya’s economy, 
reportedly having been responsible for up to one quarter of its gross domestic product 
(GDP) over the past ten years (Munyua, 2016). 
In the early 2000s, it became clear that Kenya needed a new national ICT policy 
framework that would not only deepen liberalisation efforts but would be more capable 
of addressing new challenges in the sector. Yet the civil society and private sector 
stakeholders who could work with and lobby government for such a framework were 
pulling in different directions (Adam et al., 2007).  
Kenya saw the creation of not only the world’s first national and regional IGF initiatives 
but also a multistakeholder platform for deliberation on policy and other developments 
pertaining to the ICT, the Kenya ICT Action Network (KICTANet) (Souter & Kerretts-
Makau, 2012). Participants from the media, business, civil society, academia, and 
development sectors were invited to an initial meeting in October 2004 where the 
KICTANet was created as a loose alliance with the specific aim of developing an ICT 
policy framework for the country. According to Adam et al. (2007), KICTANet was 
specifically designed to welcome multistakeholder participation due to the ‘perceived 
strength and effectiveness in joint collaborative policy advocacy activities, which would 
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be based on pooling skills and resources’ (p. 26) as opposed to wasting resources in 
‘competing, overlapping advocacy’ (Munyua, 2016; p. 213).  
The Ministry of Information and Communication in Kenya invited KICTANet to 
participate officially to draft an ICT policy and to organize a national multistakeholder 
workshop to finalise the policy. The KICTANet submission on the draft policy was used 
as a working document by the Ministry, and the Kenya ICT Policy was finally approved 
by the country’s Cabinet in March 2006 (Adam et al., 2007), thereby ‘heralding the 
beginning of a new form of policy-making, which was more participatory and 
collaborative in nature’ (Munyua, 2016; p. 213). Today, KICTANet has almost 4000 
members and continues to help organise the national Kenya IGF along with a new 
annual Kenya School of Internet Governance.  
2.5.3 Missing Multistakeholder Efforts in Lebanon 
 
 The slow growth performance in many developing countries, especially Middle Eastern 
and North African countries, has been disappointing over the last decade (Emara & 
Chiu, 2016). Mehanna, Yazbeck, and Sarieddine (2010) study the relationship between 
governance and economic development in 23 countries in the Middle East and North 
Africa region. The study shows that improving governance is the main challenge facing 
the MENA countries including Lebanon, where voice and accountability, government 
effectiveness, and control of corruption would exert the strongest economic impact. 
Since the second half of the 1980’s, growth and development studies have started to 
shed light on the importance for economic growth of improving institutions of 
governance. In the absence of a stable government in post-conflict Lebanon, 
multistakeholder partnerships have been critical to the buildup of the country’s core 
Internet infrastructure (Almeida, 2017).  
The necessity for a multistakeholder body to assist in the amalgamation of different and 
competing interests was highlighted by Fadi Shehade, ex CEO of ICANN, during a 
reconnaissance visit to Beirut in February 2013. The different stakeholders engaged in 
long sessions of critical thinking on governance structure outcome, impact and 
alternatives and, while they acknowledged that multistakeholder governance will 
introduce complex processes with insecure outcomes, they made a conscious decision 
that multistakeholder governance is a strategic and preferred option for Internet 
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governance in Lebanon. On June 2nd, 15 months later, Fadi Shehade returned to Beirut 
to celebrate with Lebanon the launching of LINC from the Ministry of Economy and 
Trade (ISOC, 2015). However, LINC failed to take place as a bottom-up, non-profit 
Private Public Partnership that aims to govern and operate the (.lb) country code top-
level domain registry and to fill the long-standing gaps in Internet governance in 
Lebanon.   
Various attempts have been made to coordinate Lebanon’s digital policies, but no 
comprehensive strategic plan for the digital economy exists to date. Different strategies 
were coordinated with the ICT Coordination Office. However, the Lebanese 
government did not adopt the strategies, except for bits and pieces of the action plans 
executed in silos (WEF, 2017). 
2.6 Theoretical Framework 
Internet Governance raises complex and interlaced issues, and an overwhelming number 
of methodological and theoretical approaches are used to study and analyse the 
governance process. However, with the advancement of multistakeholderism as a model 
in Internet governance, there is a need to explore other approaches and determine how 
some concepts of governance such as regulation and stakeholder participation are 
related to the Internet governance process. 
This thesis asserts that regulation is one of the main pillars for a healthy and competitive 
business environment that will boost Internet and economic development through 
lowering the cost of economic transactions for government and businesses. As a result, 
this chapter provides a critical overview of the Cost Transaction theory and the debate 
over state regulatory theories. Furthermore, and to better understand the important role 
of regulation and government involvement, this thesis investigates the economic, public 
interest and regime theories, arguing that multistakeholder Internet governance is part 
of an appeal on the part of the Internet community in response to ineffective or unfair 
business practices by the government. 
2.6.1 Transactional Cost Theory and Economic Development 
To understand how the Internet and related digital technologies impact development and 
economic growth, it is important to understand and capture the nature of this 
relationship. 
	 63	
Transaction cost theory was developed by Ronald Coase in 1930 to explain why firms 
produce certain products, services or activities internally while others are produced and 
sold at the external market. According to transaction cost theory, a firm’s cost consists 
of production costs and transaction costs. Production costs are associated with 
productive activities, while transaction costs are associated with the economic activity 
of the firm (Masten, 1982). Fittingly, Canbäck (1998) defines transaction costs as costs 
associated with the economic activities within the organisation through arm’s length 
transactions. 
For Coase (1937), transaction costs are the cost of carrying out transactions through 
exchanges in the open market. Coase realised that using the price mechanism incurred 
a number of additional costs, such as the effort of finding buyers or suppliers, 
negotiating contracts and enforcing them. Hence, most of the Coasian transaction costs 
stem from the costs of acquiring and sharing information. Many years later, the Internet 
has vastly reduced these costs, with major implications for market exchanges among 
individuals, businesses and governments. Internet and digital technologies have 
dramatically expanded the information base, lowered information costs, and created 
information goods. This has facilitated searching, matching, and sharing of information 
and contributed to greater organisation and collaboration among economic agents, 
influencing how firms operate, how people seek opportunities, and how citizens interact 
with their governments (World Bank, 2016). 
Therefore, by reducing information costs, the Internet greatly lowers the cost of 
economic and social transactions for the public and governments. However, according 
to the World bank (2009), regulatory reform as well as structural reform are needed to 
unlock the potential benefits of Internet. In the context of Lebanon, one of these reforms 
will be the full implementation of the new Telecom law (law 431) ratified in 2002, 
adopting privatisation and liberalisation of the telecom market in addition to rational 
reforms related to Internet development. In the offline world, such reforms require some 
form of regulation to protect the public interests, to be discussed in the next section. 
2.6.2 Economic & Public Interest Theories  
In the 1950s, economic theory provided a variety of reasons for regulation using Public 
Interest theory, which stated that regulation was a government response to public 
demand for intervention due to ineffective or unfair business practices.  
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According to Public Interest theory, one of the main reasons for economic regulation 
was to correct market failures, which prevent markets from operating in the public 
interest, such as market power by private interest, natural monopoly, and information 
problems as described in the works of Breyer (1982), Noll (1989) and Ogus (1994). 
Another reason is the protection of rights, often labelled “social regulation”, which came 
at a much later stage, and referencing such issues as equity, the correction of past or 
possible future unfairness and the protection of public interests in such fields as health, 
safety, and the environment (McGowan & Wallace, 1996). One of the main concepts in 
this perspective is that regulatory rules are supposed to enhance justice and fairness 
within the private sphere in which they intervene (Baldwin & Cave, 1999). Therefore, 
government agencies were viewed as being set up to protect consumers against 
monopoly power, inadequate information and other such issues. (Baldwin ey al, 2012). 
Nevertheless, the liberal economists criticised the notion that regulation was motivated 
by public interest. They argued that government regulation is the result of the selfish 
actions of politicians and bureaucrats, in alliance with self-interest groups. According 
to Edelman (1964), attempts by governments to regulate industries tended to be 
symbolic politics, which appease consumers by providing them with symbolic 
regulation, rather than actually regulating industry to provide concrete benefits. He also 
accused political elites in a representative democracy of utilising symbols and myths to 
secure and maintain the support of the politically ‘unaware’ masses (Wilson, 1980). 
The theory of regulation was, however, re-invigorated by the neo-classical revolution, 
described as the ‘Chicago School’ of regulatory policy and developed mainly by three 
economists: Stigler, Posner and Peltzman. These liberal economists believed that 
markets operate effectively and can be perfectly self-sustaining, whereas politics was 
imperfect, serving narrow particularistic interests and compulsive in nature (Stigler, 
1971; Posner, 1971 & Peltzman, 1976). Peltzman (1976) went even further, arguing that 
governments were able to act against the wishes of large economic interests. 
2.6.3 State Theory and the Changing Role of Government 
The debate regarding the changing role of the state within a globalised world context is 
not new (Rosenau, 1990; Camilleri & Falk, 1992; Ohmae, 1990; Strange, 1996; Held et 
Al., 1999). These discussions are centred on the influences of the external economy on 
states’ behaviour as actors and highlight the fact that such influences alter the economic 
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substance of states in essential ways due to states’ choices as actors and to a 
misconception of the nature of what had previously been believed to be predominantly 
national economies (Sorensen, 2004). 
One of the schools of thought related to State theory is the theory of ‘Retreat of State’, 
which is reflected in the works of Sorensen (2004), Held et Al. (1999). The ‘Retreat of 
State’ theory argues that the changing role of states in dealing with external influences 
should be seen as a serious threat to the power and autonomy of the state. The theory 
proposes that non-governmental stakeholders and markets are stronger than states. This 
theory argues that states are becoming weaker due to more power being shifted towards 
other actors. The thesis agrees with Wallington, Lawrence and Loechel, who argue that 
governance is about governments seeking to govern more effectively, rather than to 
govern less: “it is to improve the efficiency of public and private sector investment, and 
to better ensure the delivery of on-ground outcomes” (Wallington et al., 2007, p. 3).  
Due to the economic and political changes that have occurred, a new concept has 
emerged: that of the regulatory State. This notion was recognised by Sunstein (1990), 
Majone (1994), Braithwaite (2000), McGowan and Wallace (1996), Loughlin and Scott 
(1997) and Moran (2001), to name but a few. The main purposes of the Regulatory State 
are to improve the efficiency of the economy, promote competition, and protect 
consumers and citizens. Braithwaite addresses the fact that such a regulatory state 
should be compared to the new regulatory state, which he describes as seeking to 
accommodate the growing pluralism of modern governance. Similarly, Scott labels this 
era the ‘post-regulatory state’, which is very similar to Braithwaite’s ‘new regulatory 
state’. This includes self-regulation, soft regulation, framework regulation, responsive 
regulation, governance, and networks between public and private organisations (Knill 
& Lenschow, Modes of regulation in the governance of the European Union: towards a 
comprehensive evaluation, 2004).This will lead us to explore the changing role of the 
government in theories.  
Bell and Hindmoor (2009) argued that embedded states, those intertwined in complex 
governance arrangements, can meta-govern effectively, stating that governments have 
enhanced their capacity to achieve goals by developing closer relationships with non-
state actors.  According to them, the six core elements of meta-governance includes: 
steering, effectiveness, resourcing, democracy, accountability and legitimacy. 
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Moreover, Chhotray and Stoker (2009) in ‘Governance in Theory and Practice’ strongly 
implied that governance is not so much about theory as about practice. This thesis agrees 
with this understanding, thus emphasising the empirics of Internet governance to 
describe the practice of governance is essential.  Hence, governance is a regime that not 
only considers management of resources, people or institutions, but also ponders how 
relationships among different stakeholders impact their effectiveness and influence the 
process of development in their countries. Thus, an Internet governance regime is 
complex as it involves many issues, actors, mechanisms, procedures, and instruments, 
which will be explored in the next section. 
2.6.4 Regime and Institution Theory in Governing the Internet 
As defined by regime theory, which falls within the neo-liberal institutionalism camp, 
regimes are sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international 
relations (Krasner, 1983). Participants in regimes may include either state or non-state 
actors which may be respectively described as international or transnational regimes or 
a mixture of both (Yong, 1999). Recall, from the Introduction the United Nations 
Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) definition of Internet governance: 
“Internet governance is the development and application by Governments, the private 
sector, and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, 
decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape the evolution and use of the 
Internet” (WGIG, 2005, p. 3). The WGIG definition follows the pattern of frequently 
used definitions in the regime theory. WGIG is here, implicitly, identifying Internet 
governance as a regime. And that is exactly what it is: a regime in which both state and 
non-state actors participate in governance (Franda, 2001).  
The Internet governance regime is complex as it involves many issues, actors, 
mechanisms, procedures, and instruments. Recognition of Internet governance as a 
regime is not limited to the United Nations; it is also accepted by scholars such as Spar 
(1999), who considers it a private international regime. Similarly, Franda (2001) argued 
that the parameters of regime governance are shaped by a wide variety of private 
business firms, governments, universities and scientific, professional and epistemic 
communities spread across the globe.  
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As the Internet operates in different political and regulatory environments, it 
necessitates new ways of governance that lead to institutional changes. Predicting the 
future of the structures that will govern the Internet is difficult because of the rapid 
changes in technology, political and economic dynamics, and the social evolution that 
is affecting government and non-governmental actors. While the explanations are 
complementary, it seems likely that liberal institutionalist and cognitive regime theories 
will provide better tools for understanding those changes than oversimplified theories 
of hegemonic transition (Nye, 2014).  
Institutions and institutional processes that shape organisations and businesses are most 
often studied within the organisational field in which they are embedded. DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) define organisational fields as those organisations that, in aggregate, 
constitute a recognised part of institutional life, key suppliers, resource and product 
consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organisations that may influence the way 
organisations do things. The organisational fields are the basis for the diffusion of 
innovation or new practices across different actors. These innovations and new practices 
can be adopted due to coercive pressure/isomorphism (formal and informal pressures 
by other organisations on which the organisation is dependent), mimetic isomorphism 
(wanting to do what others are doing due to uncertainty –risk avoidance) and normative 
isomorphism (based on the accepted norms) (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). When 
investigating Internet governance, the focus would be on the Internet community and 
entities that are most involved in the Internet or share the same values. 
According to Fligstein (2001), organisational fields are influenced by institutions in 
three ways: by the societal practices/regulatory institutions which may influence the 
construction of the field through laws, regulations and infrastructure/technology; by 
embedded power relations between groups, which is adhered to according to local 
knowledge; and by actors within the field that have cognitive structures that utilise 
cultural frames to analyse the meanings of the actions of others. Institutional theory and 
organisational fields can, therefore, be used to examine how organisational, societal and 
local actors build consensus around the meaning of emerging issues, such as ‘Internet 
governance’, and thus lead to these practices being accepted (Scott Marshall et al., 
2005).  
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One way to understand how such normative and cultural cognitive institutions may 
influence economic behaviour and innovation in a cluster is to examine how connections 
or social networks among individuals in a community influence economic development 
(Putnam, 2000). Granovetter (1985) and Uzzi (1996) show how strong bonds may lead 
to high voluntary participation and civic engagement and is stronger in more 
homogenous societies and emerges through long historical processes, leading to dense 
interpersonal networks. These strong bonds form the basis for groups of people’s 
identities, business interests and professional associations and networks, and, thereby, 
contribute to economic development. A low degree of embeddedness in local social 
structures of Internet governance, on the other hand, may lead to isolation, lack of trust 
and knowledge-sharing and a pure profit-oriented approach. Stakeholder theory 
provides significant advantages due to its key theoretical approach to Internet 
governance, which will point us to multistakeholderism.  
2.6.5 Stakeholder Theory and Governance  
The extant empirical literature on stakeholder theory is generally supportive of a positive 
relationship between stakeholder-oriented management and performance, which is 
almost always measured in terms of financial returns. Most of this empirical literature 
took stakeholder performance as the independent variable, with economic performance 
as the dependent variable (Berman et al., 1999; Choi & Wang, 2009; Hillman & Keim, 
2001). 
This thesis underpins this perspective and asserts the argument, found in stakeholder 
literature, that the more stakeholder interests are overlapped or joined, the better the 
performance is (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Freeman, 1984; Freeman, Harrison & Wicks, 
2007). 
In the academic field, multi-stakeholder terminology evolved as part of the branching 
out of stakeholder theory. But what aspects of stakeholder theory are most relevant to 
Internet governance? According to Health and Norman (2004), stakeholder theory of 
governance is about how specific stakeholder groups should exercise oversight and 
control over management (e.g. which groups should be represented on the board, and 
how the board should function). In this context, Kofi Annan, the ex-Secretary General 
of the United Nations, established a Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) 
as a response to open issues over control of Internet resources left unresolved at the 
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World Summit on Information Society (WSIS) held in 2003 (Stauffacher & 
Kleinwachter, 2005). The working group, which included 40 participants from 
governments, the private sector, and civil society, was charged with developing a 
definition of Internet governance, which it devised as follows: “Internet governance is 
the development and application by Governments, the private sector and civil society, 
in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, 
and programmes that shape the evolution and use of the Internet” (WGIG, 2005, p. 3). 
This definition, adopted by the different stakeholders, including governments, has led 
both scholars and practitioners to resolve that the Internet is an example of 
multistakeholder governance. 
Nevertheless, it is inappropriate to speak of the multistakeholder model for Internet 
governance as though there were a single system of governance (DeNardis & Raymond, 
2013). Hence, one common question is: how should the Internet be governed? The short, 
common answer is: there is no unitary entity that can govern the Internet. This thesis is 
convinced that tasks such as regulations and policies are to be carried out by 
governments and that other tasks such as investment and development are to be handled 
by the private sector and other stakeholders, each in its area of expertise.  
 
2.7 Conclusion 
The literature reviewed in this chapter leads to some major conclusions. First, in the 
Internet governance debates, there has been a great interest in upholding traditional 
multistakeholder governance that seeks to balance governmental power with that of 
other stakeholders. But finding this appropriate balance of powers is technically and 
institutionally complex and unmanageable; in some areas, it may be appropriate to have 
less governmental involvement, while other areas fall within the traditional jurisdiction 
of government. According to Kooiman (2003), the multistakeholder approach can be 
conceptualised as a mode of governance that involves actors of different natures 
(governmental and non-governmental), expressing different interests, in a political 
process characterized by interaction among actors and interconnection among levels of 
authorities.  
From a theoretical rational perspective, the role of the government is to be changed to 
respond to governance requirements by empowering other stakeholders, while still 
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keeping its facilitator role. Therefore, we can argue that the need to revise the 
multistakeholderism and governance concepts is more than an academic problem. 
Although part of literature on Internet governance promotes multistakeholderism as the 
model of choice, it does not directly address the question of how multistakeholder 
Internet governance does or should occur in practice. For scholars and practitioners of 
Internet governance, the argument advanced here is valuable in that it calls into question 
the idea that an Internet governed in a multistakeholder manner is increasingly 
threatened by the resonant divergence between governments, the private sector and civil 
society.  
Second, the literature agrees that the Internet spurs countries’ economic development 
and growth; however, good governance is also indispensable for such development. 
Many scholars and researchers have confirmed the positive link between improved 
quality of governance and economic growth (Keefer, 1997; Campos and Nugent, 1999; 
Kaufmann et al. 1999a and 1999b; Mehanna et al., 2010; Han et al., 2014).  
Moreover, the 2 case studies from Brazil and Kenya investigated by this thesis showed 
the impact of multistakeholder participation outcomes on Internet development and 
economic performance. It is clear that there is no unique ‘multistakeholder Internet 
governance’ approach, because the Internet governance ecosystem is made up of 
different governance models in varying degrees. Examination of these case studies has 
shown that in a multistakeholder model mechanisms must learn to work alongside or in 
relation to other approaches to dialogue and in a transparent way. Thus, we can argue 
that some governance functions are performed in ways that are clearly not instances of 
multistakeholderism; still less are such functions performed in a coordinated way. 
Third, empirical evidence was reviewed on the impact of broadband Internet on the 
economy with different formulas and variables. In general, despite the methodology and 
divergence between cross-country and single-country approaches, every study 
examined by this thesis found a positive economic impact from broadband Internet. 
However, the literature fails to link the relationship between Internet governance and 
economic growth. From a theoretical perspective, our knowledge on the impact of 
Internet governance on the economy is very limited. While the extant literature on the 
Internet mostly showed its positive impact on economic performance, the literature fails 
to relate economic performance to governance. 
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Forth, Internet governance has proved to be a crucial matter and of great importance on 
the political level, and thus it is discussed at the highest diplomatic levels. Whether 
democratic or autocratic, governments want a voice in Internet governance nationally 
and globally. Some governments are concerned about national security issues that 
threaten state stability. Others are concerned about human rights and freedom of 
expression. Still others insist that decreasing the digital divide is fundamental to 
realising the full benefit of the Internet. For these reasons, the political debate on Internet 
governance is still engaged. 
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Chapter 3: Conceptual Framework 
3.1 Introduction 
The WSIS stimulated multistakeholder approaches for Internet policy formulation at 
national levels (Adam et al., 2007). As such, multistakeholder governance at the national 
level could credibly be considered an innovative concept, part of a wider global debate 
about rethinking governance in a globalised world (Mueller & Wagner, 2014). 
As discussed in the previous chapter, several examples of multistakeholder inclusion 
already exist at the national level. Although it does not seem easy for governmental 
decision-making processes to open themselves to participation by other stakeholders, it 
is important to stress that stakeholder participation is already a reality. Indeed, the 
aforementioned examples highlight that multistakeholderism is not a mere slogan and 
can be utilised to propose concrete solutions, which can be adopted or exploited by 
national policymakers as well as international organisations. 
In this context, this chapter presents the ‘Multistakeholder Internet Governance – 
Lebanon’ (MIG-L) as a conceptual model underpinned by the reviewed literature, 
derived from qualitative findings and endorsed by quantitative results illustrating the 
reality and dynamics between Lebanese stakeholders, and it links Internet governance 
to economic growth in an empirical setting.  
This research frames its work with reference to the working definition of Internet 
governance, developed by the United Nations World Summit on the Information Society 
(WSIS) in the Tunis Agenda and underpinning the regime theory: “A working definition 
of Internet governance is the development and application by governments, the private 
sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, principles, norms, 
rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape the evolution and use of 
the Internet” (WSIS, 2005b). 
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3.2 Proposed Model 
The literature on the Internet governance debate, i.e., the debate between scholars 
insisting on the effective role for governments in governance (Bell & Hindmoor, 2009; 
Goldsmith & Wu, 2006; Scharpf, 1994; Dunsire, 1996; Jessop, 1997) and others 
supporting stakeholders’ involvement (Murray, 2006; Netanel, 2000; Barlow, 1996; 
Lessig, 1999), suggests the need to develop a multistakeholder model with a new 
approach, taking into consideration governments’ reservations and stakeholders’ 
expectations through re-negotiation of the relationship and interaction between these 
different stakeholders in a multistakeholder environment. 
According to Wilson (2005), Internet governance comes from a social formation, which 
consists of patterned interactions among elites in four sectors of the economy, with 
individuals seeking to maximize their material and ideational interests by restructuring 
selected rules of the game that most affect their access to and control over the scarce 
services and goods provided by new information and communication technologies. The 
proposed model (MIG-L) illustrated in figure 3.1 adopts Wilson’s interpretation and 
shows multistakeholder Internet governance as a social interaction between different 
stakeholder groups -governmental, private, academic, civil and technical (stakeholders)- 
carried out by the shared principles of multistakeholderism (foundations) and linking 
multistakeholder Internet governance and Internet development (enablers) to Economic 
growth (target). 
The conceptual model for the present study is presented in Figure 3.1. The relevant 
independent variables in the model are the government, the private sector, civil society, 
technical & International organisations and the academic community. The dependent 
variables are multistakeholder Internet governance and growth economy.  
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Figure 3.1: MIG-L conceptual model 
 This model is characterised by balanced, multidirectional and sustainable relations 
among stakeholders, wherein they are able to discuss and collaborate in an open, 
transparent environment to reach common agreements on Internet governance. 
However, would different stakeholders have an equal voice in this model of 
multistakeholder participation? More pointedly, what model to be applied to achieve 
effective governance? 
Liddicoat and Doria (2012) explain that while there is no one single multistakeholder 
model; it is a form of participatory democracy that allows all of those who have a stake 
in a policy to take part in crafting that policy. While the traditional model of 
multistakeholder Internet governance suggests a balanced relationship between the 
stakeholders’ groups, this research propose a conceptual model (“MIG-L”) with a new 
re-negotiation between the government and other stakeholders. The proposed model 
advocates the involvement of non-governmental stakeholders, but government still 
retains the capacity to ‘steer at a distance’ within the model. Governments are the 
representatives of citizens within their borders and hold a wide variety of 
constitutionally legitimate powers (Hirst & Thompson, 2000). Additionally, public 
sector leaders represent institutions with authority, legitimacy and stability, elements 
sorely needed during the transition (Wilson, 2005).  
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The qualitative and quantitative findings revealed that the government in Lebanon is the 
key actor for all Internet-related issues, hence the need to reconsider the government’s 
role and its relationship with other stakeholders. The evidence presented here 
underpinned by the reviewed literature confirms that governments remain the primary 
actors in world politics; their preferences on regulatory issues have their origins in 
domestic politics (Drezner, 2004). Therefore, “MIG-L” proposes that the government 
remain the primary actor, especially regarding issues related to national security. 
However, it is not the only actor -other stakeholders can contribute through their varied 
expertise - in their respective roles - in a multistakeholder participation environment.  
Drawing on the literature reviewed in the earlier chapter, the proposed conceptual model 
illustrated in Figure 3.1 proposes a complementary diagram (Figure 3.2). The diagram 
provides a rationale for stakeholders’ interactions and for the results expected to flow 
from the multistakeholder participation. 
  
Figure 3.2: Diagram of multistakeholder participation 
4.2.1 Multistakeholder Process Foundations 
Multistakeholderism in Internet governance refers most directly to the words “ in their 
respective roles” in Paragraph 34 of the Tunis Agenda in the second phase of WSIS held 
in Tunisia in 2005: “A working definition of Internet governance is the development 
and application by governments, the private sector and civil society, in their respective 
roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes 
that shape the evolution and use of the Internet” (WSIS, 2005b, p. 6). 
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Hemmati (2002) notes that multistakeholder processes inform decision makers on 
issues, generate support for decisions, identify solutions to problems and encourage 
stakeholders to take ownership of issues. It has been effective in many social, political, 
economic and technical contexts, especially when the problems that have arisen are new, 
fast-changing and complex with important social and cultural dimensions. With the 
Internet becoming the 21st century global infrastructure for commerce and 
communication, a new regime of governance is emerging with inclusiveness, openness, 
transparency, and accountability as attributes of authority (Antonova, 2007). 
These attributes are endorsed by the findings of this research and reflect the Internet 
Society (ISOC) approach for multistakeholder Internet governance where ISOC 
recognised four attributes for successful multistakeholder decision-making:  
 -Inclusiveness is the basis of legitimacy in collaborative decision-making. Those 
significantly affected by a decision should have the chance to be involved in making it. 
Inclusiveness is not just an admirable goal but an essential part of an effective process. 
The less inclusive a process is, the less likely it is to engender the trust and support of 
those outside of the process.  
- Transparency of inputs, process, and decision-making is fundamental to the Internet. 
The global technical community has long practiced a publicly archived process for 
developing technical standards. Transparency is also essential legitimacy as it can 
document that all stakeholders were heard. 
- Collaboration is the process of two or more people or institutions coming together to 
achieve a common goal. The Internet is the outcome of the collaborative efforts of 
different actors. It benefits from an increasing number of actors teaming up and working 
together. 
- Accountability is when decision-making power is transferred from a principal (e.g. the 
citizens) to an agent (e.g. government). There must be a mechanism in place for holding 
the agent to account for its decisions and, if necessary, for imposing sanctions, 
ultimately by removing the agent from power (ISOC, 2016).  
The proposed multistakeholder model suggested by this thesis is not about balancing 
these attributes but rather ensuring that a framework exists where each stakeholder 
understands his/her responsibility to act not only in their own interest, but also in the 
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interest of the Internet ecosystem as a whole. In essence, the process should result in 
outcomes that are win-win rather than zero-sum games. National security and a healthy 
Internet environment are mutually reinforcing in the long run. All stakeholders must 
recognise and act on their responsibility for a stable, resilient, advanced and secure 
Internet in collaboration with all others, or no one will be successful. 
4.2.2 Stakeholders: MIG-L Social Interaction Origin 
 In line with Wilson’s (2005) views that Internet governance comes from a social 
formation that consists of patterned interactions among elites, ‘MIG-L’ illustrates and 
explains the origin of “Internet governance” that involves diversity of stakeholder 
groups. Here, multistakeholderism in Internet governance refers directly to the WGIG 
definition and to Paragraph 49 of WSIS Declaration of Principles (WSIS, 2003), which 
states that the management of the Internet encompasses both technical and public policy 
issues and should involve all stakeholders and relevant intergovernmental and 
international organizations. In this context, stakeholder groups are: government, the 
private sector, academia, civil society, the technical community and International 
organisations.   
However, the most central element of multistakeholder governance is the definition of 
the responsibilities of various classes of stakeholders to participate effectively in and 
influence the evolving governance systems. Here the contested aspect of the WSIS 
definition – and of multistakeholder approaches more generally – is the term ‘in their 
respective roles’. “MIG-L” accepts the definition given by WSIS to different roles and 
responsibilities that are defined in paragraph 35 of the Tunis Agenda, which affirms that 
Internet governance concerns both technical and public policy issues and ‘should 
involve all stakeholders’. It delineates roles and responsibilities for each stakeholder 
group. The ‘sovereign right’ of policy authority for international Internet-related public 
policy issues belongs to States, while the private sector should continue to have an 
‘important role’ in developing the Internet in ‘technical and economic fields’. 
International organizations are tasked with the development of Internet-related technical 
standards and relevant policies, while civil society should continue to play an ‘important 
role in Internet matters, especially at community level’ (WSIS, 2005b). 
Lebanon is considered a fertile environment for Internet governance as there are many 
Lebanese experts involved in the Internet technical community and in international 
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organisations such as the Internet Society (ISOC), Regional Internet Registry (RIR), the 
Internet corporation for Names and numbers (ICANN), the World Bank and United 
Nations agencies. As the technical community is deeply involved in Internet operation, 
standard-setting and development, this community could make a permanent and 
valuable contribution to the stability, security, functioning and evolution of the Internet. 
As for the government, and as highlighted earlier, while there is no unified policy for 
Internet governance in Lebanon, the government is the only body responsible for 
implementing regulations and policies for the Internet, and nothing can be done without 
its consent. The term ‘government’ is unambiguous in this case, since the Internet is 
actually administrated by the council of ministers, the ministry of telecommunications 
and the sole public operator, OGERO.  
Lebanese civil society is very dynamic, and its presence and participation in the global 
Internet governance scene has increased drastically. Its main focus is monitoring 
government compliance and the enforcement of laws. Hence, it is important to promote 
collaborative dialogue and partnership between the government and civil society. 
The private sector is the main pillar of the Lebanese economy. The private sector was 
the first to introduce internet service in Lebanon, and it helped to develop the ICT sectors 
and allowed the banking, health, educational, university and manufacturing industries 
to develop. Nevertheless, the private sector also seeks access to political resources, with 
the aim of influencing governance mechanisms and regulations. However, the final 
decision rests ultimately in the hands of the politicians, whose interests inform the 
government’s verdict. 
The high ranking scored by Lebanon in the world bank and International 
Telecommunications Union studies assessed in this thesis is owed mainly to the 
advanced academic system and knowledge purchasing. The primary motivation to 
interact with epistemic academic is to share and disseminate knowledge. While the main 
role is engaging in research and innovation, Lebanese academics can also be helpful in 
policy-making and the formation of regulations.  
4.2.3 Enablers 
Under the monopoly system, active and direct participation in setting policies was 
narrowly restricted to the telecommunication ministry officials and their counterparts in 
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the government. Since who sits at the table helps determine who gets what services 
under what terms, the “MIG-L” approach is conceptualised as a mode of governance 
that involves actors of different natures (governmental and non-governmental) 
expressing different interests, in a political process characterized by interaction among 
actors and interconnection among levels of authorities (Kooiman, 2003).  For Souter 
(2017), multistakeholder approaches tend to be favoured either because supporters want 
a change in governance (usually by diluting the power of governments and/or 
companies) or they want to improve the Internet by adding diversity and expertise and 
by encouraging consensus-building on the issues being governed.  
In Internet governance, particular attention has been paid to internet development. In 
this light, the development of the Internet has turned out to be more similar to that of 
the telecommunications infrastructure. Thus, the practical challenge in the current 
search for a suitable form of Internet governance is generating a binding and legitimate 
regulatory capacity for a dynamically-evolving infrastructure, amidst intensified 
conditions of transnationalism and decentralisation (Hofmann, 2005).  
4.2.4 Target 
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
report (2009), new broadband infrastructure investments are good targets for economic 
stimulus spending because many projects can be initiated relatively quickly, are labour-
intensive, can minimise economic leakages, and may promise stronger marginal impacts 
on supply and productivity. Hence, there is a direct link between economic growth and 
the adoption of new technology (Heeks, 1999). This is reflected also in the study by 
Roller & Waverman (2001), whose result showed a strong relation between investment 
in ICT infrastructure and productivity growth. According to Altig and Rupert (1999), 
Internet access is correlated to the economic growth performance.  
The argument of the neo-institutional economists is that improving indicators of 'good 
governance' is a necessary condition for creating the institutional conditions of lowering 
transaction costs. Thus, a competitive market is conducive to increasing efficiency in 
the allocation of resources and the pace of economic growth (Mira & Hammadache, 
2017). Several econometric studies of Kaufmann and Kraay (2003), Hall and Jones 
(1999), Knack and Keefer (1997) and Barro (1996) show that the variables of good 
governance such as control of corruption, stability of property rights and democracy are 
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closely correlated with variables such as GDP growth rate per capita, investment and 
human capital development. These studies show that improved indices of "good 
governance" have positive effects on economic growth and provide long-term 
convergence with the so-called developed countries (Mira & Hammadache, 2017). 
Khan (2004) illustrates the results of good governance among countries in slow- and 
rapid-development indices obtained during a panel of econometric studies of the IRIS 
centre at Maryland University and the World Bank, the empirical results of which reveal 
a strong correlation between good governance and GDP growth rate.  
Suitably, the “MIG-L” model proposed by this thesis correlates Internet governance and 
economic performance in line with Khan’s findings and the general pattern illustrated 
in figure 3.3.  
 
 
Figure 3.3: Governance impact on economy growth. Source Khan (2004) 
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4.3 Critical Success factors 
But what about the approach that makes the governance process adaptable, robust and 
sustainable? And how can we make sure that the multistakeholder Internet governance 
process is successful and continues to evolve?  
Economists have recently devoted considerable attention to the impact of social 
structure and networks on the economy (Zuckerman, 2003; Dutta and Jackson, 2003). 
The concept of the organizational field has been extensively dealt with in the literature 
on institutional theory, in which it is used to examine how organisational, societal and 
local actors build consensus around the meaning of emerging issues, such as ‘Internet 
governance’, and thus lead to acceptance of certain practices (Marshall et al., 2005). 
Underpinning the Institutional theory, Granovetter (1985) and Uzzi (1999) show how 
strong bonds may lead to high voluntary participation and civic engagement, which form 
the basis for people’s group identity, business interests and professional associations 
and networks and, thereby, contribute to economic development. Therefore, the stronger 
the multistakeholder structure, the better the performance of the Internet governance 
process.  
In the wider context, all stakeholders need to move toward the optimal area to achieve 
not only resiliency but also sustainability.  The more resilient the ‘MIG-L’ is, the faster 
Internet development in Lebanon will be. Hence, and in line with Khan’s (2004) 
findings and the general pattern of the impact of governance on the economy illustrated 
in figure 4.4, “MIG-L” predicts that more vigorous governance contributes to a higher 
GDP (Figure 3.4). 
 
Figure 3.4: Economic performance Scenario 
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To reach the optimal area and achieve a robust MIG-L, decisions should be taken 
through the interaction of participating interests, rather than the exercise of power by a 
single sector, interest group or even representatives of a simple majority position. 
Evidently, such interaction has proved successful in many cases (Spuy, 2017). Looking 
at stakeholders’ positions related to power and authority, the research findings revealed 
that the government is the sole player with full authority but has no expertise, while the 
private sector, academics and the technical community are a reservoir for knowledge 
and expertise but have no authority (Figure 3.5).  
 
 
Figure 3.5: Reaching the optimal area of multistakeholder Internet governance structure 
Figure 3.5 illustrates the research findings on stakeholders’ positions related to power 
and authority and helps to clarify where expertise and interest lie and to identify gaps of 
participation.  Not surprisingly, the distribution of power between social factions and 
classes provides a good historical explanation of the pace and direction of institutional 
change in many countries (Bardhan, 2000). 
However, the multistakeholder approach is challenged by risks. Among the challenges 
is the ascendant phenomenon of unilateral decision-making. Sometimes this is by 
individual states; sometimes it is by Internet companies working in a silo on their terms 
and services (Spuy, 2017). Hence, the re-negotiation between the government and other 
stakeholders underpinned by the code of good governance suggests several important 
key assumptions. First, that all stakeholders will play a role in Internet governance in 
their areas of expertise or authority but not everyone will decide on everything. “MIG-
L” suggests that all stakeholders will have either direct or indirect involvement 
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depending on the needed expertise, shaping the governance ecosystem in a context in 
which the Internet grows to become a key enabler to achieve inclusive and sustainable 
development for all. Second, it emphasises that principles, norms, rules and decision-
making procedures must be transparent and respected and implemented by all. Third, 
Internet governance is concerned not only with the Internet’s infrastructure and 
administration, but also with its evolution and use, so that Internet governance is 
inherently oriented toward the future and the impact on economy and society. 
The research findings and data analysis show that Lebanese stakeholders come from 
different backgrounds with different ideologies forming small groups of the social 
network that consists of businessmen and politicians to monopolise power. Khan (2004) 
explains that development is an ugly and conflict-ridden process because the social 
structures involved are rapidly changing, new classes are emerging, and new wealth is 
being accumulated at historically unprecedented rates. He asserts that social conflicts 
are intense and that stable and productive political constituencies on which viable 
democracies can be based are often absent. The absence of democracy increases the 
chances that small groups can continue with their socially damaging rent-seeking 
(Olson, 2000; North, 1990). 
Therefore, failing the code of good governance, “MIG-L” will be challenged with 
unilateral decision-making risk (fragmented approach), which is illustrated above in 
Figure 3.4. In the context of fragmented governance (scenario 2), “MIG-L” shows how 
creating fragmented governance may lead to instability and deterioration of the 
governance process outcome as different stakeholders engage in the manipulation of 
public policy and economic conditions as a strategy for promoting group interest and 
increasing profits. Far from being a service provider, the state is an instrument in the 
hands of contending classes, groups, and political entrepreneurs, each attempting to 
capture resources and steer the transformation in specific directions (Khan, 2004). 
Comparing the multistakeholder approach to a monopolistic approach, the two 
approaches give contradictory and divergent results.  The findings of this research 
revealed that, while the Lebanese government does deliver public services, the service 
delivery model does not enable any economic growth. Historically, the critical area of 
state failure has been the absence of adequate institutional and political capacity in the 
governments of developing countries to assist in and accelerate dynamic transformation. 
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Without strategies to enhance this role of the state, sustained progress on service 
delivery is also unlikely (Khan, 2004). 
It can be concluded that the above presented conceptual developments were inspired by 
a real shift in the Internet governance regime, from the kind of unequal distribution of 
power associated with representative democracy to a more accessible, inclusive and 
collaborative decision-making process (Antonova, 2007).  
4.4 Conclusion 
A conceptual model for multistakeholder Internet governance is developed for this study 
to investigate the direct and indirect relationships between Internet governance and 
economic growth. 
With the advancement of multistakeholderism as a governance model, determining a 
suitable governance model turns out to be challenging. This may require multifaceted 
theoretical and conceptual tools that the researcher hopes this study can help in 
providing. 
While the extant literature on the Internet mostly shows the positive impact of the 
Internet on economic performance, the literature fails to relate economic performance 
to governance. Accordingly, underpinning the theoretical framework set, this chapter 
attempted to reframe the traditional multistakeholder Internet governance framework in 
developing a new conceptual model mapping the social interactions among stakeholders 
and linking it to economic growth.  
The new conceptual model “MIG-L” proposed here, stages multistakeholderism as 
social interaction among the five Lebanese stakeholder groups; government, private, 
academic, civil society and technical community. It reframes the traditional model of 
multistakeholder Internet governance, where government opposition to this model 
makes the implementation of multistakeholder participation difficult and even 
impossible. Pointedly, the conceptual model attempts to link Internet governance to 
economic growth in correlating its multistakeholder participation structure to economic 
performance. The model predicts that the stronger the MIG-L structure is, the better the 
Internet and economic performance will be; the weaker the MIG-L is, the weaker the 
performance will be. 
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Chapter 4: Methodology and Research Design 
4.1 Introduction 
 The previous chapters identified knowledge gaps and relevant research and studies on 
Internet governance and its impact on Internet and economic growth. This chapter 
locates the study within the appropriate research paradigm and justifies the selection of 
methodology, design and procedures for the research. Both quantitative and qualitative 
data are useful to examine and understand Lebanese views on multistakeholder Internet 
governance and what drives and hinders its impact on economic growth.  
This chapter will present the conceptual framework for the study wherein quantitative 
and qualitative data will jointly provide rich and complementary information. This 
mixed-methods research uses a pragmatic epistemological approach as a paradigm with 
a methodological lens to collect data employing a concurrent parallel design. An online 
survey was used to generate data for the quantitative strand while semi-structured 
interview was used to generate data for qualitative strand.  
As mentioned in chapter one, the aim of this research is to investigate Lebanese 
perceptions and thoughts on multistakeholder Internet governance and the latter’s 
implications for Internet development and economic growth. Accordingly, the analysis 
examines and explores the relationship between the different stakeholders, reflecting 
their views on Internet governance through quantification and in-depth investigation. 
The quantitative findings examine and generate insights on stakeholders’ relationships 
and on the causal relationship between Internet governance and development and 
economic growth. The findings explore the interpretation of the phenomena and validate 
the conceptual model. Hence, this research incorporates both quantitative and 
qualitative triangulation of data.  
4.2 The Research Framework 
Researchers start a project by setting a framework stating certain claims with 
assumptions about what they will learn and how they will learn it during their inquiry. 
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These claims coalesce into what are called paradigms (Lincoln & Guba, 2000); 
philosophical assumptions, epistemologies, and ontologies (Crotty, 1998); or research 
methodologies (Neuman, 2000). Philosophically, researchers make claims about what 
is knowledge (ontology), how we know it (epistemology), how we write about it 
(rhetoric), and the processes for studying it (methodology) (Creswell J. W., 1994). 
Crotty (1998) established the groundwork for a research design framework with four 
questions to be considered:  
1. The epistemology or the theory of knowledge embedded in the theoretical 
perspective. 
2. The theoretical perspective or the philosophical stance that lies behind the 
methodology in questions (e.g., positivism/post-positivism, interpretivism, 
critical theory, etc.). 
3. The methodology, strategy or plan of action that links methods to outcomes 
(e.g., experimental research, survey research, ethnography, etc.).  
4. The methods, techniques and procedures that we propose to use (e.g., 
questionnaire, interview. focus group, etc.). 
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Figure 4.1: Research design framework 
These four questions show the interrelated levels of decisions that go into the process of 
designing a research project. Suitably, this research design adopted Crotty's model 
conceptualised in Figure 5.1. 
Figure 4.1 displays how the knowledge claim (theoretical perspectives), strategy of 
inquiry (methodology), and method converge to form the researcher’s framework for 
this research. By applying “pragmatism” as a knowledge claim, “quantitative and 
qualitative” as the strategy for inquiry and “survey and semi-structured interview” for 
the research method, we can identify that the approach to inquiry is mixed: quantitative 
and qualitative. 
Approch to 
research 
"Mixed 
Methods"
Knowldge Claim
"Pragmatism"
Strategy of 
inquiry 
"Quantitative 
& Qualitative"
Method
"Questionnaire & 
Semi-structured 
Interview"
 
Convergent parallel design 
Collect both types of data concurrently 
Analyse the two data sets separately  
Interpret combined results 
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4.2.1 Pragmatism as Knowledge Claim 
Pragmatism derives from the work of Peirce, James, Mead, and Dewey (Cherryholmes, 
1992). As a philosophical underpinning for mixed methods studies, Morgan (2007), 
Patton (1990), and Tashakkori & Teddlie (2010) conveyed importance the importance 
of pragmatism for focusing attention on the research problem in social science research 
and then using pluralistic approaches to derive knowledge about the problem. According 
to Cherryholmes (1992), pragmatists believe that we need to stop asking questions about 
reality and the laws of nature; they would like to simply change the subject  (Rorty, 
Pragmatism Without Method, 1991). 
For pragmatists, an ideology is true only if it works and generates practical 
consequences for society. Hence, pragmatists focus not on whether a proposition fits a 
particular ontology, but whether it suits a purpose and is capable of creating action 
(Rorty, 1998). Hence, being pragmatic, the researcher has the flexibility to choose the 
approach and research design that best meet his need, the research aim and objectives. 
Pragmatism is a thoughtful alternative for the researcher who seeks mixed methods, 
different assumptions and different forms of data collection and analysis. Pragmatists 
do not see the world as an absolute unity. In a similar way, mixed methods researchers 
look to many approaches to collect and analyse data rather than using one of the 
traditional approaches (quantitative or qualitative) (Creswell, 2009). 
In this way, this research promoted and adapted Creswell views on mixed methods, 
asserting that pragmatism opens the door to multiple methods, different worldviews, 
and different assumptions, as well as to different forms of data collection and analysis 
in the mixed methods study (Creswell, 2009). 
4.2.2 Strategy of Inquiry (Methodology) 
This research uses a mixed methods approach incorporating both quantitative and 
qualitative data. In this research, empirical findings show the level of significance of the 
Internet stakeholders’ relationships and views on Internet governance and its impact on 
Internet development and the economy. The qualitative information, on the other hand, 
explores interpretation of the phenomena. Therefore, this research approach is described 
as a convergent methodology, ‘multimethod’ (Campbell and Fiske, 1959), convergent 
validation or what has been called ‘triangulation’ (Webb et al., 1966). 
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Mixed methods research is becoming increasingly recognized as the third major 
research approach or paradigm. According to Johnson et al. (2007), mixed methods 
research adopts a pragmatic method and system, based on a view of knowledge as being 
both socially constructed and based upon the reality of the world we experience and live 
in. Johnson et al. (2007) describe how Campbell and Fiske’s (1959) article on ‘multiple 
operationalism’, introducing the idea of triangulation, is sometimes viewed as 
pioneering the use of mixed methods. This encouraged other researchers to examine 
multiple approaches to data collection in their studies and prompted others to mix 
methods, and soon approaches associated with field methods such as observations and 
interviews (qualitative data) were combined with traditional surveys (quantitative data) 
(Sieber, 1973). 
The present research deployed a quantitative survey using a probability sampling 
technique to reach a large population and a qualitative interview with a purposive 
sampling technique involving interviews of decision makers and business figures from 
the different stakeholder groups. The aim is to obtain stakeholders’ specific views and 
hear their voices about Internet governance and then cross-validate results from the 
quantitative survey with qualitative findings. Hence, using multiple methods, the results 
triangulate, converge or corroborate one another, strengthening the validity of the 
findings (Greene et al., 1989). 
Seeking convergence across different methods, different types of mixing data emerged. 
For example, the results from one method can help develop or inform the other method 
(Greene et al., 1989). Alternatively, one method can be nested within another method to 
provide insight into different levels or units of analysis (Tashakkori & Tedllie, 1989). 
This led to the development of procedures for mixed methods strategies of inquiry; the 
adoption of numerous terms found in the literature, such as multimethod, convergence, 
integrated, and combined; (Creswell, 1994) and the shaping of procedures for research 
(Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2010). While the quantitative research involves deduction, 
hypothesis testing and statistical analysis, the qualitative focuses on induction, 
exploration and qualitative analysis.  
Mixed methods have been defined as the collection or analysis of both quantitative and 
qualitative data in a single study in which the data are collected concurrently or 
sequentially, are given a priority, and involve the integration of data at one or more 
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stages in the process of research (Creswell et al., 2003). According to Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie (2004), a mixed methods mode of inquiry makes use of induction (to 
identify patterns), deduction (to test theories and hypotheses) and abduction (to uncover 
and rely on the best explanations for understanding one’s results).  
For this research, a convergent parallel-mixed method is used to collect diverse types of 
data to provide a more complete understanding of multistakeholderism and Internet 
governance and the impact thereof on Internet development to achieve a country’s 
economic growth. Here, the researcher collected both quantitative and qualitative data 
at the same time during the study and then integrated the results and findings in the 
interpretation of the research investigation in chapter 7. It is a form of mixed method 
design in which the researcher converges or merges quantitative and qualitative data to 
provide a comprehensive analysis of the research problem (Creswell, 2013). 
This combination of the two research methods is not only to validate, contradict or 
develop theories but also to achieve triangulation through integrating the quantitative 
results with in-depth interview findings. Greene et al. (1989) identify five main 
rationales behind using mixed methods: triangulation, complementarity, development, 
initiation, and expansion. Additionally, combining the quantitative and qualitative 
research methods overcomes the limitations in each of the methodologies used alone. 
Hence, using multiple methods, the results converge or corroborate one another, 
strengthening the validity of the findings. The quantitative strand is discussed in chapter 
5 and the qualitative approach is discussed in chapter 6. 
However, some voices have criticized the use of mixed methods. For example, Bryman 
(2007) argued that there is still considerable confusion concerning how mixed methods 
findings can be integrated. Moreover, Giddings (2006) was more antagonistic: “mixed 
methods are nothing more than positivism dressed in drag” (p. 198). Besides, from a 
practical and cost perspective, integrating interviews or participant observation into a 
quantitative study costs more and increases the time required for both participants and 
the researcher. According to Krahn et al. (1995), collecting both quantitative and 
qualitative data can be expensive. 
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4.2.3 Research Methods 
As discussed in the previous section, there is a consideration of literature on research 
methods that advocates the use of mixed methods. This mixed research used qualitative 
and quantitative research methods to collect data employing a concurrent parallel design 
where both an online survey was used to generate data for the quantitative strand and 
semi-structured interviews to generate data for qualitative strand.  
Quantitatively, there are number of reasons for using an online survey in this research, 
principally, such a survey allows the researcher to reach a large and dispersed 
community at a low cost, and it gathers data from larger sample than would be possible 
using any other technique. This data collection technique is considered appropriate for 
this research as it facilitates the exploration of various actors’ experience. According to 
Babbie (1990), surveys use questionnaires for data collection, with the intent of 
generalising from a sample to a population. 
Hence, an online survey (Appendix A) was deployed using Monkey Survey platform. 
The questionnaire design of the survey was critical and important as it affects the 
response rate and provides the appropriate data needed for the research. Inadequate 
design will not only discourage respondents from taking part but could also increase 
measurement error (Oppenheim, 1992).  
In this online survey, closed-ended questions were applied in two categories: 
dichotomous and multiple dichotomous. Closed questions can be attitudinal as well as 
factual (Oppenheim, 1992). The multiple dichotomous questions provide a list of 
possible responses and allow the respondent to select a response from the list. On the 
other hand, the dichotomous question allows the respondent to choose from two possible 
responses: “yes” or “no”. The Likert Scale was also used, allowing respondents to select 
a choice that best demonstrates their level of agreement with a given statement. 
At the end of the survey, two open-ended questions were used to give more space and 
flexibility for respondents to express their views and reflections on the strengths and 
weaknesses of multistakeholderism, and how multistakeholder Internet governance can 
best support Lebanon’s economy.  
From the qualitative approach, a purposive sampling technique was used more to 
provide a more complete understanding of the contested topic of Internet governance 
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than to verify findings from the quantitative survey. Purposive sampling leads to greater 
depth of information from a smaller number of carefully selected cases, whereas 
probability sampling leads to greater breadth of information from a larger number of 
units selected to be representative of the population (Patton, 2002). 
Therefore, a purposive interview was deployed targeting governmental and business 
figures, decision makers and experts to obtain their views and hear their voices about 
Internet governance. In this approach, a purposive sampling technique was used on the 
assumption that interviews provide a more complete understanding of the contested 
topic of Internet governance than does quantitative data alone; moreover, they are 
believed to verify findings from the survey. Purposive sampling leads to greater depth 
of information from a smaller number of carefully selected cases, whereas probability 
sampling leads to greater breadth of information from a larger number of units selected 
to be representative of the population (Patton, 2002). Thus, for this qualitative approach, 
several elites were selected for semi-structured in-depth interviews. 
4.3 Convergent Mixed Methods Research Design 
The research design selected for this study is a convergent mixed-methods design to 
examine the same phenomenon: Internet governance and its impact on the economy. As 
the conceptual model (Figure 3.1) illustrates, this research proposes an empirical setting 
to investigate the theoretical relational path of Internet governance drawn from the 
literature and to link it to economic growth. The conceptual framework seeks to quantify 
the data (Malhotra, 2002) for the purpose of explaining the causal relationships. The 
approach for this investigation is explanatory and comprises quantitative research tools 
and techniques. However, for further conceptual validation, qualitative information 
might be worthwhile in any research approach. Therefore, qualitative information is 
gathered so as to generate in-depth insights. Accordingly, the proposed research 
incorporates both quantitative and qualitative triangulation of data where empirical 
findings show the level of significance of the relationship and qualitative information 
explores interpretation of the phenomena. 
4.3.1 Quantitative Strand 
Quantitative research is looked upon by Morales (1995) as supporter to   positivism and 
encroached on hypothetical-deductive processes and objectives. Just like any other 
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research, quantitative or positivist research has its own expectations. However, 
Reichardt and Cook (1979) assert that quantitative research has no room for any 
personal matters or natural occurrence -it only focuses on finding out the exact 
truthfulness or the main cause of a phenomenon.  
Knowledge, understanding and keeping track of human experiences are some of the 
fundamental things that quantitative research believes in. According to Stanfield (2006), 
scientific principles should be observed, and failure to observe these principles can 
cause the researcher’s findings and the researcher to be overlooked. This research 
approach provides a concrete answer to the research question scientifically, which is 
defined in an objective way and measured through statistical tools and techniques 
(Rosner, 1990). 
However, Leedy and Ormrod (2005) argue that positivism is criticised by the 
interpretivist for ignoring the role of the human actors when it comes to the constructing 
reality. In addition, critical theorists attack the positivists’ claims of generalization, their 
view of the world as a closed system, and their tendency to ignore the world’s 
complexity;  Scott and Usher (2011) note that positivism can be criticised on the grounds 
that it fails to understand some of the most essential concepts. Additionally, this research 
approach limits the objectivist approach and is not suitable for subjective experiments 
or information where statistical analysis is not required for detailed discussion of the 
situation (Beedles, 2002). 
The following sections discuss the targeting population, sampling and response rate, 
survey design and data validity and reliability. 
4.3.1.1 Targeting Population 
As emphasised, it was imperative to select appropriate knowledgeable key respondents 
who are involved and engaged with the Internet through verification of their relevant 
details (Skarmeas et al., 2002). In identifying the key informant, Campbell (1955) 
suggested that the key informant would not be chosen for statistical representativeness; 
instead, he or she would be chosen because they possess special qualities. More 
specifically, the key informant should have a role that makes him or her knowledgeable 
regarding the issues under the study. 
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 Internet actors as defined in Article 29 of the working group on Internet governance 
(WGIG) and by the Tunis WSIS Declaration include national governments, 
international organisations, the business sector, civil society, and the technical and 
academic communities (WGIG, 2005; WSIS, 2005). Accordingly, the targeted 
participants were all actors (stakeholders) form these stakeholder groups involved in 
Internet development and its policy in Lebanon. 
Therefore, an effort was made to access the appropriate individuals among these 
stakeholder groups. In line with the research objectives of this study, the most fitting 
individuals expected to be knowledgeable in Internet governance were the ones who 
participated in WSIS and who are involved in Internet Governance Forum (IGF) and 
Telecommunications International Communication Union (ITU) meetings. 
The researcher’s educational and professional background gave him an opportunity to 
participate in and attend some national, regional and global meetings related to the 
Internet including the International Communication Union (ITU) and the Internet 
Governance Forum (IGF) meetings. This made it easier for the researcher to establish a 
well-defined mailing list for the online survey consisting of Lebanese and other 
stakeholders working and involved in Information Communications Technology, 
including the Internet.  
4.3.1.2 Sampling and Response Rate 
This research is a unique empirical study on multistakeholder Internet governance and 
its impact on the economy from the perspective of national development. The primary 
plan of this research is to study multistakeholder Internet governance at a regional level 
for Arab countries, gathering and exploring information about different practices and 
understandings of Internet governance in order to solicit an acceptable common model.  
However, examination of the different existing Internet governance models in the 
different Arab countries in the Middle East Region found that each country defines and 
understands the Internet governance differently; where their priorities intersect relate 
differently to government and governance. Another important challenge was ensuring 
the receipt of replies from and follow-up with participants in the study, taking into 
consideration the geographical aspect and the critical political situations that most 
Arabic countries currently face. Therefore, the researcher decided to select and study a 
single national context. The rationales for selecting Lebanon as a context were the 
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researcher’s Lebanese nationality, his previous work in the Internet industry and his 
interactions with the Lebanese Internet community. According to Amine and Cavusgil 
(1986), the collection of data in a fairly homogeneous environment is expected to further 
facilitate the control of plausible impacts arising from uncontrollable external variables. 
As the context has been set, a good problem statement is necessary to identify the 
population relevant to evaluating program impacts. Here, the population is composed of 
the individuals that are involved and interested in Internet development and thus, are the 
focus of the evaluation. A probability sample was used.  
For Gay & Diehl (1992), the number of respondents acceptable for a study depends upon 
the type of research involved; for descriptive research the sample should be 10% of the 
population. However, Glenn (1992) argues that if descriptive statistics are to be used 
(e.g. mean, frequencies), then nearly any sample size will suffice. For him, a good size 
sample of 200 to 500 is needed for multiple regression, analysis of covariance, or log 
linear analysis, which might be performed for more rigorous state-impact evaluations. 
Similarly, Roscoe (1975) suggested approaching the problem of sample size with the 
rule of thumb that samples of 30 or more are recommended for experimental research 
involving the measurement of the effect of an independent variable (IV) on a dependant 
variable (DV). Roscoe’s simple rule indicated that samples larger than 30 ensure the 
researcher the benefits of the central limit theorem (Roscoe, 1975; Abronavic, 1997).  
Mitchell (1989), argues that the survey response rate should be calculated as the number 
of returned questionnaires divided by the total sample who were sent the survey initially. 
A recent study in a developing country context extracted 203 usable responses with a 
response rate of 17% (Shamsuddoha, 2004).  
Therefore, this research attempts to yield approximately 200 or more valid samples that 
will satisfy the statistical recommendations. From a sample list of 1800 contacts, 316 
responses were received, setting the response rate at 18.6%. 
In examining the response rate for each question in the survey, it was found that the 
average missing data rate was 10%. Bennett (2001) argued that statistical analysis is 
likely to be biased when more than 10% of data are missing.  
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4.3.1.3 Survey design 
The questions in the survey covered four main parts. The first part of the survey intended 
to produce demographic data of the stakeholders participating in the online survey. The 
second part of the survey was to gather opinions and reflections on the status of current 
Internet infrastructure and information on who is in charge (actual governance model). 
The third part investigates the perceptions of Lebanese stakeholders on Internet 
governance and multistakeholderism and their level of involvement and participation in 
Internet policy and regulation. The fourth and final part of the survey carried out an 
empirical investigation of the implications of multistakeholder Internet governance on 
the country’s economic growth. 
This online survey was deployed using Monkey Survey platform. The questionnaire 
design of the survey was critical and important as it affects the response rate and the 
appropriate data needed for the research. Inadequate design will not only discourage 
respondents from taking part but could also increase measurement error (Oppenheim, 
1992). 
The online survey consisted of closed-ended and open-ended questions; the latter could 
be attitudinal as well as factual (Oppenheim, 1992). Multiple dichotomous, dichotomous 
and Likert scale questions were deployed, allowing respondents to select a choice that 
best demonstrates their level of agreement with a given statement. At the end of the 
survey, two open-ended questions were used to give more space and flexibility for 
respondents to express their views and reflections on the strengths and weaknesses of 
multistakeholderism and the ways multistakeholder Internet governance can best 
support Lebanon’s economy. 
4.3.1.4 Data Collection 
Online data collection has advantages and challenges. The benefits in reduced cost, ease 
of data entry, format flexibility, and ability to access different populations make this 
type of data collection extremely appealing. Nevertheless, as with any survey method, 
measurement errors, low response rates, and possible non-representativeness of the 
sample must be addressed. In this mixed-methods research, the qualitative data should 
cover these gaps.  Hence, using multiple methods, the results triangulate, converge or 
corroborate one another, strengthening the validity of the findings (Greene et al., 1989). 
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Data was obtained by means of an online survey (questionnaire), a series of pre-defined 
questions that was deployed and self-administered on Monkey Survey. The online 
survey stayed open for five months (October 2016 – February 2017), asking questions 
under four thematic areas:  
• The actual Internet infrastructure status and who is in charge,  
• The degree of involvement of different stakeholders in Internet policy, 
• Multistakeholder Internet governance,  
• The impact of Internet governance on economic growth. 
 
Three hundred sixteen (316) individuals from the five pre-defined stakeholder groups 
participated: 42 respondents from the government, 108 from the private sector, 83 from 
academia, 41 from the Technical community and International organisations and 34 
from civil society. The use of the questionnaire is based on the basic underlying 
assumption that the respondent will be both willing and able to give truthful answers 
(Burns, 2000). 
The most basic and fundamental part of any research findings using a quantitative 
method (in this case the questionnaire) is data that is supposed to be analysed and 
produce results to be compared to the hypothesis or outcome derived from the literature 
review. Data were analysed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) to 
determine if correlation exits between the five independent variables (government, 
private organisations, civil society, technical & International organisations and the 
academic community) and the two dependent variables (multistakeholder Internet 
governance and economic growth). The research uses various frequency tables, bar 
diagrams and charts to analyse and present the data 
The data was collected and analysed under four thematic sub-areas as follows: 
• Thematic area I: “The status of Internet infrastructure and who is in charge” was 
analysed using frequency, means and standard deviation exploiting questions 5, 
6, 7, 8 and 10. 
• Thematic area II: The importance of multistakeholderism for Internet 
governance was analysed using frequency, means, standard deviation and 
ANOVA test exploiting question 9. 
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• Thematic area III: The degree of the level of involvement of different 
stakeholders in Internet policy was analysed using frequency, means and 
standard deviation exploiting questions 11, 12, 13 and 17. 
• Thematic area IV: The impact of Internet governance on economic growth was 
analysed using frequency, means and standard deviation using questions 14, 15, 
16 and 18.  
4.3.1.5 Data Validity and Reliability 
Several content assessment methods have been described in research methods literature 
(Nunnally, 1978). According to him, one common method requires respondents to 
categorise or sort items based on their similarity so that experts in the domain can 
construct definitions. For this research, a pilot questionnaire and face-to-face validity 
were administered by a selected group of participants during the Arab Meeting Advisory 
Group (AMAG) of the Arab Internet Governance Forum (Arab IGF) at the United 
Nations (UN) house in Beirut. AMAG is the advisory committee for the Arab IGF 
consisting of experts in Internet governance. This pilot contributed to useful 
supplementary findings in that it demonstrated that the questionnaire content and 
approach were valid. Because researchers are so close to their own work, the next step 
is to get other people to comment, particularly if they are subject experts in relation to 
the concept being measured (Nunnally, 1978). The content validity of the questionnaire 
was also supervised by two academic scholars from Beirut, Lebanon and Stockholm, 
Sweden.  
Reliabiliy may be calculated in a number of ways, but the most commonly accepted 
measure in field studies for assessing a scale’s internal consistency is Cronbach’s alpha, 
which tells how well the items measure the same construct (Price, 1997). According to 
Black (1999), reliability is an indication of consistency between two measures of the 
same thing but is never perfect. Internal reliability is measured by Cronbach’s alpha test, 
which calculates the average of all split-half reliability coefficients. An alpha coefficient 
varies between 1 (perfect internal reliability) to 0 (no internal reliability). In the social 
and business sciences, it is rarely above 0.90. 
The reliability test was assessed using the Cronbach scale reliability procedure in SPSS. 
Under this procedure, the overall reliability of the scale had Cronbach’s alpha values 
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greater than .70, indicating a satisfactory level of reliability (Nunnally, 1978). The 
Cronbach’s alpha was maintained between 0.848 and 0.727. 
4.3.2 Qualitative Strand 
Researchers using a qualitative research design generally engage in exploring, 
describing and understanding the personal and social experiences of participants and 
trying to capture the meanings that particular phenomena hold for them. According to 
Smith and Dunsworth (2002), qualitative research is an attempt to understand a small 
number of participants’ lived experience or views of the world rather than trying to test 
a preconceived hypothesis on a large sample. This is also consistent with Creswell 
(1998), in which the qualitative approach is a subjective approach to finding an answer 
to the research question; difficulties of generalisability, however, are another result of 
the findings (Beedles, 2002). 
4.3.2.1 Selection of Participants and sampling 
The researcher deployed a purposive sampling for the qualitative strand of this research. 
Purposive sampling leads to greater depth of information from a smaller number of 
carefully selected cases, whereas probability sampling leads to greater breadth of 
information from a larger number of units selected to be representative of the population 
(Patton, 2002). Maxwell (1997) defines purposive sampling as a type of sampling in 
which, ‘‘particular settings, persons, or events are deliberately selected for the important 
information they can provide that cannot be gotten as well from other choices’’ (p. 87). 
Rigorous attention was paid to selecting the appropriate informants for the in-depth 
interviews. The targeted participants for this research were all stakeholders (individuals) 
belonging to the Lebanese Internet community who are interested and involved in the 
development and governance of the Internet in the country. Kayrooz and Trevitt (2005) 
suggest that the background, values and role of the researcher is important for 
understanding how the researcher relates to the subject matter and people studied. The 
researcher is a member of the Order of Engineers in Lebanon, a member of the working 
group for the creation of the Lebanese Internet Center (LINC) and member of 
the Technical Cooperation Working Group for Arab Internet Governance Forum 
(TCWG-AIGF). Since 1999, the researcher has also been a lecturer at the Lebanese 
university, giving lectures on Information Management Systems for master’s students. 
In addition, working and interacting with hundreds of experts and professionals has 
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given the researcher substantial confidence in selecting the appropriate interviewees for 
the qualitative inquiry. 
Following the WSIS definition, these stakeholders were categorised under five different 
stakeholder groups: government, private organisations, civil society, technical & 
International organisations and the academic community. As a result, 11 individuals 
were identified from the five stakeholder groups. The stakeholders’ profiles are as 
follows: 
• Government: the Lebanese Prime Minister’s office and the Telecommunication 
Regulatory Authority. 
• Private sector: Chief Information Officer (COO) of one of the biggest companies 
in technology and service providers, and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of one 
of the biggest Internet Service providers (ISPs). 
• Technical community and International organisation: Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Numbers and Names (ICANN), Internet Society (ISOC) Lebanon 
Chapter, and Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) – 
United Nations (UN). 
• Academic: The leading American University and Research Centre (Number one 
university in the Middle East Region), and the Balamand University. 
• Civil society: An end user and a representative from the “Women in 
Technology” civil association.  
There are no rules governing sample size in qualitative inquiry. Sample size depends on 
what you want to know, the purpose of the inquiry, what's at stake, what will be useful, 
what will have credibility, and what can be done with available time and resources 
(Patton, 1990). The size of the sample of this qualitative interview was determined by 
informational considerations. As the purpose of this qualitative part is to maximise 
information, the researcher intended to collect two samples from each stakeholder group 
that gave reasonable coverage of the phenomenon. The researcher observed that no new 
information was gleaned from new sampled units and that additional interviews ended 
in information redundancy. 
	101	
According to Patton (1990), the power of purposive sampling lies in selecting 
information-rich cases that manifest the phenomena of interest in a way that facilitates 
greater insight into the theoretical construct underlined in the proposed study. As the 
aim of this research looks at Internet governance and its impact on Internet development 
and economic growth, representatives from government and International organisations, 
business figures, academics and experts were considered as major candidates for 
purposive sampling. This selection enabled a general sample representation from all 
Internet stakeholders, validating theoretical arguments proposed in this thesis.  
4.3.2.2 Interviews 
This research followed Hagan’s (1986) view that the interview is a path for 
understanding the participant, and the researcher should have certain flexibility rather 
than be constrained by restrictions. Pollio et al. (1997) refer to Hagan’s (1986) views on 
conducting interviews and add that understanding the participant’s perspective is not 
simply a matter of finding a neutral phrase to use; rather, it requires the interviewer to 
explore the meaning of the terms for the interviewee. Therefore, clarifying questions 
can and should be asked without attempting to determine the direction of the interview. 
However, with certain interviewees, it may be impossible to identify questions of non-
threatening nature for the participant because there may be personal or political factors. 
As mentioned earlier, eleven participants were selected for semi-structured in-depth 
interviews. According to Malhotra (1993), the semi-structured interview allows the 
interviewer to uncover a specific list of hidden issues of research interest. Similarly, 
Moustakas (1994) explains that the purpose of the interview is to deduce a 
comprehensive story of the individual’s experiences of the phenomenon under 
investigation. The questions were used for the collection of respondent’s views and 
feedback, for clarification of terms and variables, and for elaboration on specific topics 
of importance that were not sufficiently covered by quantitative questionnaires (Luna-
Reyes and Andersen, 2003). To achieve this, a semi-structured interview was conducted 
(Appendix B). 
4.3.2.3 Data Collection Procedures 
This research used a semi-structured interview that used a pre-determined set of open 
questions to gather in-depth information and to explore themes. Qualitative studies 
produce a lot of data depending on the research topic and design, but not all of it is 
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meaningful. Hence, the researcher undergoes a process of data reduction, reducing and 
transforming the raw data to identify and focus on what is meaningful. According to 
Krathwohl (1997) and Miles & Huberman (1994), it is the job of the researcher to comb 
through the raw data to determine what is significant and transform the data into a 
simplified format that can be understood in the context of the research question. 
Through this process, the researcher was able to identify patterns and relationships 
observed within and across stakeholder groups. Regardless of what display format the 
researcher chose, it should help him arrange and think about the data in new ways and 
assist him in identifying systematic patterns and interrelationships across themes and/or 
content (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
Furthermore, in a mixed-method design, the researcher converges or merges 
quantitative and qualitative data to provide a comprehensive analysis of the research 
problem (Creswell, 2013). To achieve this objective, the qualitative data for this 
research will be collected and examined under the same four thematic sub-areas used in 
the quantitative data analysis in chapter 6. Accordingly, the findings will be categorised 
under the following titles: 
• The actual Internet infrastructure status and who is in charge,  
• The degree of involvement of different stakeholders in Internet policy, 
• Multistakeholder Internet governance,  
• The impact of Internet governance on economic growth. 
4.3.2.4 Findings Validity 
Several tactics or strategies have been deployed by different authors working with 
qualitative research methods to enhance the truthfulness or validity of qualitative 
findings (Crabtree & Miller, 1999; LeComple & Goetz, 1982; Morse 1991and Corbin 
& Strauss 1990) 
For LeCompte and Goetz (1982), validity in qualitative research is concerned with the 
accuracy and truthfulness of findings, whereas reliability is concerned with the 
consistency and repeatability of the informant’s accounts as well as the investigators’ 
ability to collect and record information accurately (Selltiz et al., 1976). 
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One of the major critical strategies for producing trustworthy and believable findings in 
qualitative research is triangulation. Triangulation refers to integrating qualitative and 
quantitative data (Amaratunga & Baldry, 2001), validating convergence and reliability 
of data. The present research incorporates both quantitative and qualitative triangulation 
of data with the major goal of circumventing the personal bias of the researcher and 
overcoming the deficiencies intrinsic to single-investigator, single-theory, or single-
method study, thus increasing the validity of the study (Denzin, 1989). 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter locates the study within the appropriate research paradigm and justifies and 
describes the selection of methodology, design and procedures for the research. It 
discusses and justifies the selection of participants and data collection, and, finally, it 
assesses validity and reliability of the method and data selected. 
Brannen (2005) argues that an interviewing approach which allows interviewers to 
probe and the interviewees to give narratives of incidents and experiences is likely to 
result in a more holistic picture of people’s understandings than a conventional survey 
analysis would provide; such an approach also allows interviewees to elucidate the 
meanings that research participants attribute to their practices and actions. Thus, this 
research used mixed methods, collecting both quantitative and qualitative data to best 
understand the problem. Accordingly, this research surveyed a large number of 
individuals and interviewed a few elites to obtain their views and hear their voices on 
Internet governance in Lebanon.  
This research deployed a mixed-methods approach with pragmatism as a knowledge 
claim. It employed a concurrent parallel design for data collection as a strategy of 
inquiry, gathering both numeric and textual data, and thus findings emerged from both 
quantitative and qualitative research methods. This also incorporates triangulation by 
integrating qualitative and quantitative data. Jick (1979) argues that triangulation may 
be used not only to examine the same phenomenon from multiple perspectives but also 
to enrich our understanding by allowing for new or deeper dimensions to emerge. 
Although many designs exist in the mixed-methods field, the present research used the 
convergent parallel-mixed method to collect diverse types of data and provide a more 
complete understanding of multistakeholderism and Internet governance and its impact 
	104	
on Internet development to achieve a country’s economic growth. In this mixed-
methods research, both forms of data were collected and analysed at the same time. This 
data analysis of the quantitative strand will be discussed in chapter 5 while the 
qualitative findings will be explored in chapter 6. As a result, Chapter 7 will compare 
and triangulate the quantitative statistical results with the qualitative findings supported 
by key informants’ quotations.  
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Chapter 5: Quantitative Data Analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
In this convergent parallel mixed-methods research design, both forms of data 
(quantitative and qualitative) were collected at the same time; the findings are combined 
and interpreted in chapter 7. An online survey (Appendix A) was used to collect the 
quantitative data for descriptive statistical analysis on the participants’ views about 
multistakeholderism as a suitable model for Internet governance, and the impact of 
Internet governance on the country’s economic growth. 
In chapter 4, research methodology and research design are discussed in detail. This 
chapter presents data analysis of the quantitative strand to answer the research questions 
that were organised under four related thematic sub-areas. Data were analysed using the 
Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) using descriptive statistics for 
quantitative survey. 
5.2 Survey Analysis Procedures 
The quantitative data is collected and analysed under four thematic sub-areas as follows: 
• Thematic area I: “The status of Internet infrastructure and who is in charge” was 
analysed using frequency, means and standard deviation exploiting questions 5, 
6, 7, 8 and 10. 
• Thematic area II: The importance of multistakeholderism for Internet 
governance was analysed using frequency, means, standard deviation and 
ANOVA test exploiting question 9. 
• Thematic area III: The degree of the level of involvement of different 
stakeholders in Internet policy was analysed using frequency, means and 
standard deviation exploiting questions 11, 12, 13 and 17. 
• Thematic area IV: The impact of Internet governance on economic growth was 
analysed using frequency, means and standard deviation using questions 14, 15, 
16 and 18.  
Data is analysed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). Descriptive 
statistics were applied to the survey questions using the frequency distribution and 
means for each response. The mean provided the central tendency for each area studied, 
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while the frequency distribution is the count of responses associated with different 
values of a variable. 
For comparative analysis and statistical significance detection, cross tabulation with 
Pearson’s Chi-Square and ANOVA tests were used to determine if correlation exists 
between the five independent variables (government, private organisations, civil 
society, technical & International organisations and the academic community) and the 
two dependent variables (multistakeholder Internet governance and economic growth). 
Cross-tabulation is the merging of the frequency distribution of two or more variables 
in a single table (Malhotra, et al., 2002) to provide more clarity of interpretation and 
greater insights into complex phenomena. Accordingly, statistical significance was used 
as a tool to examine the relations between the variables based on the alpha level (P-value 
0f 0.05) to investigate any difference in stakeholders’ views regarding the subject-
matter. Hence, if P-value is less than 0.05, significant difference does exist, whereas, if 
the P=value is larger than 0.05, significant difference does not exist. 
However, to apply Pearson’s Chi-Square and ANOVA tests, their pre-determined 
assumptions should be met. For Pearson’s Chi-Square tests, the following assumptions 
were met: The P- value <0.05, no more than 20% of cells with expected count less than 
5 and no expected count less than 1. As for ANOVA, the researcher respected and 
applied the assumptions of independence, normal distribution and homogeneity of 
variance. In general, it is said that the Central Limit Theorem “kicks in” at an N of about 
30 (Mordkoff, 2011). In other words, as long as the sample is based on 30 or more 
observations, the sampling distribution of the mean can be safely assumed to be normal. 
According to Mordkoff (2011), the second known property of the Normal Distribution 
says that, given random and independent observations (from a normal distribution), the 
sample mean and sample variance are independent. The only distribution for which this 
is true is the normal distribution. Therefore, we assume that populations are normal. 
5.2.1 Demographics 
The targeted participants for this questionnaire were all individuals that are involved 
and interested in the Internet and its governance in Lebanon. These individuals were 
categorised under five different stakeholder groups: government, private organisations, 
civil society, technical & International organisations and the academic community. The 
first four questions in the survey are related to demographic concerns: gender, age, area 
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of residence and industry. The researcher used nominal scale as it serves as label or 
identification.  
The sample of this research is composed of 234 males (74.3%) and 81 females (25.7%) 
collected from the overall 316 responses obtained (Table 5.1). The researcher avoided 
multiple responses by single individuals/computers by configuring the online survey to 
accept only one survey response per IP address. 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
M 234 74.1 74.3 74.3 
F 81 25.6 25.7 100.0 
Total 315 99.7 100.0  
Missing System 1 .3   
Total 316 100.0   
 
Table 5.1: Repartition by gender 
 
Here, the demographic information reported confirms the gender equity problem, which 
is a universal issue in the Information Communication Technology sector (ICT).  
Lebanese women face huge obstacles in this area, and this was clearly witnessed in the 
weak participation in the 3rd Arab Internet Governance Forum held in Beirut in 
November 2014.  The Forum was a men’s land; gender distribution was 72% Male and 
28% Female (Ben Youssef, 2014). 
The second question inquired about the area of residence of respondents. Mount 
Lebanon governorate came first, with one hundred thirty stakeholders representing 
41.3% of the participating population. This makes sense, as Mount Lebanon governorate 
hosts the majority of ICT industry participants and occupies around 20% of Lebanon’s 
total territory, spanning the country along the Mediterranean coast between 
Lebanon's North Governorate and South Governorate. Beirut, the capital of Lebanon, 
came second, with one hundred thirteen participants representing 35.9%; the North 
governorate contributed thirty participants, the South governorate six participants and 
Bekaa governorate 4 participants to the participating population (Table 5.2). 
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  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Beirut 113 35.8 35.9 35.9 
Bekaa 5 1.6 1.6 37.4 
Mt Lebanon 130 41.1 41.3 78.4 
North 30 9.5 9.5 87.9 
South 6 1.9 1.9 89.8 
Outside 
Lebanon 32 10.1 10.2 100.0 
Total 316 100.0 100.0  
 
Table 5.2: Repartition by area of residence 
Table 5.3 displays the age distribution, indicating that more than 80% of the respondents 
were under 50 years of age, matching worldwide statistics on the age distribution of 
internet users (Statista, 2017). 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
18-25 80 25.3 25.6 25.6 
25-50 179 56.6 57.2 82.7 
50-64 49 15.5 15.7 98.4 
64+ 5 1.6 1.6 100.0 
Total 313 99.1 100.0  
Missing System 3 .9   
Total 316 100.0   
 
Table 5.3: Repartition by age 
The last demographic question of the survey asked the participants to identify the 
stakeholder group to which they belong. The private sector came first, with one hundred 
eight participants (34.6%). Through this high participation, the private sector sought to 
raise its voice towards the uncountable issues and problem with the government due to 
the unfair competition and lack of transparency.  
The second largest stakeholder group among the participants was the academics, with 
eighty-three participants (26.6%), followed by the government, with forty-two 
participants (13.5%), technical and International organisations (13.1%) with forty-one 
participants, and social society, with thirty-four participants (10.9%). The 4 non-
identified participants were eventually not included in the analysis. The repartition by 
stakeholder groups is presented in the table 5.4.  
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  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Academic 83 26.3 26.6 26.6 
Civil Society 34 10.8 10.9 37.5 
Government 42 13.3 13.5 51.0 
Private Sector 108 34.2 34.6 85.6 
Technical 
Community & Int. 
Organisations 
41 13.0 13.1 98.7 
Other 4 1.3 1.3 100.0 
Total 312 98.7 100.0  
Missing System 4 1.3   
Total 316 100.0   
 
Table 5.4: Repartition by stakeholder groups 
To conclude, the descriptive statistic for the demographic data shows that the sample of 
this research consisted of three hundred sixteen participants (316) with more than 80% 
above 50 years old, covering the whole country and representing well the five pre-
defined stakeholder groups.  
5.2.2 The actual Internet infrastructure status and who is in charge 
The aim of this part of the survey was to gather opinions and reflections on the current 
status of Internet infrastructure and the actual governance process. Data were obtained 
from questions 5, 6, 7 & 8 that were designed to cover this thematic area. A 5 points 
(very poor, poor, satisfactory, good and very good) Likert type questions scale was used 
for questions 5, 6 & 7. The respondents selected the choice best demonstrating their 
level of agreement on the management of Internet domain names, deployment of 
Internet address version 6 (IPv6) and connectivity status. Connectivity constitutes the 
main pillar for Internet development, and IPv6 deployment gives an indication of 
network advancement. The domain name industry also plays an important role in the 
digital economy. A multiple dichotomous question with a list of possible responses was 
used for question number 8 to allow the respondent to select the entity that oversees the 
Internet infrastructure in Lebanon.  
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Table 5.5: Descriptive analysis for questions 5, 6 & 7 
 
 
  
N Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Question Stakeholder Group 
How would you 
assess domain 
name 
management in 
Lebanon? 
Academic 81 2.44 .880 1 5 
Civil Society 34 2.09 .753 1 4 
Government 40 2.58 1.035 1 5 
Private Sector 106 2.52 1.080 1 5 
Technical 
Community & 
Int. 
Organisations 
41 2.63 .888 1 5 
Other 4 3.00 .000 3 3 
Total 306 2.48 .966 1 5 
How would you 
assess the 
deployment of 
Internet 
Protocol 
version 6 
(IPv6) in 
Lebanon 
Academic 78 2.00 .837 1 5 
Civil Society 33 1.73 1.069 1 5 
Government 40 2.18 1.083 1 4 
Private Sector 102 1.93 .893 1 5 
Technical 
Community & 
International 
Organisations 
40 1.70 .648 1 3 
Other 4 1.75 .500 1 2 
Total 297 1.93 .901 1 5 
How would you 
assess the 
Internet 
connection in 
Lebanon? 
Academic 80 1.62 .786 1 4 
Civil Society 34 1.82 .576 1 3 
Government 41 2.02 .935 1 4 
Private Sector 108 1.73 .860 1 5 
Technical 
Community & 
International 
Organisations 
41 1.83 .771 1 4 
Other 4 1.75 .957 1 3 
Total 308 1.77 .817 1 5 
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Within this study, management of Internet domain names had a total mean of 2.48 with 
standard deviation of 0.966, the deployment of Internet Protocol had a total mean of 
1.93 with standard deviation of 0.901 and internet connection had a total mean of 1.77 
and standard deviation of 0.817. The descriptive analysis is presented In table 5.5. 
The interpretation of these data shows that the mean of the management of the domain 
names scored slightly below average. However, the results showed a poor deployment 
of IPv6 and a connectivity with a mean low below average.  
As for the entity in charge of Internet infrastructure, it is apparent that respondents are 
aware of the main key Internet players in the country; in addition, they have a general 
idea concerning the heavy involvement of the Lebanese government. As table 5.6 
shows, the government scored 171 responses (55.3%), followed by the private sector 
with 91 responses (29.4%), academic institutions with 59 responses (19.1%) and 
individuals with 40 responses (12.90%). 
Question 8 Choices Responses Percent of Cases 
  N Percent  
Who do you think is in 
charge of the Internet 
infrastructure including 
country code Top 
Level Domain (ccTLD) 
in Lebanon? 
Academic 
Institutions 59 14.30% 19.10% 
Government 171 41.40% 55.30% 
I don't know 40 9.70% 12.90% 
Others 12 2.90% 3.90% 
Private 91 22.00% 29.40% 
Individuals 40 9.70% 12.90% 
Total 413 100.00% 133.70% 
 
Table 5.6: Descriptive analysis for question 8 
 5.2.3 Involvement of different stakeholders in Internet policy  
This thematic area analysis the level of involvement of the different stakeholder groups 
contributing and participating to Internet policy and regulation in Lebanon. Question 9 
used 4 points (very difficult, difficult, easy and very easy) Likert type questions scale to 
obtain the data. The respondents selected the choice best demonstrating their level of 
agreement on how easily the different stakeholder groups can be involved in Internet 
legislation and regulation. 
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The answers of the respondents on this question were exported and coded to SPSS for 
analysis and examined using descriptive statistics deploying frequency, means and 
multivariate ANOVA to assess whether there is statistical significance difference 
towards the perception of level of involvement in policy and regulation of the different 
stakeholder groups: government, the private sector, academia, civil society and the 
Technical community.  
The results revealed that respondents are aware of the heavy involvement of the 
Lebanese government in Internet policy and regulation: the government recorded the 
highest score with 182 out of 306 responses (59.5%) that the government can easily 
participate and contribute to Internet policy and regulation. Inversely, the results 
collected show that civil society, with 224 out of 302 responses (74.1%), scored the 
highest negative score compared to other stakeholder groups in how easily it can 
participate in Internet policy and regulation. The private sector scored 175 responses 
(58.7%), the technical community 187 (61.9%), and academia 196 (65.8%). In this 
perspective, the level of involvement of government in Internet regulation and policy 
scored the highest, with a mean of 2.71, followed by the private sector with a mean of 
2.33. Academia scored a mean of 2.14, and the technical community scored a mean of 
2.24, and the degree of involvement for civil society scored a mean of 1.92.  
Analysing the data in table 5.7, a statistical significance difference was detected within 
the stakeholders’ perception towards government involvement and participation in 
Internet policy with p=0.03 < 0.05. Another statistical difference was also detected 
within the stakeholders with respect to their perception towards academic participation 
in setting Internet policy with p=0.03 < 0.05. This is linked to how strong and beneficial 
the relationship of different stakeholders with government is. It depends on the level of 
coordination, political convergence or divergence and/or personal interests. 
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Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
How easy is for the 
mentioned different 
stakeholders to 
contribute and 
participate in the 
Internet policy and 
regulation in 
Lebanon? - 
Government 
Between 
Groups 20.155 5 4.031 
3.7
10 .003 
Within Groups 
322.703 297 1.087 
  
Total 
342.858 302 
   
How easy is for the 
mentioned different 
stakeholders to 
contribute and 
participate in the 
Internet policy and 
regulation in 
Lebanon? - Private 
Sector 
Between 
Groups 6.604 5 1.321 
1.9
01 .094 
Within Groups 200.840 289 .695   
 
Total 
207.444 294 
   
How easy is for the 
mentioned different 
stakeholders to 
contribute and 
participate in the 
Internet policy and 
regulation in 
Lebanon? - 
Technical 
Community 
Between 
Groups 5.324 5 1.065 
1.4
26 .215 
Within Groups 218.817 293 .747   
 
Total 
224.140 298 
   
How easy is for the 
mentioned different 
stakeholders to 
contribute and 
participate in the 
Internet policy and 
regulation in 
Lebanon? - 
Academic 
Between 
Groups 13.434 5 2.687 
3.6
52 .003 
Within Groups 212.587 289 .736   
 
Total 
226.020 294 
   
How easy is for the 
mentioned different 
stakeholders to 
contribute and 
participate in the 
Internet policy and 
regulation in 
Lebanon? - Civil 
Society 
Between 
Groups 7.249 5 1.450 
2.0
94 .066 
Within Groups 202.825 293 .692   
Total 
210.074 298 
   
 
Table 5.7: Descriptive analysis for question 9 
5.2.4 Multistakeholderism and Internet governance  
The aim for this third thematic area is to investigate Lebanese perceptions and thoughts 
on multistakeholderism and Internet governance. The dichotomous questions 11 and 12 
allowed the respondents to choose from two possible responses: “yes” or “no”. Question 
11 examined the familiarity of the respondents with Internet governance while question 
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12 investigated whether multistakeholderism is a suitable model for Internet governance 
in Lebanon. As for the extent to which Internet governance matters, question 13 in the 
survey (a multiple dichotomous question) provided a list of possible responses and 
allowed the respondents to select among: national, regional and global levels. For this 
thematic area, an open-ended question was used at the end of the survey asking the 
participants to share their views on the strengths and weaknesses of multistakeholder 
Internet governance. 
The answers of the respondents were coded to SPSS for analysis. The answers were 
examined using descriptive statistics deploying the means to record the data tendency 
and univariate ANOVA to assess if there is statistical significance among the five 
stakeholder groups with regards to the multistakeholder Internet governance as model 
to administrate the Internet in Lebanon.  
The objective of the question number 11 was to check the knowledge and familiarity of 
the stakeholders with Internet governance.  The descriptive data in table 5.8 showed that 
there is sufficient awareness with Internet Governance, with around 80% of participants 
answering that they are familiar with the term.  
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
Yes 245 76.3 79.3 79.3 
No 63 19.9 20.7 100.0 
Total 308 96.2 100.0  
Missing System 8 2.6   
Total 316 100.0   
 
Table 5.8: Are you familiar with the term "Internet Governance"? 
For the question 12, related to multistakeholderism as a model for Internet governance 
in Lebanon, the descriptive analysis in table 5.9 shows that 82.3 % of the stakeholders 
are confident that the multistakeholder framework is suitable for Internet governance 
for Lebanon. 
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  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
Yes 250 78.2 82.3 82.3 
No 56 16.8 17.7 100.0 
Total 306 94.9 100.0  
Missing System 10 3.1   
Total 316 100.0   
 
Table 5.9: Is multistakeholderism a suitable model for Internet governance? 
 Looking at the mean that each stakeholder group scored, the descriptive statistic in table 
5.10 shows that civil society’s choice for the multistakeholder process had scored a 
mean of 1.06 with a standard deviation of 0.339, followed by the private sector with a 
mean of 1.14 and a standard deviation of 0.346, the technical community and 
international organisations with a mean of 1.20 and a standard deviation of 0.405, 
academia with a mean of 1.22 and a standard deviation of 0.416, and the government 
with a mean of 1.28 and a standard deviation of 0.456.  
 
N Mean Std. Deviation 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
 Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Academic 78 1.22 .416 1.12 1.31 
Civil Society 34 1.06 .239 1 1.14 
Government 39 1.28 .456 1.13 1.43 
Private Sector 102 1.14 .346 1.07 1.21 
Technical Community 
& Int. Organisations 40 1.20 .405 1.07 1.33 
Total 297 1.18 .381 1.13 1.22 
 
Table 5.10: Descriptive analysis for question 12 
The data in table 6.10 shows that civil society is the most supportive of 
multistakeholderism, followed by the private sector. Unsurprisingly, the government is 
less supportive of such a process. 
The ANOVA test (table 5.11) was not significant, with p=0.098, which means that 
stakeholders agree that multistakeholderism is a suitable model of the Internet 
governance in Lebanon. 
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 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 1.343 5 .269 1.880 .098 
Within Groups 41.553 291 .143   
Total 42.896 296    
 
Table 5.11: Stakeholders agreement on multistakeholderism 
As for question 13, related to the level at which Internet governance matters, the 
descriptive data in table 5.12 showed that 63% of the respondents selected that Internet 
governance matters at both levels: the national and the global.  
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
 
National 29 9.2 0.5 10.5 
Global 49 15.5 17.7 28.2 
All of the above 199 63.0 71.8 100.0 
Total 277 87.7 100.0  
Missing System 39 12.3   
Total 316 100.0   
 
Table 5.12: At what level does Internet governance matter? 
The interpretation of the above descriptive data shows that the majority of the 
respondents were familiar with Internet governance and had awareness of the 
multistakeholder process. In general, respondents viewed multistakeholder governance 
as a suitable model for Internet governance in Lebanon.  
Furthermore, the objective of the open-ended question in the survey was to get in-depth 
information from the Lebanese stakeholders on the strengths and weaknesses of 
multistakeholderism in the realm of Internet governance. Given the variety of 
stakeholder perspectives, many appraisals emerged from the answers. However, the key 
strengths and weaknesses that emerged from the responses are highlighted and 
summarised in table 5.13. 
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Strengths Weaknesses 
Representation Time and money Consuming 
Quality of Services Different Interests 
Better Decisions Unbalanced power 
Development Political Interferences 
Democracy Ineffective under current regime 
Transparency Government Influence 
Independence Unqualified stakeholders 
Attract Investments Security and privacy issues 
 Complicated model 
 
Table 5.13: strengths and weaknesses in multistakeholder process 
In general, respondents viewed the multistakeholder process as representative, inclusive 
of all stakeholders and the optimal choice for enhancing quality of services and making 
better decisions. Furthermore, the stakeholders viewed multistakeholder Internet 
governance as an efficient way to promote development and democratic values. 
Respondents also expressed their confidence that multistakeholder governance will be 
an opportunity for transparency and investment attractiveness (see figure 5.1). 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Strengths of multistakeholder process 
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As for the weaknesses, a significant number of respondents questioned the utility of 
such a time-consuming process. Additionally, several respondents expressed their 
concerns over diverging interests, unbalanced powers and authorities, political 
interference and government obstruction. The respondents also raised another concern 
about the possible risk of involving unqualified stakeholders and the cost of such a 
process (see figure 5.2).  
 
Figure 5.2: Weaknesses of multistakeholder process 
5.2.5 The impact of Internet governance on economic growth 
The fourth and the final thematic area of this research carried out empirical investigation 
about multistakeholder Internet governance with regard to the country’s economic 
growth. From this perspective, how and to what extent the different stakeholders see 
multistakeholder Internet governance as a tool to achieve development and economic 
growth.  
Here, the data is obtained from analysing questions 14, 15 and 16. A 5 points Likert type 
questions scale was used for question 14 with 1 indicating greatest importance and 5 
least importance. The respondents selected the choice best demonstrating their level of 
agreement on the degree of impact of Internet governance on individual, business, 
governmental and economic levels. Questions 15 and 16 used a multiple dichotomous 
question with a list of possible responses and statements mapping out stakeholders’ 
views on the factors that made Internet governance important and how they viewed the 
future role of governmental and non-governmental players. 
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The methods that were applied in the previous thematic areas were applied here. The 
answers of the respondents on these three questions were exported and coded to SPSS 
for analysis. The answers were examined deploying descriptive statistics using the 
frequency, means and ANOVA test to detect any statistical significance in the 
perception of the stakeholders related to Internet governance as a main driver of 
economic growth and how they viewed the future role of governmental and non-
governmental players. 
On the issue of the future role of government and non-governmental stakeholders, the 
majority of the respondents (65.1%) support a decrease in government control (table 
5.14) and greater space for other stakeholders (88.5%) (table 5.15).  
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
Strongly 
Disagree 26 8.2 10.0 10.0 
Disagree 65 20.6 24.9 34.9 
Agree 104 32.9 39.8 74.7 
Strongly Agree 66 20.9 25.3 100.0 
Total 261 82.6 100.0  
Missing System 55 17.4   
Total 316 100.0   
 
Table 5.14: Government should be less involved 
 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly 
Disagree 5 1.6 1.9 1.9 
Disagree 25 7.9 9.5 11.5 
Agree 123 38.9 46.9 58.4 
Strongly 
Agree 109 34.5 41.6 100.0 
Total 262 82.9 100.0  
Missing System 54 17.1   
Total 316 100.0   
 
Table 5.15: Non-governmental actors should be more influential 
On the question of the importance of multistakeholder Internet governance as an 
economic driver, table 5.16 shows that 89 % of the respondents agreed that Internet 
governance is of great importance for economic growth.  
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Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly 
Disagree 9 2.8 3.5 3.5 
Disagree 17 5.4 6.6 10.2 
Agree 149 47.2 58.2 68.4 
Strongly 
Agree 81 25.6 31.6 100.0 
Total 256 81.0 100.0  
Missing System 60 19.0   
Total 316 100.0   
 
Table 5.16: Multistakeholder Internet governance as economic driver 
However, as shown in table 5.17, a statistically significance difference was detected 
between the stakeholder groups on the issue of the level government involvement, with 
p= 0.025 < 0.05. Here, we can argue that stakeholders evaluated the involvement of the 
government based on the intersection of their interests with the government. The more 
the stakeholder is involved with the government, with which he or she shares mutual 
interests and benefits, the more he or she resists government withdrawal from the scene. 
  Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Do you strongly 
agree, agree, 
disagree, or strongly 
disagree with the 
following statements: 
Government should 
be less involved  
Between Groups 
11.075 5 
2.215 2
.
6
2
0 
.
0
2
5 
Within Groups 213.883 253 .845   
 
 
Total 
224.958 258 
   
   
Table 5.17: Significance difference in level of government involvement 
The open-ended question (number 17 in the survey) asked the participants about their 
views on the ways multistakeholder governance can best support Lebanon’s economic 
growth. The results represented in figure 5.3 include: economic and financial 
performance, better representation and quality services, more regulation and control, 
fair competition and more transparency and efficiency.  
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Figure 5.3: How can multistakeholder Internet governance best support the economy? 
5.3 Conclusion 
An online survey was used to collect the quantitative data for descriptive statistical 
analysis with the aim to uncover Lebanese views and opinions about the 
multistakeholder process in the realm of Internet governance and its impact on the 
country’s economy. The sample of the quantitative strand of this research is composed 
of 234 males (74.3%) and 81 females (25.7%) collected from 316 responses. The 
targeted participants belong to the Lebanese Internet community who are involved and 
interested in the Internet. These individuals were grouped under five different 
stakeholder groups: government, private organisations, civil society, technical & 
International organisations and the academic community.  
The first part of the survey covered questions intended to produce demographic data of 
the stakeholders participating in the online survey. The second part of the survey was to 
gather opinions and reflections on the current status of Internet infrastructure and who 
is in charge (actual governance model). The third part concerns the perceptions of the 
Lebanese stakeholders and their level of involvement in contributing to Internet policy 
and regulation in Lebanon. The fourth and final part of the survey carried out an 
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empirical investigation on the implication of the Internet and its multistakeholder 
governance for the country’s economic growth. 
Data were coded and analysed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) 
and then categorised under four thematic areas: the actual status of Internet 
infrastructure and who is in charge, the degree of involvement of different stakeholders 
in Internet policy, multistakeholder Internet governance, and the impact of Internet 
governance on economic growth. Descriptive statistics were applied to the survey 
questions using the frequency distribution means for each response. The mean provided 
the central tendency of each area studied, while the frequency distribution is the count 
of responses associated with different values of a variable. For comparative analysis and 
statistical significance detection, cross tabulations with Pearson’s Chi-Square and 
ANOVA tests were used.  
The analysis shows that Internet connectivity in Lebanon is below average and 
supported by weak infrastructure. On the question of entities involved in infrastructure, 
participants were aware of the main Internet players in the country and had a general 
idea concerning the heavy involvement of the Lebanese government. A statistically 
significant difference was detected in stakeholders’ perceptions of participation by 
government and academia, respectively, in setting Internet policy. This was due to the 
stakeholder’s level of coordination with the government and political issues.  
The descriptive data showed that the majority of respondents were familiar with Internet 
governance and aware of the multistakeholder process. In general, respondents viewed 
multistakeholder governance as a suitable model for Internet governance in Lebanon. 
On the issue of the future role of government and of non-governmental stakeholders, a 
majority of respondents support decreased government control and greater space for 
other stakeholders. However, a statistically significant difference was detected between 
the stakeholder groups related to the preferred level of government involvement.  
Concerning participants’ views of the importance of multistakeholder Internet 
governance as an economic driver, 89% of respondents agreed that Internet governance 
is of great importance for economic growth. Asked how multistakeholder governance 
can best support economic growth in Lebanon, the participants’ responses included: 
economic and financial performance, better representation and quality services, more 
regulation and control, fair competition and more transparency and efficiency. 
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Chapter 6: Qualitative Data Analysis  
 
6.1 Introduction 
This mixed-methods research employed a quantitative online survey to reach a large 
population and qualitative purposive interviews to answer the research questions, 
provide a more complete understanding of the contested topic of Internet governance 
and to verify findings from the survey. Qualitative research is primarily concerned with 
gaining direct experience with a setting and is intrinsically an exploratory endeavour 
(Mann, 2003). Therefore, a purposive interview was deployed targeting political and 
business figures and experts to obtain their views and hear their voices about Internet 
governance, backing the quantitative survey. To achieve this objective, a semi structured 
interview was conducted with 11 interviewees with the following questions: 
1. How would you assess the following Internet governance-related issues in 
Lebanon: access to the Internet, affordability of the Internet, availability of local 
Internet content, cyber security and privacy, regulation and policymaking by 
government, Broadband policy and connectivity, and Domain name 
management? 
2. Who are the decision makers and what are the decision-making processes that 
influence the evolution and use of the Internet in Lebanon? 
3. How is the Internet governed in Lebanon currently? 
4. How easy is it for different stakeholder groups to participate and contribute in 
Internet policy and governance in Lebanon? How do they interact with one 
another? 
5. What are the principal issues of Internet governance in Lebanon?  
6. What is your understanding of Internet governance? 
7. What does the term “multistakeholder” mean to you? 
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8. How important and effective will national Internet governance environment be 
for you as a stakeholder? Challenges and opportunities? 
9. Do you think there are efficient and effective mechanisms in place at the national 
level to address the Internet-related challenges you have identified above? 
10. Is the Internet important for Lebanon’s development and economic growth? 
11. In your opinion, how can multistakeholder Internet governance best support 
Lebanon's Internet and economic development? 
6.2 Interview Analysis Procedure 
The interview’s questions were used for the collection of respondents’ views and 
feedback, for clarification of terms and variables, and for elaboration on specific topics 
of importance that were not enough covered by quantitative questionnaires (Luna- 
Reyes & Andersen, 2003). 
According to Malhotra (1993), the semi-structured interview allows the interviewer to 
uncover a specific list of hidden issues of research interest. Similarly, Moustakas (1994) 
explains that the purpose of the interview is to deduce a comprehensive story of the 
individual’s experiences of the phenomenon under investigation. Hence, this research 
used a semi-structured interview that combined a pre-determined set of open questions 
to gather in-depth information and explore themes.  
Qualitative studies produce a lot of data depending on the research topic and design, but 
not all of it is meaningful. Hence, the researcher undergoes a process of data reduction, 
reducing and transforming the raw data to identify and focus on what is meaningful. 
According to Krathwohl (1998) and Miles & Huberman (1994), It is the job of the 
researcher to comb through the raw data to determine what is significant and transform 
the data into a simplified format that can be understood in the context of the research 
question. 
Through this process, the researcher grouped the qualitative data into meaningful 
patterns that would help to answer the research questions. Regardless of what display 
format the researcher chose, it should help him arrange and think about the data in new 
ways and assist him in identifying systematic patterns and interrelationships across 
themes and/or content (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  
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The researcher was able to identify patterns and relationships observed within and across 
the stakeholder groups. These themes may be directly evolved from the research 
questions or gleaned from the data as the study was conducted (Taylor-Powell & 
Renner, 2003). In this research, themes have been evolved from both the research 
questions and gleaned from the data. After identifying themes, the researcher 
compressed, categorised and organised the data into textual tables and charts to facilitate 
interpretation and drawing of conclusions.  
To use quotes more effectively and to facilitate presentation, the interviewed 
stakeholders’ profiles are coded according to their categories and summarised below in 
table 6.1. 
Stakeholder 
Group Organisation type Job Title Code 
Government  Office of Prime Minister Gov1 
Government  Telecommunication Regulatory Authority Gov2 
Private 
Sector Technology Provider Chief Operating Officer - COO PS1 
Private 
Sector 
Internet Service 
Provider Chief Executive Officer - CEO PS2 
Technical 
Community 
Internet Society 
ISOC President - Lebanese Chapter TC1 
Technical 
Community 
Internet Corporation 
for Assigned Names 
and Numbers - 
ICANN 
Engagement Manager TC2 
Academic 
Community 
University and 
Research Centre Chief Information Officer and Lecturer AC1 
Academic University Professor and IEEE vice president AC2 
Civil Society Women in Technology Founder and Member CS1 
Civil Society Consumer End User CS2 
International 
Organisations United Nations (UN) 
Director of ICT Administration - 
Economic and Social Commission for 
Western Asia (ESCWA) - UN 
IO 
 
Table 6.1: Interviewed stakeholders’ profiles and codes 
Furthermore, in a mixed-method design, the researcher converges or merges 
quantitative and qualitative data to provide a comprehensive analysis of the research 
problem (Creswell, 2013). To achieve this objective, the qualitative data for this 
research will be collected and examined under the same four thematic sub-areas used in 
the quantitative data analysis in chapter 5. Accordingly, the findings will be categorised 
under the following titles: 
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• The actual Internet infrastructure status and who is in charge,  
• The degree of involvement of different stakeholders in Internet policy, 
• Multistakeholder Internet governance,  
• The impact of Internet governance on economic growth. 
6.2.1 The Actual Internet Infrastructure Status and Who is in Charge 
The first two questions of the interview gathered opinions and reflections on the current 
status of Internet infrastructure and who is in charge. The first question was treated 
quantitatively, while the other had a qualitative character. According to Brannen (2005), 
a fieldwork method may include a quantitative approach so that data on particular items 
are collected systematically. Suitably, a 5-points Likert type question scale (1-very poor, 
2-poor, 3-satisfactory, 4 -good and 5-very good) was used to assess the first question on 
the current infrastructure. The respondents selected the choice best demonstrating their 
level of agreement on: access to the Internet, affordability of the Internet, availability of 
local Internet content, cyber security and privacy, regulation and policymaking by 
government, Broadband policy and connectivity, and Domain name management. Table 
6.2 shows the mean of the two informants’ responses from each stakeholder group (from 
1 to 5). 
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Civil Society 1 1.5 1 1 1 1 3.5 
Government 3.5 2 2 1 1 1 1.5 
Int. Organisations 3 2 2 2 4 2 4 
Private 2.5 2.5 2.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 2 
Technical 
3.5 3 1 1.5 1.5 2.5 3.5 
 
Table 6.2: Assessment of Internet infrastructure by the informants 
 
Figure 6.1 gives more insight into table 6.2, where the respondents assessed the current 
Internet infrastructure in Lebanon. Informants assessed the availability of local Internet 
content, broadband policy and connectivity as below average. The findings also revealed 
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that the current infrastructure is vulnerable to cyber security threats and lacks data 
protection and privacy laws. In term of access, affordability of the Internet, and domain 
name management, the informants assessed the current infrastructure status as average; 
the one exception was civil society, who gave infrastructure a negative evaluation. 
Furthermore, the findings revealed that all stakeholders, except the informant from 
International organisations, perceived that government is not doing its job in the areas 
of regulation and policy. 
 
Figure 6.1: stakeholders’ assessment of the Internet infrastructure 
The in-depth findings from the qualitative interviews showed that this undesirable 
situation is due to the limited bandwidth of current, long-standing and government-
owned infrastructure. It was found that OGERO (the telecom and Internet public service 
provider) has exclusivity in providing International bandwidth to Lebanon and owns 
and operates all landline and mobile networks. On this point, TC1 elaborated that: 
Ministry of Post & Telecommunications/OGERO provides the 
international connectivity and Internet backbone infrastructure. It 
allocates the waveband frequencies, authorises or blocks services 
and sets the prices. 
 
The findings revealed that the ministry of telecommunications through OGERO, the 
public operator, owns exclusivity to the landline networking infrastructure and the 
0 1 2 3 4 5Access	to	the	Internet
Affordability	of	the	InternetAvailability	of	local	Internet	content
Cyber	security,	data	protection	and	privacy
Regulation	and	policymaking	by	governmentBroadband	policy	and	connectivity
Domain	name	management
Internet	Infrustructure	Status
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provisioning of international Internet capacities. It was found also that, while OGERO 
holds the biggest market share as an Internet service provider (ISP), private ISPs 
comprise the main share of the country’s biggest institutions and organisations, in 
addition to some governmental institutions such as the Ministry of Finance, Customs 
and Internal security. PS1 further expressed that: 
Internet service providers and data service providers find 
themselves trapped to get the necessary bandwidth allowing them to 
access all subscribers including their customers in the whole 
country providing them with high quality service and fast internet.  
 
From a regulatory perspective, it was revealed that all stakeholder groups were 
convinced that the lack of updated regulation and policy had a significant negative 
impact on the actual infrastructure and development of the Internet. Supporting this, the 
statement from PS2 emphasised that: 
The infrastructure is weak, under development, lagging by 5-10 
years.  That is even if it is developed under current efforts and 
regulations, cannot catch-up with evolving worldwide standards. 
 
Supporting this argument, AC2 commented: 
 
In the lack of the application of the Telecom liberalisation law and 
the absence of the Telecommunication Regulatory Authority (TRA) 
active role, the ministry of telecom is the body that has the major 
influence over the status quo evolution and the operation of the 
Internet. 
 
Focusing on political conflicts as a reason behind the complete non-implementation of 
Telecom law 431, manifested in the inactive Telecommunication Regulatory Authority 
(TRA) and the non-establishment of the private-public operator ‘Liban Telecom’, the 
participants explained the current unhealthy Internet ecosystem. TC1 stated that: 
I participated and supported the development and ratification of 
framework that was supposed to liberalise, regulate and develop 
telecommunications in Lebanon (Law 431 ratified in 2002). Law 431 
led to the establishment of the Telecommunications Regulatory 
Authority (TRA) as an independent public institution but the TRA 
role was neutralized for political reasons.  
 
This statement highlighted the heavy political influence in the country. Supporting this 
statement and elaborating on the government’s role, the CS1 expressed that: 
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The TRA processes included mandatory consultations, but now the 
TRA is dismantled, so the government does what it wants.   
 
Gov1 expressed her views regarding telecom law 431, acknowledging its importance 
and admitting its neutralisation: 
In fact, the telecom law number 431 that was issued in year 2002 
that entails establishing a public-private operator “Liban 
Telecom”, privatising the mobile sector and creating an 
independent regulatory authority (TRA) was a good step ahead, but 
it has not been fully implemented.  
 
The civil society stakeholder highlighted what the government left unstated: why the 
telecom law is still not fully implemented. CS2 commented on the issue, stating: 
For political conflicts and religion consideration, “Liban Telecom” 
did not show the light. 
 
Whereas, TC1 highlighted that: 
The “TRA” role was neutralized by the sitting Ministers and the 
incumbent public operator, OGERO. 
 
Findings from the second question revealed additional insight on who governs the 
Internet in Lebanon currently. There was a consensus (73% of total responses) that the 
government governed the internet through its agencies and institutions. The in-depth 
interviews disclosed more detailed information. Table 6.3 shows that 33% of the 
respondents indicated that the government is in charge, 20% specified that OGERO (the 
public operator) is in charge, 13% stated that the ministry of Telecommunications is in 
charge, and 7% of the responses stated that the Telecommunication Regulatory 
Authority is in charge.  
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Lebanon currently? 
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Government  2 1   2 33% 
OGERO 1  1    20% 
Ministry of Telecom 1   1   13% 
Telecom Regulatory authority 1      7% 
American University of Beirut  1    1 13% 
Unclear    1 1  13% 
Grand Total 3 3 2 2 1 3 100% 
 
Table 6.3: who governs the Internet in Lebanon currently? 
CS1 Commented on government control stated: 
In Lebanon, we have a “double whammy”: We have total control of 
the internet by the government, but the government is not managing 
this well at all.  
 
Similarly, AC1 approved the above statements by explicitly stating: 
Currently, it is the government – and it is driven by pretty local 
politics. 
 
As showed in figure 6.2, one private and one technical community interviewee 
identified that the American University of Beirut (AUB) is involved in Internet 
governance in Lebanon. This can be explained by the role of AUB in handling the 
country code Top Level Domain (.lb). Additionally, for one civil society and one 
International organisation informant (13% of total respondents), it was unclear who 
governs the internet. 
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Figure 6.2: Who governs the Internet in Lebanon 
6.2.2 The actual involvement of different stakeholders in Internet policy 
On the question of how the Internet is governed in Lebanon currently, the majority of 
respondents answered that it was a monopoly, with 23%, 20% noted a lack of strategy 
and laws, and 17% noted weak infrastructure. Political interests and lack of coordination 
scored 10% each, followed by lack of transparency, accountability, and corruption, with 
a score of 7% each (See table 6.4 and figure 6.3). 
How is the Internet 
governed in Lebanon 
currently? 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t 
Pr
iv
at
e  
Ac
a d
em
ic
 
C
iv
il 
So
ci
et
y 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
O
rg
an
is
at
io
ns
 
Te
ch
ni
ca
l  
To
ta
l 
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
Government Monopoly 1 1 2 1  2 7 23% 
Lack of strategy and law 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 20% 
Weak Structure 1 1 1  1 1 5 17% 
Political Interests  1 1 1   3 10% 
Lack of coordination   1 1  1 3 10% 
No transparency  1  1   2 7% 
Corruption 1   1   2 7% 
No Accountability    1  1 2 7% 
Grand Total 4 5 6 7 2 6 30 100% 
 
Table 6.4: How the Internet is governed in Lebanon currently? 
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Figure 6.3: How Internet is governed in Lebanon? 
The in-depth findings disclosed relevant information on how the Internet is governed in 
Lebanon currently and how decisions are made. The findings revealed that the 
government stakeholders involved in the Internet are those that are associated directly 
with the telecommunications ministry and OGERO, the public operator. In this regard, 
Gov2 openly summarised the situation: 
Historically, the Ministry of Economy played a role in managing the 
digital economy and implicitly accepted the role of the ccTLD 
registrar.  Currently the role of the Ministry of Economy is 
diminishing with respect to the role of the Ministry of 
Telecommunications and OGERO. The decision-making process is 
top down with no transparency and accountability. The government 
does not apply consultations with anybody. 
 
And what makes things more challenging in Lebanon is the vast number of Internet 
stakeholders. Gov2 designated these stakeholders as follows: 
The principal stakeholders in Lebanon at the national Lebanese 
level include but are not limited to: the council of ministers, the 
ministry of Telecommunications (MOT), the Telecommunications 
Regulatory Authority (TRA), the 2 Mobile operators, the different 
economic (and governmental) sectors, the private operators (Data 
Service Providers, and Internet Service Providers(ISPs) the private 
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sector, the academicians, civil society, ISOC, the Personal 
Computer Organizations, The different companies in the different 
economic sectors, the users and the consumer affairs organisations, 
and the military and security organizations.  
 
No doubt Gov2 succeeded in listing all the Internet stakeholders, including the Lebanese 
army, which is involved in allocating and monitoring usage of Internet frequency 
spectrums. However, it was found that no framework specifies the role of each and 
coordinates their work, and that each stakeholder understands governance in a way that 
suits his or her interests. AC2 shed more lights on this: 
Different governance aspects are being dealt with by different 
stakeholders. The (.lb) country code Top Level Domain has been 
managed by one person since the mid-nineties of the last century. 
The international gateway, IP acquisition and distribution, and 
backbone and infrastructures are handled by the telecom incumbent 
OGERO (a subsidiary of the ministry of Telecom). Internet 
Exchanges, Caching, and other services are handled by private ISPs 
and academic institutions…. this is a vague and loose model. 
 
Furthermore, PS2 elaborated: 
The Private sector (ISPs) with hap-hazard, non-planned efforts, 
inconsistent follow-up and interest, mostly driven by economic self-
interest, with no clear oversight of the overall economic benefits of 
Internet adoption. 
 
More specifically, the in-depth findings shed more light on the actual Internet 
governance process. While the Internet is governed by the Ministry of 
Telecommunications, the council of ministers is the venue where decisions are 
parachuted and approved. Gov1 shed more light on the council of minister’s role: 
The council of ministers has the final say especially in setting local 
and international tariffs. 
 
Since the government’s role was maligned, the follow-up question is this: how easy is 
it for other, different stakeholder groups to participate in and contribute to Internet 
governance in Lebanon? The informants’ majority answer was “not easy,” with 56% of 
the total responses, followed by “government doesn’t allow” with 19%. Table 6.5 shows 
that one of the civil society interviewees revealed the need for a transparent legal 
framework to facilitate their involvement, while one of the government interviewees 
mentioned that there is no dialogue with civil society, which confirms the civil society 
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concern. Moreover, the technical and government informants indicated that the 
“government is not interested” in including other stakeholders. The academic also 
mentioned “political interests” as an obstacle to involvement in Internet governance in 
Lebanon. 
How easy is it for different stakeholder groups to 
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Not easy 2 1 2 1 2 1 56% 
Government doesn't allow  1 1   1 19% 
Political interests 1      6% 
No dialogue counterpart for Civil society   1    6% 
No framework  1     6% 
Grand Total 3 3 4 2 3 3 100% 
 
Table 6.5: How easy to be involved in Internet governance? 
The civil society informants specified that their good values and intentions sometimes 
contrast with the plans and intentions of the government. Even some of civil society 
views and opinions on certain topics are taboo to the government. CS1 explicitly stated 
that:  
Our contribution is not easy at all nor is it welcomed. 
 
Gov1 commented on civil society’s lack of a voice, stating: 
Civil society is well organized and active; however, it does not have 
a counterpart for dialogue. 
 
Almost all the interviewees described Internet governance in Lebanon as a disordered 
domain that is difficult to contribute to. The technical and government informants 
revealed that the “government is not interested” in including other stakeholders. This 
was confirmed by Gov2: 
It is not easy for the different stakeholders since the ministry have 
made it clear that they do not consider the different stakeholders 
important in the Internet governance. 
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The findings and the evidence openly reflected in the above statements show and 
confirm the tight control of the government on telecommunications and the Internet. 
However, it was found that, for some private elites, the government is playing fair and 
giving space due to certain common interests. Private sector views on this were very 
open. PS2 stated: 
Ministry of Telecommunications/OGERO and some private companies 
(owned by elites/politicians) interact with each other depending on their 
interests. 
 
Further, CS1 elaborated that: 
In Lebanon, many factors contribute to the lack of good governance, some 
of which are monopoly within the government and certain private sector 
companies that do not allow room for growth. Internet in Lebanon is 
governed by lack of transparency from both public and private sector. 
There is no clear frame or structure to how it will be developed more, 
deployed or maintained.  
 
The in-depth qualitative findings revealed that an initiative involving the different 
stakeholder groups was initiated but failed due to government antagonism. On this 
point, TC1 clearly stated that this multistakeholder attempt was hindered by the 
government, elaborating that: 
I am also one of the founders of the Lebanese Internet Center (LINC), a 
bottom-up public-private multistakeholder NGO founded in 2014. LINC is 
a multistakeholder entity where membership includes associations of 
companies, syndicates, chambers of commerce, civil societies, universities 
and government. LINC main responsibility is to manage and operate the 
.lb &.  ﻟﺒﻨﺎن  country domain name registry.  
 
LINC will be invested in capacity and community building activities and 
projects that promote the positive development of the internet in Lebanon. 
LINC association was blocked by the Ministry of Telecommunication. 
 
Describing the actual situation, findings indicated interference by government for 
political and personal interests. 
6.2.3 Multistakeholder Internet governance 
One of the major objectives of the qualitative interviews was to solicit interviewees’ 
opinions and understandings about Internet governance; this was achieved through 
question 6 in the interview. Considering the diversity of the interviewees’ backgrounds 
and the variety of stakeholder perspectives, however, responses to this varied only 
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narrowly. As revealed and illustrated in table 6.6, four themes emerged from the 
informants’ answers related to their understanding of Internet governance, namely: 
collaborative governing, infrastructure, decentralization and resource management. 
 
Table 6.6: Internet governance as perceived by the interviewees 
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Collaborative 
Governance management and control 
    1  6% 
 
administration and 
development to shape 
evolution and use of 
internet 
     1 6% 
 
frameworks, rules, 
procedures to set how 
internet should work 
 1     6% 
 
Policy mgmt., processes, 
systems, people, 
technologies, monitoring, 
interactions, 
communications, access, 
privacy for Internet 
management 
  1    6% 
 global and local standards     1  6% 
 set of rules, regulations 
and process 1 
     6% 
 sets of rules 1      6% 
 set of processes for best 
management 
   1  1 12% 
Collaborative 
Governance Total 
 2 1 1 1 2 2 53% 
Infrastructure 
development 
access, infrastructure, 
maintenance, technology 
deployment 
  1  1  6% 
 sharing decision making to 
create better infrastructure 
 1 1    6% 
Infrastructure total   1 2  1  24% 
Decentralisation distributed and collaborative 1 
     6% 
 decentralized 1      6% 
Decentralized total  2      12% 
Resources 
Management 
managing Internet 
Resources 
  1    6% 
Resources 
management total 
   1    6% 
collective benefit maximizing interests  1  1   6% 
Collective benefits 
total 
    1   6% 
Grand Total  4 2 5 2 3 2 100% 
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 Figure 6.4: Internet governance understanding 
Figure 6.4 illustrates the consensus of the stakeholders on the importance of 
collaboration, which is the primary component of Internet governance. This indicates 
that the informants are familiar with Internet governance and its principles. The in-depth 
Interview findings revealed that 53% of the interviewees described Internet governance 
as “collaborative governing”, and 24% - namely, government and private - perceived it 
as infrastructure development. More specifically, the following sub themes and topics 
were derived from the data analysis of each multistakeholder group: 
For the government, Internet governance is the management of people and 
infrastructure, of interaction between different processes, and of regulation and policies. 
Gov1 stated that: 
Internet governance is the process of managing Internet resources.  
It is an ensemble of bodies, processes, and methodologies used to 
manage the Internet infrastructure.  
 
Also, Gov2 elaborated: 
Internet governance is the total system of governing the Internet 
including policy, regulations, management, processes, systems, 
people, technologies, monitoring to guarantee usage, growth, 
2
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benefits, interactions, communications, access to information and to 
others/all, security, privacy, rights, responsibilities/duties, etc. 
 
For the private sector, Internet governance is the management of the Internet developed 
by the Internet community, including regulations and appropriate laws. PS2 specified 
that: 
Internet Governance is the collective activities, processes, 
mechanisms, regulations and laws that determine how the Internet 
is managed.  These are incepted, instigated, developed, promoted, 
regulated by stakeholders in the Internet community.  
  
Supporting the neutrality and efficacy of the Internet governance process, PS1 defined 
Internet governance as: 
A non-profit and non-aligned body that sets rules, regulations and 
creates awareness for the use, evolution and promotion of the 
Internet. 
 
The academic representative mentioned solely “decentralization” as a requirement of 
Internet governance in addition to the traditional definition: a set of rules, regulations 
and processes. AC1 illustrated that: 
Internet governance to me are a set of rules that all operators abide 
by to ensure that the principles on which the internet was founded 
are preserved. Internet governance should be defined and managed 
in a “federated” and “decentralized” manner such that no one 
entity (or small group of entities) can dictate their rules and 
principles on the rest of the internet community.  
 
The views of the technical community and International organisations on Internet 
governance is the WSIS definition. TC2, for example, stated: 
I define Internet Governance as how it was defined in the Tunis 
Agenda of 2005; “Internet governance is the development and 
application by all stakeholders in their respective roles, of shared 
principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and 
programs that shape the evolution and use of the Internet”. 
 
 For CS1, Internet governance is: 
The interaction of all internet stakeholders in decision making 
process in order to create a better working internet structure. 
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These are important insights on Internet governance; one can observe that only the TC2 
and IO cited the WSIS definition of Internet governance referenced in the literature 
review.  
Question number 7 -on multistakeholderism- reveals that the interviewees had full 
awareness of the term; “engaging all stakeholders” was the highest common theme, with 
43%, followed by “representation from several sectors,” with 29% of the total responses. 
Note that the Private sector and government representatives tackled the theme of 
“inclusion in decision making,” with 14% from the total responses. Additionally, the 
term “Transparency” was raised by the technical community, which is a key element 
and a necessary one for the multistakeholder process (see table 6.7). 
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Engaging all stakeholders 1  1 1 1 2 6 43% 
Representation from all 
sectors 2 1 1 
   4 29% 
Including all parties in 
decisions 
  1  1  2 14% 
Involving people interested 
in Internet 1 
     1 7% 
Transparency      1 1 7% 
Grand Total 4 1 3 1 2 3 14 100% 
 
Table 6.7: What “multistakeholderism” means for the informants 
Generally, the interviewees had the same views on multistakeholderism. However, there 
was a divergence in positions on how to implement it. A statement from PS2, defining 
multistakeholderism, can be highlighted here: 
Stakeholders from different sectors should equally contributing to 
the same objective 
 
The definition given was similar and straightforward; “engaging all stakeholders” was 
the most prominent common theme, followed by “representation from several sectors”. 
Gov1 expressed his views: 
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Multistakeholderism is the set of efforts of actively engaging the 
different players and stakeholders of the society (government, 
private sector, civil society, academia, technologists, users, and 
others) in policy making and in governance. 
 
TC1 similarly stated that: 
Multistakeholder is bringing all stakeholders (Governments, Private 
Sector, Civil Society, and Academia and Technical Community) 
together to the table to work together in an open and transparent 
environment 
 
Therefore, a model of multistakeholder Internet governance could be an opportunity and 
an alternative to change this status quo that entails the overall development of the 
Internet. TC2 highlighted that: 
A national Internet governance environment is a good venue for 
people from different needs and backgrounds to come together and 
discuss how to better the Internet ecosystem. Key challenges would 
be the buy-in; mainly in the initial steps leading to such a 
framework. However, many opportunities can arise if the forum is 
in the hands of the right people, and is conducted in a bottom-up, 
multistakeholder, and transparent manner. 
 
Focusing on the importance of such a multistakeholder framework, CS1 elaborated that: 
It will be very important; a change trying to make a better 
governance and create advanced infrastructure that can provide 
better services for users and other citizens.  
 
Further, AC2 explained that: 
Lebanon environment is very well suited to have a multi-stakeholder 
governance model due to the strong civil society and the private 
sector.  
 
The interviewees entirely agreed that a suitable Internet governance framework is 
important to put Lebanon back among the developed and advanced countries. The 
informants highlighted the opportunities and identified number of challenges facing 
multistakeholder processes in Internet governance. Specifically, the opportunities 
identified by interviewees are as follows: inclusiveness and transparency, sustainable 
development, attracting international funds and encouraging investors, and bottom-up 
decision-making. Challenges to a multistakeholder process that were identified include: 
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government influence and power gaps, political interference, building a culture of trust 
in a society with stakeholders of diverse political and cultural backgrounds, equal 
representation among stakeholders and securing adequate and sustainable funding to 
keep the multistakeholder process evolving (see table 6.8 & figure 6.5).  
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Extremely important 2 1 1  1 2 7 
Important  1  1  1 3 
Challenges        
Implementing ICT policy 1  1  1 1 4 
Government and political Interference  1   1 1 3 
Build a culture of trust  1 1  1  3 
Power gap  1     1 
Equal Representation    1   1 
Funding the process   1    1 
Many other issues such as security   1    1 
Opportunities        
Sustainable Development 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
Inclusiveness and Transparency  1 1  1 1 4 
Bottom-up process 1     1 2 
Encourage investors      1 1 
Grand Total 5 7 7 3 6 9 37 
 
Table 6.8: Importance, challenges and opportunities of national Internet governance 
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Figure 6.5: Opportunities and Challenges of Internet governance 
Emphasizing these challenges, Gov2 thought that: 
The principal challenges for the Internet governance in Lebanon 
are: Corruption, Political Instability, Politicizing ICT, Absence of a 
futuristic, open and stable ICT policy, Lack of willingness to put the 
law in effect, Control by one person/entity, Absence (pushing out) of 
the private sector, Inefficiency of the governance system and 
engagement of the different stakeholders. 
 
Further, reflecting on the challenges of Internet governance, PS2 categorised these 
challenges on two levels: the legal level and that of the stakeholder: 
On stakeholder level, the challenges are the Individual non-
coordinated activities, with clashes of interest, and lack of real 
driving force. Additionally, the legal system is under development, 
and long overdue, stuck within the realm of political clashes, again 
by the time it catches-up, new issues will emerge. 
 
More specifically, focusing on the challenges of political conflict, AC2 elaborated: 
It should be fairly easy to have different stakeholders contribute to 
Internet policy and governance, provided that these policies do not 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8Extremely	important
ImportantChallenges
Implementing	ICT	policyGovernment	and	political	Interference
Build	a	culture	of	trustPower	gap
Equal	RepresentationFunding	the	process
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Sustainable	DevelopmentInclusiveness	and	Transparency
Bottom-up	processEncourage	investors
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	143	
interfere with political interests, but it is not the case. 
 
To the follow-up question whether there is any source of amelioration or a mechanism 
in place at the national level to address Internet-related challenges, the majority, 
including Gov1 and Gov2, simply answered “no”. However, some informants indicated 
that the mechanism is “getting slightly better” as TC2 stated: 
At the moment, no. However, with the changes that took place in 
Lebanon within the Ministry of Telecom and its main Internet arm 
OGERO, I can see changes on the horizon. 
 
Other stakeholders considered it to be “getting worse”. TC1 contended that: 
No, I believe that the gap between the Internet society in Lebanon 
and the political establishment is very wide and that the situation 
deteriorated after the Snowden incident and subsequent Internet 
governance activities spearheaded by ESCWA. I foresee that the 
Lebanese government is heading more and more toward imposing 
restrictive controls over the Internet.     
 
For their part, academic and technical representatives stressed once again the need to 
activate Telecom law 431 and give the Telecommunication Regulatory Authority (TRA) 
independence and power. For example, AC2 commented that: 
All telecom related challenges, including the Internet, would be 
faced and managed properly by the telecom liberalization law (law 
431/2002) or an updated version of this law. It just requires a 
political decision to implement it. 
 
The informants agreed that these challenges will have direct and indirect implications 
for implementing a national strategy and developing Internet infrastructure and services. 
Confirming this, CS2 explained that: 
 Not working on the Internet governance challenges will imply a lack 
of clear strategy to define the country needs and requirements for 
safe productive internet, and delay of infrastructure and services 
development. 
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6.2.4 The impact of Internet governance on economic growth 
Is the Internet important for Lebanon’s development and economic growth? All the 
interviewees stressed that the Internet can contribute positively to economic growth and 
social development. This question seeks the informants’ views on the economic benefits 
that can be gained by developing the Internet and its associated information and 
communication technologies. The informants’ input on the implications of the Internet 
in Lebanon are summarised in table 6.9.  
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Economic 
development 
Support other 
industries 1 2 1 1 1 2 8 25% 
 Increase GDP 2 1 1 1 2 1 8 25% 
 Encourages 
Entrepreneurships 
 1 1  1 1 4 13% 
 Job Creation  1 1  1  3 9% 
 
Enhanced 
management and 
productivity 
1    1 1 3 9% 
 Innovation 1    1 1 3 9% 
 Decrease transaction 
costs 1 
 1  1  3 9% 
Total  6 5 5 2 8 6 32 100% 
Social Implications Inclusiveness   1  1 1 3 38% 
 Diversity 1 1  1   3 38% 
 Communications with 
Lebanese Diaspora 
  1  1  2 25% 
Total  1 1 2 1 2 1 8 100% 
 
Table 6.9: The importance of the Internet for Lebanon’s economic growth 
The results showed that 50% of the respondents indicated that the Internet affected 
economic growth positively by supporting other industries and increasing the country’s 
GDP. Furthermore, it was found that 13% of the respondents believed that the Internet 
encourages entrepreneurship, job creation, innovation and transaction cost-reduction. 
All of these components received an equal share (9%) of the overall responses. 
Furthermore, and addition to the economic implications, another theme -social 
implications- emerged: the findings indicated inclusiveness and diversity as top benefits 
of Internet governance, with 70% of the responses. Towards exploring the impact of 
multistakeholderism on the economy, for example, AC1 stated that: 
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Yes, establishing neutral and independent multistakeholder internet 
governance in Lebanon that upholds the principles on which the 
internet was built will be the single most important step in 
supporting Lebanon’s economic development. 
 
More obviously, answering the question on how multistakeholder Internet governance 
can best support Lebanon's economic development, TC2 focused on the impact on the 
GDP stated: 
For sure. Today, the digital economy (Internet Economy) 
contributes to 4-5% of the global economy. And with the turbulent 
economic situation worldwide, the Internet economy is a bright ray 
of light. 
 
Additionally, PS1 expressed that: 
By having a proper Internet governance, we will create a positive 
climate for entrepreneurs and consumers by providing guarantees 
and a managed sector. Hence, develop the ability to attract more 
investments and skills workforce while increasing the GDP and 
strengthen the economy in Lebanon. 
 
Further, CS2 recalled some studies on the positive impacts of Internet development on 
the economy, expressing that: 
Very important as clearly showed by various studies correlating 
broadband and mobile penetration with national GDP growth, 
employment, entrepreneurship and other important metrics. 
 
Supporting the above statements, CS1 stated that: 
I definitely believe that internet and its governance is important not 
only for Lebanon but for every country’s development and growth 
for the economy. It is directly proportional to the GDP of a country 
as proven by a study conducted in the world bank. 
 
The contribution of multistakeholder Internet governance to the Lebanese economy was 
found to be substantial. The views of the informants on the positive effect of 
multistakeholder Internet governance are noted in table 6.10. It was found that the 
positive impact of multistakeholder Internet governance was multifaceted: interviewees 
said that such governance supported other economic sectors (45%), increased 
transparency and accountability (27%), and improved competitiveness (18% each). 
Furthermore, better coordination and more efficiency, transparency and accountability 
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were also cited as benefits of multistakeholder Internet governance. CS1 considered 
that: 
Multistakeholder Internet governance can support Lebanese growth 
by taking into consideration the roles of all stakeholders and 
integrating them into creating one entity. We need to make the 
current entity accountable to the people and the people as a watch 
dog to the government and private organisations. 
 
Gov2 elaborated that: 
The different stakeholders need to organise into a non-allied group 
that lobbies with the public and the government to push for an open 
Internet agenda that drives social and economic growth and 
improved competitiveness for Lebanon and its products and 
services. 
 
How can multistakeholder Internet 
governance best support Lebanon's 
economic development? 
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support other economic sectors 1 1 1  1 1 45% 
Transparency and Accountability 1 1   1 1 27% 
Enabling environment 1 1     18% 
Improves competitiveness   1  1  18% 
Better coordination      1 9% 
Inclusiveness  1  1   9% 
Efficiency     1  9% 
Social development   1    9% 
Grand Total 3 4 3 1 3 2 100% 
 
Table 6.10: How multistakeholder governance supports economic growth? 
6.3 Conclusion 
This chapter presented the findings of the qualitative data revealed from the interviews, 
in which two samples from each stakeholder group were selected for a semi-structured, 
in-depth interview to provide insight on Internet governance and its importance in 
achieving the country’s development and economic growth. The qualitative data was 
categorised into meaningful patterns helping to answer the research questions, enriched 
by key informants’ quotations. 
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For data comparison purposes, the qualitative data was structured and analysed under 
the same four thematic sub-areas as was the quantitative data: the actual Internet 
infrastructure status and who is in charge, the degree of involvement of different 
stakeholders in Internet policy, multistakeholder Internet governance, and the impact of 
Internet governance on economic growth. 
One of the major objectives of the qualitative interviews was to solicit interviewees’ 
opinions and understandings about multistakeholder Internet governance. Four themes 
emerged from the informants’ answers: collaborative governing, infrastructure, 
decentralization and resource management. Also, there was full awareness of 
multistakeholderism and strong support for its principles and values.  
The in-depth findings showed that the respondents specified that the Internet affects 
economic growth positively by supporting other industries and increasing the country’s 
GDP. 
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Chapter 7: Findings, Discussion and Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction  
This thesis has investigated the interactions and relationships between the Lebanese 
stakeholders involved in the Internet and its policy, and the impact of Internet 
governance on Internet development and Economic growth. To achieve the research aim 
and objectives, this mixed methods research used as a research paradigm a pragmatic 
epistemological approach employing a concurrent parallel data collection design. In 
doing so, a theoretical model was developed and validated empirically and theoretically. 
This was particularly helpful in developing a clear and more complete explanation of 
the impact of Internet governance on the Internet and economic performance.  
This chapter discusses the overall findings, bringing chapters 5 and 6 together into a 
coherent discussion on the perception and views of the Lebanese stakeholders on 
multistakeholder Internet governance and on its impact on Internet development and the 
country’s economic growth. It discusses the in-depth findings from the qualitative 
interviews, validating the quantitative survey results. This combination is not only to 
examine the data convergence or validate/contradict theoretical arguments but also to 
achieve triangulation through integrating the quantitative results with in-depth interview 
findings enriched by the key informants’ quotations. This mixed-methods research 
incorporates triangulation by integrating qualitative and quantitative data (Amaratunga 
and Baldry, 2001), validating convergence of data and suggesting conclusions. Hence, 
this chapter presents, compares, triangulates, interprets, discusses and validates the 
findings and the conceptual model in relation to the research aim and objectives. 
The findings are summarised in this present chapter in an endeavour to address the 
theoretical and practical implications as well as the impact of the study. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the limitations of the study, future research directions 
and conclusion. 
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7.2 Findings and Discussion 
The discussion begins by examining the findings on the actual status of Internet 
infrastructure and who is in charge and proceeds with an examination of the degree of 
involvement of different stakeholders in Internet policy. Then it will examine 
multistakeholder Internet governance as it is defined in the literature in relation to the 
views expressed by the participants and their views on the impact of Internet governance 
on economic growth. 
To ensure understanding of the significance of Internet governance in a Lebanese 
context, it was essential to examine the actual status of Internet infrastructure and 
Internet governance. Internet infrastructure constitutes the main pillar for Internet 
connectivity: deployment of new technologies such as Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) 
gives an indication of the networks’ advancement, since Internet Protocol version 4 
(IPv4) is globally depleted and networks need to be upgraded to satisfy the increasing 
demand for Internet connection. In this context, the quantitative descriptive analysis on 
the actual status of Internet infrastructure showed that the mean of Internet connection 
and Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) is far below average. This undesirable situation 
was confirmed qualitatively by the in-depth interviews, the results of which showed 
little divide between the different stakeholders, especially the government. The 
informants qualitatively assessed the current infrastructure as a hoary national network 
that is not able to provide sufficient Internet capacity, which creates a bottleneck for 
connectivity and service affordability. It was revealed that this undesirable situation is 
due to the current long-standing infrastructure with limited bandwidth that is owned by 
the government. It was found that OGERO, the telecom/Internet public service provider, 
has exclusivity in getting International internet bandwidths to Lebanon and owns and 
operates the whole landline network. Consequently, the private Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs) depend on OGERO’s infrastructure to provide their Internet services. 
This was confirmed by TC, stating that: 
Ministry of Post & Telecommunications (MPT)/OGERO provides 
the international connectivity and backbone infrastructure for all 
telecom networks including mobile operators, data service 
providers, internet service providers (ISP).   
MPT/OGERO allocates the waveband frequencies, authorises or 
blocks services and sets the prices. 
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Moreover, the findings revealed that outdated regulations and policies have a significant 
negative impact on infrastructure improvement and the development of the Internet 
overall. In this context, the non-implementation of the new Telecom law 431 was 
identified as being a significant obstacle to enhance and develop the Internet and 
telecommunications in Lebanon. It was found that the ministry of telecom is the body 
that has major influence over the status quo evolution and operation of the Internet in 
the absence of the Telecom liberalisation law and of an active role for the 
Telecommunication Regulatory Authority (TRA).  
This clearly hints that the Internet governance landscape in Lebanon is plagued by the 
government’s monopolistic policies imposed by the ministry of telecommunication and 
the incumbent operator OGERO, which are based on an outdated and obsolete 
telecommunication regulatory framework. These findings impose a complex situation 
confirming the theoretical assertion on the regulatory state and contradicting the public 
interest theory that liberal economists criticised. These economists criticised the notion 
of public interest in regulation and argued that government regulation is the result of the 
selfish actions of politicians and bureaucrats, in alliance with self-interest groups. 
According to Edelman (1964), attempts by governments to regulate industries tended to 
be symbolic politics, which appease consumers by providing them with symbolic 
regulation, rather than actually regulating industry to provide concrete benefits.  
This thesis strongly agrees with the views of liberal economists and the Chicago School 
of regulatory policy, who argue that markets operate effectively and can be perfectly 
self-sustaining, while politics is seen to be imperfect, serving narrow particularistic 
interests and being compulsive in nature (Stigler, 1971; Posner, 1971 & Peltzman, 
1976). The thesis endorses this view in the context of Lebanon, where not only the 
Internet sector, but also other essential and critical sectors such electricity and water, 
suffer from the politicians’ selfish actions. Gov2 explicitly admits and validates this 
theoretical argument where he openly expressed: 
The Internet in Lebanon is currently governed by the seat of the 
pants and by following personal well, and desires, and by doing 
what has personal and party returns and benefits. 
 
The findings converge on the involvement of different stake holders in current Internet 
policy, citing the heavy involvement of the Lebanese government in Internet governance 
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and the voicelessness of civil society and other stakeholders. The quantitative result 
converges with the qualitative findings, revealing the difficulty non-governmental 
stakeholders face in increasing their participation.  Moreover, it was also revealed and 
noted that there is no dialogue with civil society regarding Internet governance. Gov1 
confirmed civil society’s lack of voice, stating: 
Civil society is well organized and active; however, it does not have 
a counterpart for dialogue. 
 
Overall, almost all the interviewees described Internet governance in Lebanon as a 
disordered domain where it is difficult to contribute. The findings revealed that the 
government is not interested in including other stakeholders. This was explicitly 
confirmed by Gov2: 
It is not easy for the different stakeholders since the ministry have 
made it clear that they do not consider the different stakeholders 
important in the Internet governance. 
 
The findings and the explicit statements clearly indicate the tight control of the 
government and contradict both the economic and State theory. The theoretical 
argument in economy suggests that regulation was a government response to public 
demand for intervention due to ineffective or unfair business practices (Breyer, 1982; 
Noll; 1989; Ogus,1994). Moreover, the main purpose of the Regulatory State is to 
improve the efficiency of the economy, promote competition, and protect consumers 
and citizens (Sunstein, 1990; Majone, 1996; Braithwaite, 2000). Here, the government 
is protecting its monopoly and the demand for good regulation is coming from outside 
the government to contest its control over the Internet. 
In this context, it is important to note the divergence between informants’ views towards 
the government role and involvement in Internet. This is can be explained by the 
idiosyncratic relationships and the level of interaction and cooperation between some 
private elites and government; it is a subjective evaluation. For example, some 
government projects go to privileged private elites, so government is seen by these 
private stakeholders as a fair player affording space to other stakeholders. However, this 
was not the case for the Lebanese Internet Centre (LINC), the creation of which the 
government opposed, as was revealed by TC1, who clearly stated that this private-public 
attempt was hindered by the government for political reasons: 
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The Lebanese Internet Centre (LINC) was blocked by the Ministry of 
Telecommunication for political reasons. 
 
These findings explicitly contradict the theory of Retreat of State that fall under the State 
theory that believes that non-government stakeholders and markets are stronger than 
states and argued that states are becoming weaker due to more power being shifted 
towards other actors, which is not the case for Lebanon. In describing the actual 
situation, findings indicated a government regime composed of political and personal 
interests and a lack of coordination and accountability. 
Almost all participants agreed that a suitable framework for multistakeholder Internet 
governance is important to putting Lebanon back among the advanced countries. This 
process faces a number of challenges. These include government influence and power 
gaps, political interference, lack of coordination and trust, the need for equal 
representation among stakeholders, clashes of interests and corruption. These challenges 
in fact recognise the complicated situation and the importance of putting in place a 
mechanism or process to address it. Asked whether there is a mechanism in place at 
national level to address these Internet-related challenges, and whether the situation is 
changing, the responses varied from “no” (from the government) to “getting slightly 
better” to “getting worse”. 
Admittedly, the concept of multistakeholder Internet governance is still very vague, and 
the roles and responsibilities of different actors are yet to be defined. This thesis 
recognises that multistakeholderism is too often employed uniformly and even 
uncritically. Just as it is a misnomer to speak of Internet governance as a single practice, 
it is also a misnomer to speak of a singular multistakeholder model. One of the most 
problematic aspects of the multistakeholder approach is the very meaning of 
“participation” in political processes and the underlying vision of governance 
(Padovani, 2005). It is clear that power-sharing and working relations between 
governments and non-governmental stakeholders are in constant flux and vary 
according to the authority relations between stakeholders. Drake (2011) argues that the 
scope of stakeholder participation remains too narrow; while there has been much debate 
in recent years about the “democratic deficit” in multilateral institutions, 
multistakeholderism unquestionably faces its own challenges with respect to 
participation and accountability.  
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Finally, on the topic of multistakeholder Internet governance as a driver of Internet 
development and economic growth, the qualitative findings confirm the quantitative 
results, i.e. that 89% of the respondents believed that Internet governance can contribute 
positively to economic growth. Clearly, the results obtained from the responses of the 
open-ended survey question and the findings from the interview on how Internet 
governance can impact the economic growth, included: economic and financial 
performance, increased GDP, improvement in productivity and quality of services, fair 
competition and management efficiency.  
This indicates that multistakeholder Internet governance is a substantial contributor to 
Lebanon’s economy. According to Putnam (2000), one way to understand how 
institutions and regimes may influence economic behaviour and innovation in a cluster 
is to examine how connections or social networks among individuals in a community 
influence economic development. This is in line with Granovetter (1973, 1985) and later 
Uzzi (1996, 1999), who argue that strong bonds formed by people of differing identities, 
business interests, professional associations and networks contribute to economic 
development. Accordingly, it is in the interests of the government to seek a healthy and 
strong multistakeholder environment and to meet the enthusiasm of the other 
stakeholders. Supporting this argument, a statement from Gov1 may be highlighted: 
It would be nice for the country to have a position on 
multistakeholder Internet governance. It would also be very useful 
to have a high-level ICT policy for the country (if not a strategy).  
This would help bring clarity into the understanding of the ICT 
sector and encourage domestic and foreign investors.   
 
Gov2 elaborated that: 
The different stakeholders need to organise into a non-allied group 
that lobbies with the public and the government to push for an open 
Internet agenda that drives social and economic growth and 
improved competitiveness for Lebanon and its products and 
services. 
 
These comments portray willingness by the government to take into consideration 
multistakeholderism as a governance model. However, the different stakeholder groups 
(Private sector, Technical community, Academic and Civil society), had concerns on 
how the government and its institutions would deal and cooperate with other 
stakeholders related to this critical and important issue. While disputes over the 
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government’s dealings with other stakeholders occur, this study revealed that these 
disputes also occur between different stakeholders in regard to their views on the 
government’s role, though not in a uniform manner. In the context of the projected 
government involvement in Internet governance, a statistically significant difference 
was detected between the stakeholder groups, with p= 0.025 < 0.05. This indicates 
divergence in stakeholders’ views on the ideal level of government involvement in 
future Internet governance. We can argue that the more a stakeholder is involved with 
the government, for whatever reasons, the more he/she would like to see the government 
stay in control. Therefore, these stakeholders fear losing government lobbying, which 
would impact their businesses or personal interests. Other stockholder groups, like civil 
society, on the other hand, encourage less government control. Emphasising and 
supporting this reasoning, CS1 considered that:  
Multistakeholder Internet governance can support Lebanese growth 
by taking into consideration the roles of all stakeholders and 
integrating them into creating one entity. We need to make the 
current entity accountable to the people and the people as a watch 
dog to the government and private organisations. 
 
This confirms and supports the literature in the ongoing debate over the government’s 
role in Internet governance, which has been and still is a controversial issue among 
scholars.  
It can be concluded that the above discussion, supported by key informants’ comments, 
reveal that a suitable framework of multistakeholder Internet governance is important 
to putting Lebanon back among the advanced countries in the area of digital economy. 
These findings support the majority of the empirical evidence in the literature as well as 
the World Bank study, the International Telecommunication Union Index, and the 
Boston consulting group report, which were referenced in this research. These studies 
show that multistakeholder Internet governance significantly influences a country’s 
economic development and growth. Reflecting on the government’s position regarding 
the importance and impact of the Internet, all stakeholders agreed that the Internet 
happens to be the most important element for Lebanon’s development and economic 
growth. Gov1 stressed that the economy is linked to industrial performance, which today 
relies on the Internet as a main enabler, stating: 
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The media and advertising sector, banking and finance sector, which 
are ones of the strengths of Lebanon, are very much dependent on 
the Internet.  Also, health and education sectors, which historically 
had a regional competitive advantage are being “punished” by the 
lack of good connectivity. 
 
 
7.3 Model Validation 
Through review of the literature, a conceptual framework can be developed to promote 
a 'progressive problem shift' that yields a new perspective, with more explanatory and 
predictive power than is offered by existing perspectives, on the literature itself (Strike 
& Posner, 1983). Thus, extensive review of relevant academic literature and pertinent 
theoretical literature suggested the need to develop a conceptual model to illustrate the 
dynamics and factual relationships between different Lebanese stakeholders and to 
empirically verify the influence of Internet governance on the economy.  
The proposed model “MIG-L” has been developed (presented in chapter 3), mapping 
the five independent variables (government, private organisations, civil society, 
technical & International organisations and the academic community) and the two 
dependent variables (multistakeholder Internet governance and economic growth). The 
proposed model is characterised by regular, multidirectional and sustainable relations 
wherein the stakeholders are able to discuss and collaborate in an open, transparent 
environment to reach common agreements. These micro-negotiations lead either to 
robust structure that enable and promote or fragmented and weak structure that 
discourage and prevent the development of substantive governance processes. The 
proposed model predicts that the more robust the structure of Internet governance, the 
faster the rate of development of the Internet and of economic growth.  
One of the validation processes of conceptual models consists of two basic validating 
approaches: empirical and theoretical. Flood and Carson (1993) present a number of 
approaches that can be used for the validation of models. They mention empirical 
validity, which checks whether the models correspond with the available data, and 
theoretical validity, which involves comparing the models with accepted theories. 
Similarly, Mohring (2002) claims that qualitative validation is at least as important as 
understanding the outcomes of models when combined with theoretical and qualitative 
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knowledge. Accordingly, the researcher uses empirical/theoretical validity to validate 
the conceptual model ‘MIG-L’ in this study. 
Having examined multistakeholder Internet governance as a driver for Internet 
development and economic growth, the findings of this research show that the different 
stakeholders support and desire an approach to multistakeholder Internet governance 
that will have a significant impact on Internet development and economic growth in 
Lebanon. The statistical findings lend support to the qualitative result: no statistical 
significance was found among the different stakeholders regarding their consensus 
around multistakeholder Internet governance. These findings support the majority of the 
empirical evidence in the literature as well as the World Bank study, the International 
Telecommunication Union Index, and the Boston consulting group report, which were 
referenced in this research.  
The outcome of this research and comparison of the 2 case studies (Brazil and Kenya) 
with the situation of Lebanon have also contributed to the validation of the conceptual 
model. These 2 case studies illustrate how multistakeholder participation in internet 
governance is shaped by social negotiations, and they show how governance impacts 
the Internet and economic performance.  
While the Brazilian and Kenyan models are taken as examples of successful 
multistakeholder approaches, Lebanese efforts to make adopt a similar approach have 
failed. In the absence of stable government in post-conflict Lebanon, multistakeholder 
partnerships have been critical to the build-up of the country’s core Internet 
infrastructure (Almeida, 2017). Various attempts have been made to coordinate different 
initiatives through a multistakeholder approach, but no comprehensive result exists to 
date. Different strategies were put in coordination with the ICT Coordination Office at 
the Prime Minister’s office, but the Lebanese government did not adopt a strategy; bits 
and pieces of different strategies and action plans were executed in silos (WEF, 2017). 
As multistakeholderism in Internet governance failed to take place, the micro-
negotiations between the different stakeholders led to relationships that discourage and 
prevent the development of any new regime of governance. The slow growth in Lebanon 
and many developing countries in the Middle East and North African countries has been 
disappointing over the last decade (Emara & Chiu, 2016). This supports the foundation 
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of the conceptual model suggesting that a weak governance structure will result in 
slower Internet development in which additional features of performance will suffer. 
From the more optimistic perspective, Brazil provides a best-case-scenario study of 
multistakeholderism in the field of Internet governance at a national level that fits the 
Lebanese, since Brazil was experiencing a contentious political conflict at the same time 
that Internet issues were being fought over. Created by national law to coordinate and 
integrate all Internet service initiatives, the CGI is a corporatist body with a fixed 
number of representational slots allocated to specific sectors: the government, business, 
civil society (known as 'the third sector' in Brazil), and academia (Mueller & Wagner, 
2014). 
The Brazilian story was about a powerful coalition of pro-monopolist parties opposed 
by a party promoting an Internet governance coalition.  A group of stakeholders saw the 
need for a new governance model and began to think about alternatives to Embratel, the 
incumbent monopoly. Soon afterward, the Minister of communications invited several 
people to discuss possible reforms.  The outcome of these interactions was not a one-
off transaction but a long-lasting strategic restructuring of the basic rules of Internet 
governance. These micro-level interactions across the stakeholders had major 
consequences for later Internet governance. Not only did the minister declare Internet a 
value-added service, he decreed that state companies would be forbidden to compete in 
Internet markets, leaving the arena open to private firms.  Most ISP business people in 
Brazil confessed that, without the decree, they probably wouldn’t be in business. It is 
almost certainly the case that, as a result of the governance reforms, Internet services 
are far cheaper and delivered more quickly to more people than would have been the 
case under the state monopolies. Restructuring governance had real consequences for 
service delivery, and it contributed to real differences in performance (Wilson, 2005).  
Here, we can argue that the battle over governance in Brazil was conducted very much 
in line with what a MIG-L model predicts: strong social interaction among stakeholders, 
built on trust and cooperation, in which the outcome was a long lasting and robust 
structure of governance that shaped subsequent behaviours and performance in the 
national Internet market in Brazil.  
The second case study is Kenya, which is widely regarded as one of the most vibrant 
Internet governance communities in Africa. Participants from the media, business, civil 
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society, academia, and development sectors were invited by the government to create 
the KICTANet. According to Adam et al. (2007), KICTANet was specifically designed 
to welcome multistakeholder participation due to the ‘perceived strength and 
effectiveness in joint collaborative policy advocacy activities, which would be based on 
pooling skills and resources’ (p. 26) as opposed to wasting resources in ‘competing, 
overlapping advocacy’ (Munyua, 2016; p. 213). This resulted in a strong ICT sector that 
contributed substantially to the growth of Kenya’s economy, reportedly having been 
responsible for up to one quarter of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) over 
the past ten years (Munyua, 2016). Suitably, this validates the conceptual model “MIG-
L,” which predicts a causal relationship between the architecture of MIG-L on the one 
hand, and the subsequent performance of the Internet and the economy on the other. 
One can be more pointed: the more robust the structure of the Internet governance, the 
faster the rate of development of the Internet and of economic growth.  
These case studies show that Internet governance practices vary from one country to 
another, notably with respect to the role of governments. However, it shows (and “MIG-
L” posits) that governments are both necessary and inevitable to initiating and leading 
the process of multistakeholder Internet governance, even if the level and nature of their 
involvement differ from one country to another. Yet, the more robust the architecture of 
the governance, the better the performance of the Internet. 
Moreover, the extant empirical literature on stakeholder theory is supportive of a 
positive relationship between stakeholder-oriented management and performance, 
which is almost always measured in terms of financial returns. Most of this empirical 
literature took stakeholder performance as the independent variable, with economic 
performance as the dependent variable (Berman et al., 1999; Choi & Wang, 2009; 
Hillman & Keim, 2001). This thesis underpins this perspective and asserts the argument, 
found in stakeholder literature, that when stakeholder interests are overlapped or joined, 
performance is proportionally better (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Freeman, 1984; Freeman, 
Harrison & Wicks, 2007). Hence, the consensus around multistakeholder Internet 
governance as a suitable framework for economic growth, conceptualised in ‘MIG-L’, 
is also theoretically validated. The findings revealed unanimous support and 
endorsement from different stakeholders regardless of the density and complexity of the 
process, especially the relation between the government and other stakeholders and their 
respective roles.  
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As argued earlier, government regimes in developing countries oppose multistakeholder 
governance and make the case for their control on the Internet by citing their duty to 
protect their citizens from cybercrimes or even from terrorist acts. The debate on the 
role of governments in providing governance has had its share of controversy, especially 
concerning the extent and role that government and other stakeholders can effectively 
play. Globalisation theorists seem to argue that governance is a process dominated 
increasingly by governments. Conversely, what many globalisation theorists fail to 
reflect on is the state centric model of governing, which is illustrated by the work of 
Wiarda (2000) on corporatism. Accordingly, this model conceptualises non-
governmental involvement, but still gives government the capacity to ‘steer at a 
distance’ especially when it comes to national and security issues.  
 
7.4 Research Summary 
The literature on Internet governance presented in this thesis exists due to the 
significance and importance of Internet on all aspects of life, socially and economically.  
 An extensive review of the literature was conducted on the contemporary topic of 
multistakeholder Internet governance and its implications for Internet development and 
economic growth. While scholars agree that the Internet plays a significant role in and 
has a significant positive impact on economic growth (Heeks, 1999), Internet 
governance is still a highly contested term with various definitions (Hoffman, 2005). 
Additionally, even though the positive aspects of multistakeholder governance have 
been clearly identified, it faces the challenges posed by the role of government authority 
and politics in the governance process. However, in multistakeholder governance, the 
roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders are yet to be defined. 
Multistakeholderism has never been fully developed and is only beginning to be 
critically studied or evaluated (Raymond & DeNardis, 2005). 
Theoretically, chapter 2 investigated the cost transaction theory and economic theory to 
better understand the important role of the Internet in economic activities (Canback, 
1998), to study the impact of regulation on the economy (Majone, 1997) and to examine 
government involvement in regulatory policy (Stigler, 1971; Posner, 1971; Peltzman, 
1976). It also examined the changing roles of the government and other stakeholders by 
exploring stakeholder theory, Public Interest theory, Regime theory, and investigating 
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how organisational, societal and local actors build consensus around “Internet 
governance”, thus leading to these practices being accepted (Marshall et al., 2005). 
Chapter 2 also gave an overview of the political and economic environment of Lebanon 
directly affecting Internet governance. It provides a brief overview of the current 
monopoly in governance and of the status of the regulatory frame work and 
infrastructure. It also examines the assessments done by the World bank and the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) on the impact of the Internet on 
Lebanon’s economic growth.  
By studying and discussing the literature and existing studies, this research concluded 
that while researchers concentrate their investigations on global Internet governance, 
relatively few detailed studies of Internet governance at the national level have been 
carried out. Therefore, this research aims at making a secondary contribution to this 
growing literature by investigating the lacunae of research on national Internet 
governance, examining the social interaction of the stakeholders and its implications for 
Internet development and the country’s economic growth. 
Chapter 3 presented a conceptual model of multistakeholder governance, gleaned from 
the findings, that recognises better the Lebanese context. The proposed competing 
model “MIG-L” (figure 4.1), endorsed by the quantitative results, illustrates the 
dynamics and relationships between different stakeholders, especially the indisputable 
reality of the leading role of the government. Furthermore, the proposed model aims at 
helping explain the origins of ‘Internet governance’ and to make the term more explicit, 
contrasting with some of the arguments presented in literature. Encapsulating the 
literature and studies discussed in this thesis, the proposed conceptual model links the 
structure of governance to the development of the Internet and economic growth.  
To achieve the research objectives, chapter 4 offered a pragmatic epistemological 
approach for this mixed-methods research (qualitative and quantitative); this research 
paradigm employs a concurrent parallel data collection design. Goodson and Walker 
(1991) explain that the task of research is to make sense of what we know, and that is 
determined by the selection of our approach. According to Libarkin and Kurdziel 
(2002), both quantitative and qualitative methods are concerned with studying 
phenomena. 
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 This study deployed an online survey to generate quantitative data and semi-structured 
interviews to generate qualitative data. Purposive sampling leads to greater depth of 
information from a smaller number of carefully-selected cases, whereas probability 
sampling leads to greater breadth of information from a larger number of units selected 
to be representative of the population (Patton, 2002). For data comparison purposes, the 
quantitative and qualitative data were analysed and structured under four thematic sub-
areas: the current status of Internet infrastructure and who is in charge of it, the degree 
of involvement of different stakeholders in Internet policy, the stakeholders’ perceptions 
on multistakeholder Internet governance, and the stakeholders’ assessments on the 
impact of Internet governance on economic growth.  
Quantitatively, the online survey gathered 316 respondents from the five stakeholder 
groups: 39 respondents from the government, 102 from private sector, 78 from 
Academia, 40 from Technical community and International organisations and 34 from 
civil society. Quantitative data was analysed using the Statistical Package for Social 
Sciences (SPSS). For comparative analysis and detection of statistical significance, 
cross-tabulation with Pearson’s Chi-Square and ANOVA tests were used to determine 
if correlation exits between the five independent variables (government, private 
organisations, civil society, technical & International organisations and the academic 
community) and the two dependent variables (multistakeholder Internet governance and 
economic growth). Accordingly, statistical significance was used as a tool to examine 
the relations between the variables to investigate any difference in stakeholders’ views 
regarding the subject-matter. No statistical differences were found related to the 
perception of the different stakeholder groups on multistakeholderism as a suitable 
Internet governance framework and its positive impact on the country’s economy. 
However, a statistically significant difference was detected between the stakeholder 
groups on how they perceive the level of involvement of the government. The more a 
stakeholder was involved in and had common interests with the government, more the 
stakeholder resisted government withdrawal from the scene. 
To acquire qualitative data, this study deployed purposive semi-structured interviews to 
obtain the views and hear the voices of business decision-makers regarding Internet 
governance, thus backing the initial quantitative results. Thus, ten interviews were taken 
from the five identified stakeholders’ groups in addition to an interviewee representing 
the United Nations. The qualitative data were grouped into meaningful patterns/themes 
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that emerged from the research questions and from the data. The findings were 
categorised and organised in textual tables and charts to facilitate conclusion drawing. 
Through this process, the researcher was able to identify patterns and relationships 
observed within and across the stakeholder groups. 
Chapter 7 presents, compares, triangulates, interprets and discusses the quantitative and 
qualitative findings. The qualitative in-depth findings revealed important hidden 
information supporting the quantitative statistical results, underpinning some of the 
theoretical reasoning and contradicting others. It also validates and the conceptual 
model and presents a summary and conclusion of the study as well its outcome. It 
concludes by positing the strengths and limitations of the study and suggestions for 
future research.  
7.5 Research Outcome 
The findings of this research permit us to conclude - as do Qiang et al. (2009), 
Koutroumpis (2009), Scot (2012), Zaballos and Lopez (2012) and Koutroumpis (2018) 
- that broad Internet and economic growth have a significant positive relationship. It 
also confirms the positive correlation between improved quality of governance and 
economic growth (Keefer, 1997; Campos and Nugent, 1999; Kaufmann et al. 1999a and 
1999b; Mehanna et al., 2010; Han et al., 2014).  
The research concludes that Internet spurs countries’ economic development and 
growth. However, good governance for the Internet is indispensable for such 
development. As such, the study of Han and el. (2014) analyses the governance gap and 
its effect on economic growth and shows that governance matters to economic growth. 
This is in line with the work of Chauvet and Collier (2004), which shows that developing 
countries with poor quality of governance will lead to lower economic growth. 
The implication of these findings for Lebanon is significant. In order to achieve Internet 
development and an important level of economic impact, Internet governance requires 
the introduction of new regime with different approach. As such, the multistakeholder 
model could credibly be considered an innovative governance concept, part of a wider 
global debate about rethinking governance in a globalised world. The multistakeholder 
approach remains the dominant paradigm of Internet politics even if the categories 
employed differ from one author to another (Mathiason, 2009).  
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The research has identified the positions of the government and of non-governmental 
actors, their roles and interactions and their relative influence and ability to structure the 
regime. The findings revealed two patterns of relations with the government: partnership 
and confrontation. It is clear that whilst some elite non-governmental stakeholders have 
been inclined to develop alliances with the government in an attempt to gain influence 
and personal benefits, others have failed 
The question remains as to what extent the multistakeholder approach can be practiced 
or applicable in the current environment? With the advancement of multistakeholderism 
as a model in Internet governance, determining which governance model is appropriate 
will be a challenge. In Lebanon, in order to make a better environment for the Internet 
and to enhance economic development, government should involve stakeholders more 
effectively in a multistakeholder setting to improve collective responsibility, effective 
decision making, transparency and accountability. 
7.6 Research Impacts 
This study reveals that suitable multistakeholder Internet governance, aimed at 
removing the obstacles hindering Internet development, significantly influences a 
country’s economic development and growth. While this causal relationship is 
confirmed empirically by the literature and by different studies examined by this study, 
the political and practical impacts of this research are significant.  
The political structure in Lebanon and across the region is patriarchal and semi-
democratic - not to say authoritarian – in enforcing laws and policies. These laws and 
policies are developed with little to no public input. This is reflected in the Arab Internet 
Governance Forum (Arab IGF) structure initiated in Kuwait in November 2012, planned 
to be held annually. However, the commitment to multistakeholderism and its principles 
seemed to recede at the October 2013 forum in Algiers, where tension between the idea 
of multistakeholderism and its implementation began to metastasise. A line began to 
emerge between governments and other stakeholders, creating a kind of binary-
stakeholderism (SMEX, 2017a) 
With no surprises, the outcome of the Global InformatIon Society Watch report, 
published in 2017, converges with the findings of this research. Quantitatively, the 
statistically significant difference detected within the stakeholders’ perception towards 
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government participation in Internet governance confirm this trend of binary-
stakeholderism. The qualitative findings endorsed the quantitative results, revealing that 
government is in charge and can be a facilitator or barrier depending how it assesses its 
interests. Moreover, the findings of the research revealed that even though stakeholders 
call for less government involvement in the governance process, they are practically 
convinced that government will remain the one-man-show in the areas of to national 
interests and sovereignty. Therefore, this research posits that stakeholders may need to 
concentrate more on the overall benefit of the multistakeholder process, accepting the 
government’s upper hand in this process.  
More specifically, the research supports the stakeholders’ position accepting the 
government as the central pillar of the multistakeholder process to keep the process alive 
and evolving. The first impact on the national political and practical scene was the 
adoption of this thesis outcome and its conceptual model by the Lebanese government 
in the creation of the Lebanon Internet Governance Forum (LIGF) on December 8, 2017. 
In line with the findings of this thesis, the director general of operations and maintenance 
at the Ministry of Telecommunications in Lebanon was appointed the chair of the LIGF 
(SMEX, 2017b) 
On the regional level, the researcher was called to reflect on his research argument and 
findings at the Global InformatIon Society Watch report 2017. The researcher quoted: 
“We should try to compromise. No-one said that the umbrella organisations or the 
governments should be left out of the equation, but other sectors need to be involved in 
the executive process, and I personally don’t mind the upper hand being for the 
government representatives, because the Arab world has its nature. We just want true 
inclusion of all stakeholders” (Global InformatIon Society Watch, 2017; p.50). 
7.7 Strengths and Limitations of the Research 
The research has several key strengths. The conceptual research model for this study is 
based upon extensive review of prior empirical research on the Internet and the impact 
of its governance on economic performance. Primary quantitative and qualitative data 
were gathered specifically for the study, and statistical techniques were used to analyse 
the data. However, this research has a number of limitations which must be taken into 
consideration in evaluating the above results and their implications. 
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The World Summit on Information Society (WSIS) held in 2005 in Tunisia published a 
working definition for Internet governance (IG) in paragraph 34: “the development and 
application by governments, the private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, 
of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes that 
shape the evolution of the Internet” (WSIS, 2005b, p. 6). However, there is still no 
academic agreement on the definition of Internet governance; the concept, and 
especially the relationship between different stakeholders including the government, is 
still unclear among academics (Hofmann, 2004). Moreover, De La Chapelle (2011), 
argues that the wording “in their respective roles” in the definition was a perfect example 
of what diplomats usually describe as constructive ambiguity, i.e. agreement on terms 
that conceals a disagreement of substance. Accordingly, this constructive ambiguity has 
become one of the great impediments to the success of the multistakeholder model. This 
thesis acknowledges that multistakeholderism is subject to power struggles in which 
stakeholders do not have equal power, and the viability of multistakeholderism is not 
determined by its inclusiveness alone but arguably by the balance of authority. That 
said, the focus of this research remained strictly upon the interaction of governmental 
and non-governmental stakeholders and did not discuss or investigate the relative 
power, roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders. 
Additionally, the Tunis debates revealed the complexity and multifaceted nature of 
Internet governance, which implicates issues ranging from human rights to economic 
aspects of the Internet. Human rights and freedom of expression have been central to 
the WSIS process since its inception, since the Internet has helped develop values of 
democracy and freedom in many parts of the world (WSIS, 2005b). For the purpose of 
this research, these terms were not addressed by this thesis. 
From the perspective of generalisability, this research is conducted from the perspective 
of a single developing country, Lebanon. Therefore, any attempt to generalize the 
findings to other developing countries needs to be verified.  
While acknowledging the above limitations, this research unveils the different 
stakeholder groups’ views and understanding of multistakeholder Internet governance, 
proposing a conceptual framework that strives to reshape the relationship among the 
different stakeholders to ensure the most appropriate and efficient use of the Internet to 
achieve the country’s economic development.  
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7.8 Further Researches 
As this thesis studied Internet governance from the perspective of a developing country 
at the national level in the extant global academic literature and researches, the study 
sought to provide new directions for academics for future research as well. This research 
strove to take new challenge using new construct measures with the triangulation of 
quantitative and qualitative data. This provides a new approach and a solid foundation 
for further research. Hence, two suggestions are made for further research. 
First, this thesis recognises that the actual literature on multistakeholderism and Internet 
governance raise definitional complications and lead to misconception by scholars. One 
of the most problematic aspects of the multistakeholder approach is the very meaning 
of “participation” in political processes and the underlying vision of governance 
(Padovani, 2005). Thus, additional empirical studies on stakeholders’ roles and 
responsibilities in Internet governance would benefit the research community as well as 
help governments and other stakeholders understand their mandates and objectives. 
Second, in this context, Raymond and DeNardis (2015) argue that multistakeholder 
governance is produced by variation on at least two dimensions: the types of actors 
involved and the nature of authority relations between actors. While multilateralism 
admittedly combines a wide variety of actors, multistakeholderism differs from it in the 
authority relations between actors. Hence, there exist several possible scenarios of 
multistakeholderism depending on the relationship between the actors. Adopting this 
stance, further research is needed to maximise the applicability of these different 
multistakeholderism scenarios to empirical cases. 
7.9 Conclusion 
The research has examined how an environment of multistakeholder governance drives 
and fosters both Internet development and economic growth. While there are different 
schools of thought on Internet governance, this thesis strives to incorporate an additional 
direction aiming at giving more in-depth insight on Internet governance at a national 
level, underpinned by the literature and theoretical framework, which results in 
developing a new conceptual model in an empirical setting. 
Contrary to many reviews, critiques and popular assumptions, governance of the 
Internet remains firmly under the control of the government. Any insinuation that 
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political power has been diffused in to other sectors, and that government is no longer 
the principal actor, is simply unfounded. The thesis explored these arguments and found 
them to be no more than myths.  
However, non-governmental stakeholders can play a varied and important role in the 
Internet’s governance, particularly in areas requiring technical expertise, which the 
government lacks. The thesis argues that the distribution of power to these non-
governmental stakeholders is a sign of government strength and not weakness, since 
government will stay the prime actor and take the credit for any success.  
Nevertheless, the concept of multistakeholder Internet governance is still very vague, 
and the roles and responsibilities of different actors are yet to be defined. This thesis 
recognises that multistakeholderism is too often employed uniformly and even 
uncritically. Just as it is a misnomer to speak of Internet governance as a single practice, 
it is also a misnomer to speak of the multistakeholder model as a single exercise. 
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Appendix	A	
	The	Online	Survey	
 
 
 
Dear online survey participant, 
 
 
I would like to thank you in advance for your participation in this questionnaire, which is part of 
my doctoral research (DBA). Your responses are very important to my dissertation thesis. 
 
Your involvement in this research is voluntary. You have the right to withdraw from the research 
project, at any time without prejudice, up to the point that the data has been aggregated and or 
analysed. Data will be treated with full confidentiality and if published, every effort will be made 
to ensure it will not be identified as your data or responses to the questionnaire. For more 
information, please don't hesitate to email me on: c030310c@student.staffs.ac.uk. 
 
My supervisor Dr. Anastasis Petrou can be reached at: Anastasis.Petrou@staffs.ac.uk. 
 
Brindley Building, B275 
Staffordshire University 
College Road 
Stoke-on-Trent 
Staffordshire ST4 2DE 
 
The survey should only take 10 minutes to complete. Please click ‘Next’ button below to begin. 
 
 
Best Regards, 
Chafic Chaya 
Mapping Multistakeholderism in Internet Governance: Implications for 
 
 
	190	
 
 
 
	191	
 
tration of Internet for Economic Development in Lebanon 
	192	
 
 
Mapping Multistakeholderism in Internet Governance: Implications for 
	193	
The 
 Administration of Internet for Economic Development in Lebanon 
	194	
 
 
	195	
Appendix	B	
Semi-Structured Interview 
 
 
1. What is your understanding for Internet governance? 
2. What does the term “multistakeholder” means to you? 
3. What are the principal issues of Internet governance in Lebanon? Please list 
them in order of importance. 
4. How is the Internet governed in Lebanon currently?  
5. Who are the decision makers and what are the decision-making processes that 
influence the evolution and use of the Internet in Lebanon? 
6. How easy is it for different stakeholder groups to participate and contribute in 
Internet policy and governance in Lebanon? How do they interact with one 
another? 
7. How importance and effective will be the national Internet governance 
environment for you as a stakeholder? Challenges and opportunities? 
8. Is the Internet important for Lebanon’s development and growth economy? 
9. In your opinion, how can multistakeholder Internet governance best support 
Lebanon's economic development? 
10. How you describe the current infrastructure status and why? How would you 
assess the following Internet related issues in Lebanon (very poor - poor – 
modest - good – very good): 
a. Access to the Internet  
b. Affordability of the Internet 
c. Availability of local Internet content 
d. Cyber security, data protection and privacy  
e. Regulation and policymaking by government  
f. Broadband policy and connectivity   
g. Domain name management 
11. Do you think there are efficient and effective mechanisms in place at national 
level to address the Internet-related challenges you have identified above? 
 
 
